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This dissertation examines the relationship between political institutions and development poli-
cies across a wide array of policy arenas. It consists of three essays. In the first essay, I examine
how corruption in political institutions affects citizens’ attitudes towards proposed policy reforms
that should yield long-run benefits. I argue that where corruption in political institutions reduces
citizens’ benefits from existing programs, governmental promises to deliver benefits via reforms
are less credible. Thus, citizens will cling to inefficient policies not because they are unable to
recognize the benefits of reform but because they do not trust political institutions to implement
reforms in ways that will benefit them in practice. I use this logic to explain why citizens fre-
quently resist attempts to reform the economically and environmentally costly practice of setting
domestic gasoline prices below market prices. To reveal these patterns, I rely on original survey
and administrative data from Indonesia. The second essay maintains the focuses on the quality of
political institutions and natural resource governance but from a more macro perspective. In this
essay, I argue that political regimes and political time horizons shape financial arrangements be-
tween governments and multinational oil companies. This essentially asks the reverse of a central
question in comparative politics. Rather than asking how oil income affects political institutions, I
ask how political institutions motivate politicians to make policy choices that increase or decrease
the government’s access to oil income over time. To do so, I utilize an original dataset on financial
arrangements between host countries and multinational oil companies, as reflected in historically
confidential oil contracts. The final essay travels to a different substantive area of development
policy, yet allows for a critical role for political institutions. This essay argues that the relation-
ship between developing country governments and foreign aid donors should be conditional on
the quality of political institutions, with aid donors giving countries with institutions better able
to commit to selecting policies that promote development wider latitude to direct foreign aid re-
sources towards local priorities. Instead, I find that political and security alliances shape whether
donors give developing country governments more “ownership” over aid flows. Overall, the dis-
sertation deepens understanding of the relationship between the quality of political institutions
and policies within developing countries, while offering insights into contemporary policy debates
about natural resource governance, environmental politics, and development aid.
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Chapter 1
How Corruption Drives Support for Fossil
Fuel Subsidies: Evidence from Indonesia
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1.1 Introduction
Governments in countries as diverse as China, Egypt, Indonesia, India, Nigeria, Russia, Togo, and
Thailand, among others, subsidize the price of fossil fuel to consumers. Subsidies are not only
economically expensive—on a post-tax basis, fossil fuel subsidies sum to nearly $2 trillion annu-
ally, or, 2.5 percent of global GDP—they are environmentally corrosive—eliminating fossil fuel
subsidies would reduce global C02 emissions by 15 percent (IMF 2013: 1). Fossil fuel subsidies
distort resource allocation by propping up energy-inefficient firms and industries. In low-income
countries, fuel subsidies also tend to be reinforce inequality, by providing the urban, car-driving
elite with greater benefits than poorer, rural households. Further, fuel subsidies impose significant
financial strain on government budgets, crowding out spending on on priority policy areas like
capital investments, health, education, and social safety nets. Given the economic and environ-
mental costs of fossil fuel subsidies, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has identified fossil
fuel pricing reform as key to long-term fiscal stability (2013, 2014).
Despite the clear economic and environmental benefits that countries could reap by properly
pricing fossil fuels, reform attempts often lead to popular resistance. Increases in energy prices
triggered riots that ultimately toppled Indonesia’s long-time dictator Suharto in 1998 and Kyrgyzs-
tan’s President Bakiyev in 2010. The Burmese government’s announcement of fuel price hikes
in 2007 led to widespread anti-governmental protests (Human Rights Watch 2007). A nationwide
strike over the removal of fuel subsidies brought Nigeria to a standstill in 2012 and ultimately
pushed the government to restore the subsidy. While many scholars make convincing economic
and environmental cases for reducing energy subsidies (e.g. Arze del Granado, Coady and Gilling-
ham 2012; Coady et al. 2006; Davis 2014; IMF 2013, 2014; IEA 2011; World Bank 2009), the
question of how to reduce energy subsidies without causing social upheaval remains unresolved.
Why do citizens often reject reforms that can yield economic and environmental benefits? Do
citizens really prefer spending on fuel subsidies to other forms of pro-poor and pro-growth spend-
ing? A common view is that citizen short-sightedness is both a cause of the initial policy—citizens
demand income assistance and do not consider budget constraints (Sachs 1990)—and a cause of
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failure to reform—citizens weigh the short-term costs of price adjustment more heavily than the
long-term gains from more sound economic policies. With this in mind, some scholars advocate
enacting pro-market reforms “by stealth” (e.g. Varshney 1998). Essentially, the argument goes,
governments can successfully push through economic reforms while the public is “distracted” by
issues like ethnic conflict. Even if this Machiavellian reform strategy were successful in some
cases, it is least likely to succeed when reforming policies whose effects are direct, obvious, short-
run, and widespread (ibid.). Removing subsidies on fuel prices affects citizens’ consumption both
directly (at the pump) and indirectly (in the cost of all consumer goods that utilize fuel as an input
or incur transportation costs); its effect is obvious to citizens, who observe prices at the pump; and,
the effect is both immediate and widespread. In short, it is hard to imagine an economic reform
that is more necessary for governments’ fiscal well-being and more susceptible to mass resistance.
Yet, citizens do not always reject subsidy reforms on basic commodities. Recent Afrobarom-
eter polling finds that over 50% of citizens in African nations support market pricing on basic
commodities like food and fuel (Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2005: chapter 5). Fuel sub-
sidy reform was a key issue in Indonesia’s 2014 presidential election. At the core of the debate
was citizens’ concern that the government’s high spending on fuel subsidies–which amounted to
over 25% of government expenditures in 2012–crowds out important long-term investments in ed-
ucation, health care and infrastructure. Citizens ultimately elected President Joko Widodo even as
he promised to cut fuel subsidies to enable more pro-poor and pro-growth spending. Further, when
President Widodo introduced fuel subsidy reforms after his inauguration, they were not met with
the same mass resistance as similar reforms initiatives in Indonesia by the prior administration in
2012.1
The electoral promises made by President Widodo align closely with the prevailing policy wis-
dom on how to reform fuel subsidies without provoking mass resistance. Articulated most clearly
1Although President Widodo, widely known as “Jokowi”, has been widely praised for eliminating fuel subsidies,
the success of his initiative is yet to be determined. Jokowi did increase automotive fuel prices in December 2014,
yet reduced them again in January 2015. Low oil prices mean that the market price for gasoline is now much closer
to the administratively-set price of gasoline in Indonesia, but the price of gasoline is still set administratively. It will
be difficult to tell whether or not Indonesia has successfully reformed the policy of subsidizing gasoline prices until
market prices rise again.
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by the IMF (2013), the prevailing policy wisdom is to replace spending on fuel subsidies with more
direct spending on income assistance for the poor, like direct cash transfers. However, even when
governments promise to replace fuel subsidies with more spending on the poor, citizens sometimes
reject reform. In a reform initiative in Indonesia in 2012, then-president Susilo Bambang Yudhoy-
ono similarly promised an expansion of spending on social safety nets, including on direct cash
transfers and subsidized rice for the poor, in exchange for a 20% increase in the price of petrol
at the pump, yet mass protests ultimately blocked the reform. Why did one reform initiative in
the same country fail and another succeed, even though promises to supplant spending on fuel
subsidies with compensation for the poor were similar?
This paper argues that, when citizens reject subsidy reform, they do not do so because they
fail to value the potential benefits from shifts in government spending away from fuel subsidies
and towards other forms of spending that better promote the welfare of the poor and the coun-
try’s long-term economic growth. Instead, citizens reject subsidy reform when the promise to shift
spending in ways that will actually benefit citizens lacks credibility. In the example above, Presi-
dent Widodo’s unique reputation for being “apart” from the corruption that plagued former regimes
no doubt played a role in enhancing the credibility of his reform promises.
This paper focuses specifically on the role that local governance institutions play in shaping
citizens’ attitudes towards reform. It does so, first, by noting that fuel subsidies are one of many
potential tools for governments to redistribute wealth within society. Like other forms of social
policy, fuel subsidies are extensive government interventions in the economy that reduce house-
holds’ exposure to market risk and provide income assistance. Yet, energy subsidies are far simpler
to administer than other, more efficient forms of income assistance. Delivering cash and in-kind
benefits to the poor requires transferring valuable benefits through potentially corrupt local bureau-
cracies. By comparison, fuel subsidies are typically distributed by national oil companies, thereby
bypassing bureaucracies and subnational governments altogether. Individuals can access the eco-
nomic benefit of the subsidy directly at the pump, without having to appeal to local politicians and
bureaucrats.
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I argue that the tradeoff between economic efficiency and administrative simplicity is central to
understanding public support for fossil fuel subsidies. On the whole, poor citizens prefer to receive
income assistance through targeted social assistance programs, like cash transfers and targeted in-
kind benefits. They do not universally support government spending on fuel subsidies: in fact,
39 percent of respondents in the sample wish to decrease government spending on fuel subsidies.
When local politicians are corrupt, however, poor citizens are more likely to instead support fuel
subsidies. Thus, the quality of local institutions forms a key barrier to increasing citizens’ support
for subsidy reforms.
To reveal these patterns, I rely on a combination of household survey data and administra-
tive data from 572 villages across Indonesia. To measure local institutional performance, I uti-
lize household-reported receipts of benefits from social assistance programs to estimate the total
amount of program benefits accruing to households within a village. I then compare this with ad-
ministrative data on the amount of benefits allocated to a particular village to derive an estimate for
leakages in social assistance programs at the village level. Using this method, I estimate that 26
percent of the overall economic benefits from the primary social assistance program in Indonesia
go missing. However, there is significant subnational variation in corruption: I estimate no cor-
ruption for nearly 30 percent of the villages in the sample, while a handful of villages experience
program leakages close to 100 percent.
Variation in local institutional performance is strongly related to levels of support for energy
subsidies. On the whole, poor citizens prefer the national government to allocate resources to
targeted social assistance programs, like cash transfers and targeted in-kind benefits. However,
when local politicians are corrupt and divert resources from these programs, poor citizens are
instead more likely to support fuel subsidies, which are less vulnerable to diversions. This is true
even if they do not own vehicles and do not directly purchase subsidized fuel.
However, it is possible that villages with greater local institutional corruption differ from less
corrupt villages in ways which could also affect political attitudes. To alleviate this concern, I use
matching methods to ensure comparability between villages with and without corruption in the
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implementation of targeted transfer programs. This helps to confirm the causal interpretation of
the results.
Throughout the paper, I focus primarily on the attitudes of poor citizens towards automotive
fuel subsidies. I focus on poor citizens for two main reasons. First, politicians often justify failure
to remove fuel subsidies out of concern for the poor, and it is worth understanding poor citizens’
preferences about this type of spending. Second, the prevailing policy wisdom is to replace spend-
ing on fuel subsidies with direct cash transfers to the poor. This paper examines how poor citizens
actually evaluate this tradeoff. This paper also focuses exclusively on automotive fuel subsidies,
or, the retail price of gasoline at the pump, which is typically the most politically salient way that
governments subsidize the consumption of fuel. And, in the case of Indonesia examined here,
automotive fuel subsidies are the main target of political debates about the role of fuel subsidies in
the budget.
This research extends and brings together three disparate literatures. First, it extends our un-
derstanding of the scope for costly reforms in low-income, democratic countries. Contrary to
popular conceptions, I find that citizens do not universally support fuel subsidies and many are
willing to support reduced government spending on them. However, support for fuel subsidies
increases when the government’s ability to redistribute wealth in other ways is compromised by
lack of institutional capacity and corruption. This shows that the standard policy suggestion of
enacting reforms by compensating the losers from the reforms may not be appropriate in countries
where administrative capacity is low. When citizens do not trust that the government is capable of
compensating them for losses, they are less likely to support the reform.
Second, this research expands our understanding of the link between local governance and na-
tional policy. A large literature explores the relationship between corruption and political attitudes
by uncovering partial correlations between self-reported perceptions of corruption and attitudes
(e.g. Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Chang and Chu 2006; Clausen, Kraay and Nyiri 2011; Selig-
son 2002). Yet, in decentralized countries, where subnational governments are responsible for im-
plementing policies, the local political environment may substantially shape citizens’ views of the
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national system (Hiskey and Seligson 2003; Weitz-Shapiro 2008). I extend this logic by arguing
that local institutional performance can also shape attitudes towards national policies. I improve
inference by estimating corruption directly (rather than using self-reported measures) and by using
matching methods. Understanding how individuals’ actual experience with policy implementation
feeds back into their support for social policies is also an important and relatively under-explored
relationship in the literature on individual support for social policy (Campbell 2012).
Finally, this research contributes to our understanding of energy and environmental policy.
Whereas there is a large and robust literature on the political effects of energy production and
resource endowments (e.g. Colgan 2010; Haber and Menaldo 2011; Liou and Musgrave 2014;
Rudra and Jensen 2011; Morrison 2009; Ross 2001, 2012), there remains “a surprising paucity of
published work. . . on the politics of energy demand and supply management” (Hughes and Lipscy
2013: 452). The preferences of individual energy consumers remains a particularly neglected area
(ibid.: 460). Yet, in developing countries with weak institutions, public attitudes can determine
whether or not environmental policies are implemented at all (Greenstone and Hanna 2014). The
research presented here shows that variation in institutional weakness within countries is also be
an important cause of public support for environmental policy.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 evaluates the literature on fuel subsidies and finds
that the arguments for why politicians initially enact fuel subsidies do not shed much light on why
fuel subsidies are so difficult to reform. To understand prospects for reform, we need to understand
citizen attitudes. Section 3 provides an institutional theory of citizen attitudes towards fuel sub-
sidies. Section 4 discusses the history of social policy and fuel subsidy reform in the Indonesian
context. Section 5 reviews the research design, data collection, and measurement strategies for the
key dependent and independent variables. Section 6 presents the results from the observational
analysis, and Section 7 presents results from the matching analysis. Section 8 concludes.
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1.2 Motivation: Why examine the demand side?
Subsidizing fuel consumption is one of many potential ways that the government can intervene in
the economy to provide citizens with income assistance and protection against market risk. This
paper focuses on consumer automotive fuel subsidies, governmental policies that lower the price
of automotive fuels paid by end users.2 Scholars propose a number of reasons for why govern-
ments may choose this policy over other means of distributing wealth. These explanations are
rooted in supply- vs. demand-side arguments (Victor 2009). Supply-side arguments focus on the
motivations of politicians to provide subsidies and tend to discount the role of citizen preferences
in policy formation. Demand-side arguments emphasize citizen demand for fuel subsidies as a
key motivation for government provision of fuel subsidies. While supply-side arguments provide
insights into why governments initially choose fuel subsidies as a redistributive tool, they fall short
in explaining why governments fail to change strategies once fuel subsidies become a fiscal bur-
den. Demand-side explanations are better suited to shedding light on the prospects for reform, yet
existing explanations may over-estimate citizen opposition to reform.
There are two main supply-side arguments for the prevalence of fuel subsidies across countries.
For one, governments may be more likely to supply fuel subsidies in countries where energy is
cheap and widely available. For countries that produce and refine energy domestically, the costs
of the subsidy are born primarily as an opportunity cost (of not selling fuel products at market
prices) and do not necessarily enter the budget as would other forms of spending. Further, the
costs of providing the subsidy covary with the size of oil revenues: when oil prices are high, the
cost of the subsidy rises, but so do oil revenues to the state. This eases the fiscal pressure of
the subsidy. Empirical studies find that major oil producers are the most likely to subsidize fuel
(Cheon, Urpelainen and Lackner 2013; Gupta et al. 2002).
Second, Victor (2009) argues that consumer fuel subsidies are a comparatively attractive tool
2The size of the pretax subsidy is the gap between the domestic retail price of the fuel product and the economic
price of the product, which is determined by the wholesale price of the refined fuel product on the international
market; the costs of transportation, distribution, and storage; and any profit margins by retail outlets. Thus, the cost of
the subsidy for government budgets varies with world energy prices and, for countries that import refined fuel products
for domestic consumption, with exchange rates.
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for governments of countries that lack the administrative capacity to redistribute wealth by other
means. Consumer subsidies on fuel are a highly visible means of distributing patronage to citizens,
and they can be distributed using the existing capacity of national oil companies. These state-
owned oil companies have been called a “state within a state” because they are often more capable
actors than the state itself and perform many of the state’s governance functions (Mommer 2002).
Fuel subsidies in this view are an attractive policy tool to administratively weak states that have
capable national oil companies. Empirically, Cheon, Lackner, and Urpelainen (2014) find that
states with national oil companies are more likely to subsidize fuel.
Notably, Victor (2009) pushes the supply-side argument further, arguing that demand-side ex-
planations are not fruitful for explaining the prevalence of consumer subsidies. Because consumers
are a dispersed interest group, they are unlikely to overcome transaction costs to organize in favor
of subsidies. He points to a “populist paradox”: fuel subsidies are common amongst autocracies,
not just democracies. Why would the regimes least susceptible to citizen input subsidize fuel if
fuel subsidies were a function of citizen demand? Thus, he explains the use of subsidies as the
choice of political leaders.
These supply-side explanations, however, do not yield much insight when considering why
fuel subsidies are so difficult to repeal. Governments continue to fund subsidies even when energy
is no longer cheap compared to other forms of wealth distribution. As declining production and
growing domestic consumption of energy resources push countries like Indonesia from being an
energy exporter to an energy importer, countries frequently fail to roll back subsidies. Energy
exporters that lack refining capacity also have to import refined fuel products at market prices,
meaning that even net energy exporters can face intense fiscal pressures to reform. Nigeria, for
example, is an oil exporter yet imports over 85 percent of the refined fuel products consumed
domestically (Siddig et al. 2014). Despite intense fiscal pressure to reform, Nigeria remains a
large fuel subsidizer. While the relative abundance of cheap energy may initially motivate major
oil producers to utilize energy subsidies as a means of redistributing wealth, this does not explain
why these countries fail to shift strategies as the fiscal burdens of the subsidy rises. Further, if fuel
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subsidies were primarily a function of politician-demand, then why do politicians attempt, and fail,
to reform? Politicians have tried to reduce fuel subsidies—lending evidence that political leaders
funding fuel subsidies do not always want them in place—only to be blocked by strong protest and
opposition from citizens. During the 2012 oil price increase alone, the governments of Indonesia,
Nigeria, Sudan, and Yemen all attempted fuel subsidy reform. In the face of strong opposition and
protests, all four attempts were reversed.3
Given the role of protests in reversing reform attempts, understanding when and why citizens
demand fuel subsidies is essential to evaluating prospects for reform. The literature on citizen-state
relations in oil-producing countries offers a more citizen-centric explanation for the prevalence and
persistence of fuel subsidies. Classic descriptions of the rentier state depict a kind of oil-based so-
cial contract, under which politicians utilize patronage and highly visible public spending projects,
of which subsidized fuel is a prominent example, to relieve pressures for greater accountability
(e.g. Beblawi and Luciani 1987; Mahdavi 1970). As long as politicians continue to deliver patron-
age, citizens do not hold governments accountable for poor performance. However, the literature
on resource-rich states also notes that citizens can over-demand patronage relative to government
resources. Resource revenues foster “a distinctive form of ‘fiscal illusion’ whereby the perception
that someone. . . else is shouldering the tax burden reinforces societal support for unbridled state
spending” (Jones Luong and Weinthal 2010: 65). In other words, citizens care less about the ef-
ficiency of public spending and government performance so long as they receive visible benefits
from resource wealth. Fuel subsidies are a particularly visible way of delivering these benefits.
Based on this logic, Ross (2012: ch 3) offers a different explanation for Victor’s “populist para-
dox.” He argues that autocratic regimes may be more susceptible to citizen protests against the
removal of fuel subsidies. They keep fuel subsidies in place because they fear being overthrown.
In these accounts, governments continue to provide fuel subsidies even when their fiscal costs grow
because citizens in resource-producing countries have unrealistically high demands from govern-
ment budgets and failure to meet these demands poses risks for politicians.
3Indonesia initiated other reform efforts in 2013 and 2014 which were successful in raising government-set fuel
prices, though the government continues to administratively set the price of automotive fuel at the pump.
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Yet, even in resource-rich states, there is a high fiscal opportunity cost to spending on fuel
subsidies. Indonesia is a prime example. The Indonesian government spends more on fuel sub-
sidies than on education, health, and social protection combined (IISD 2012). Do citizens really
not want greater spending on these priority areas? Or, are citizens insensitive to the idea of budget
constraints? We widely expect citizens to reject pricing reform, despite the fiscal and environmen-
tal costs of subsidies. Yet, according to Afrobarometer, a majority of citizens of African countries
support paying market prices for basic commodities to reduce shortages, even though market prices
will be higher than government-administered prices (Bratton, Matte, and Gyimah-Boadi 2005: ch
4). We know relatively little about citizens’ policy preferences and the sort of tradeoffs they find
acceptable with regards to fuel subsidies, but there may be more flexibility in citizen attitudes
towards basic commodity subsidies than is typically assumed.
Why do we assume that citizens support government spending on subsidized fuel products at
the expense of investments in education and health care? And, to what extent is this assumption
true? In accordance with the idea that understanding citizens’ attitudes towards reform is an im-
portant precursor to understanding governments’ scope for reform, the rest of the paper offers and
tests a theory for why citizens support fuel subsidies.
1.3 An institutional explanation for citizen attitudes
This paper argues that local institutions are key to shaping citizens’ attitudes towards fuel subsidy
reform. Where local institutions perform poorly, citizens are less likely to trust the government
and less likely to believe that increases in governmental spending in other areas will ultimately
benefit them. I note that the economic benefit from fuel subsidies is delivered to citizens in a
fundamentally different way compared to other governmental policies. Because fuel subsidies are
delivered outside of typical bureaucratic channels, they are particularly valuable to citizens who
live in areas where those bureaucratic channels are weak.
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The central government must delegate a range of governing activities, from tax collection to
policy implementation, to local bureaucrats on a daily basis. Whenever governing authority is
delegated, it opens up the potential for local bureaucrats to exploit their position, diverting public
resources for private gain. Where corruption in local institutions interferes with the delivery of
services, it opens up a gap between commitments of resources at the national level and delivery
of services at the local level. Potential for corruption is particularly high in the case of targeted
assistance programs. Constraints on the ability to find beneficiaries and deliver benefits to them
often requires the involvement of local officials, giving them implicit control over program imple-
mentation (Jaspars and Shoham 1999). Thus, while decentralization has the potential in theory to
improve service delivery by bringing responsibility for service delivery closer to users, it can result
in over-providing benefits to local elites at the expense of the poor when local elites are “captured”
(Bardhan and Mookherjee 2005). Malesky, Nguyen, and Tran (2014) find that the primary benefit
of recentralizing public service delivery in Vietnam was removing corrupt local councils from the
policy-making process. Corruption in the implementation of targeted transfer programs in partic-
ular can be so costly that it eliminates the potential benefits from redistributive policies (Olken
2006).
However, decentralization of service delivery does not automatically lead to corruption. Even
in countries widely perceived as corrupt, there is significant subnational variation in the extent
of corruption (see Golden and Picci 2005 on Italy; Olken 2006 on Indonesia; and Reinikka and
Svensson 2004 on Uganda). Thus, an important prerequisite for testing the relationship between
corruption and attitudes is establishing the level and variation of corruption in the sample.
Where corruption corrodes public service delivery, citizens can lose trust in government. By
contrast, when institutions achieve high policy performance, citizens can reward governments with
trust. The idea that citizens’ trust in government is based on their evaluation of the institutional
performance is supported by a large literature on the effects of corruption on political trust (An-
derson and Tverdova 2003; Chang and Chu 2006; Easton 1965; Ellinas and Lamprianou 2014;
Hakhverdian and Mayne 2012; Seligson 2002). However, citizens do not just make their per-
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formance assessments based on the actions of the national government. Instead, the majority of
citizens’ direct interactions with the state occur locally, with local politicians and bureaucrats. This
is especially true when service delivery is heavily decentralized. Thus, the performance of local
institutions in particular can influence attitudes towards political systems (Hiskey and Seligson
2003; Weitz-Shapiro 2008).
I extend the logic that institutional performance shapes citizens’ attitudes towards government
by arguing that institutional performance also shapes citizens’ attitudes towards the policies de-
livered by those institutions. The quality of local institutions shapes citizens’ experiences with
government services, like education, health care, and targeted social benefits. However, the quality
of local institutions notably does not shape citizens’ experiences with fuel subsidies. Fuel sub-
sidies are not delivered through typical bureaucratic channels. Instead, fuel subsidies are usually
delivered by national oil companies directly to fuel distribution points (e.g. gasoline stations), and
access to the subsidy is universal. Citizens’ ability to access the economic benefit from the subsidy
thus cannot be restricted by local politicians. Universal and transparent access to an economic
benefit can be particularly valued when the criteria to access to targeted programs are opaque and
access is controlled by politicians. Even if the institution that delivers the fuel subsidies is itself
corrupt, this high-level corruption rarely restricts citizens’ ability to access the subsidy or the size
of the economic benefit that they can derive from the subsidy.4 This is in contrast to when there is
corruption amongst the local politicians through which the national government delivers the ben-
efits from a direct cash transfer; in this case, corruption directly shapes citizens’ experience with
the program.
Trust in local institutions is particularly important when citizens are considering prospective
economic reforms. Where the quality of local institutions and local service delivery is high, I argue,
citizens are more likely to accept fuel pricing reform, because the political promise that savings
4In Indonesia, subsidized fuel is frequently smuggled out of the country and sold at international prices (the subsi-
dized price of fuel in Indonesia is only 50 percent of the cost of fuel in neighboring Malaysia and Singapore) (Lingga
2014). Indeed, when the Suharto regime initiated fuel price hikes during the deregulation of the 1980s, the public saw
price hikes as evidence of Pertamina’s mismanagement and corruption. In other words, low fuel prices were seen as a
check on corruption (Soesastro 1989).
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from reduced spending on fuel subsidies will translate into long-term benefits for citizens is more
credible. These citizens are more accustomed to benefitting from governmental spending and have
higher levels of trust in government. By contrast, citizens that experience poor local institutions
and service delivery are less likely to believe that any savings the government gets from reducing
fuel subsidies would improve their welfare. Where local service delivery is poor, citizens are more
likely to see fuel pricing reform as a net negative: they may lose the economic benefit they derive
from the subsidy without gaining any benefits from potential increases in governmental spending
on programs delivered through local institutions.
In sum, corruption shapes attitudes towards fuel subsidy reform by affecting governments’
ability to effectively deliver income assistance by other means. Where local officials fail to de-
liver benefits from targeted assistance programs, households that would otherwise support more
efficient forms of government spending instead support fuel subsidies. Fuel subsidies are com-
paratively attractive to citizens living in areas where local officials are corrupt because they are
delivered outside of typical bureaucratic channels. I expect that corruption will primarily affect
the attitudes of those that directly experience corruption (i.e. the poorer households that are the
intended beneficiaries of government transfers). This paper provides a test of this argument.
1.3.1 Rival Explanations and Confounds
This paper argues that corruption reduces trust in the local institutions that deliver social assistance
programs and, through this mechanism, increases their support for government spending on fuel
subsidies. However, an observed effect of corruption on attitudes could function through a different
mechanism (other than or in addition to trust in local institutions) or it could arise because another
factor simultaneously shapes both corruption and attitudes.
Corruption could shape attitudes through an economic self-interest rather than a trust mecha-
nism. While I argue that corruption shapes political attitudes towards government spending pri-
marily by affecting citizens’ trust in the local institutions that deliver social assistance programs,
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corruption could also affect attitudes by reducing the economic value that they receive from so-
cial assistance programs compared to the economic value received from fuel subsidies. Thus, it
is possible that citizens do not care about corruption per se but care about the level of economic
benefits they receive from a given program. Corruption could shift the relative economic value of
programs, causing citizens to shift support from targeted social assistance programs to fuel subsi-
dies. If this is the case, then we should expect the effect of corruption to be stronger among those
that derive greater material benefits from fuel subsidies. I test for this possibility.
Both corruption and attitudes could be also shaped by other factors. I identify three primary
sources of confounds. First, village remoteness could cause both support for fuel subsidies and
corruption. The economic value of the fuel subsidy varies based on the varying economic costs of
fuel. Thus, the economic value of a fuel subsidy (on a per unit basis) is generally higher in more
remote areas where the costs of transporting and distributing fuel are higher. Remote areas are
thus hardest hit when fuel prices increase, primarily through increases in the costs of other goods
which now face higher transportation costs. Alternatively, we know that households in urban areas
consume higher absolute levels of fuel and, thus, that support for fuel subsidies is higher in urban
areas. Either way, village remoteness may cause attitudes towards subsidies. Further, remoteness
could cause corruption. Again, the effect could flow in either direction. More remote villages are
more difficult for the central government to monitor, opening up more opportunities for corruption.
More remote villages also tend to be smaller, and they may have more social capital compared to
urban areas, reducing corruption.
Second, local political institutions could shape both attitudes and corruption. There is hetero-
geneity in Indonesia in the method of selecting local officials for political office. In some villages
(desa), the village head is elected by the local population, while in others (kelurahan), the village
head is appointed by the district mayor. Martinez-Bravo (2014) finds evidence that appointed offi-
cials tend to be more active in electoral fraud; it is possible that other forms of corruption are higher
in these villages as well. Electing village officials also gives the local population the opportunity
to throw out corrupt incumbents, providing a check on local corruption. These local institutions
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could plausibly affect political attitudes towards national government spending, too. Improved lo-
cal accountability could increase support for government programs that rely on local officials for
implementations, since voters have more guarantees that they will be able to punish officials to
administer the programs poorly.
Third, local culture could confound analysis. Villages with higher social capital could be bet-
ter able to coordinate around punishing corrupt local officials, and social capital could encourage
support for government programs that provide more diffuse social benefits. Indonesia is also fa-
mously heterogeneous both culturally and linguistically, and broad cultural differences could shape
corruption and attitudes.
I address these potential confounds in several ways. I control for village remoteness, local
political institutions, and social capital in the analysis. If these factors just shape attitudes, then the
analysis of the effect of corruption on attitudes in a normal regression framework should be fine.
If they also cause corruption, however, then there could be bias in the corruption estimate. Thus,
I use propensity score matching to ensure that corrupt and uncorrupt villages are similar along
these characteristics. Matching within districts helps to ensure that unobservables that are spatially
correlated, like culture, are not biasing results.
1.4 Fuel subsidies in Indonesia: an imperative to reform
Fuel subsidies were initially put in place in Indonesia under the Sukarno administration in the
1960s. They were reportedly intended to protect the poor from inflation, which reached as high as
500 percent during the period (Beaton and Lontoh 2010). When Suharto assumed power in 1968,
consistent with his embrace of liberal economic theory, he reduced the subsidies on fuel. However,
the government continued to administratively set the prices for fuel products (Beaton and Lontoh
2010). The Suharto regime adjusted fuel prices several times to curb spending during its 31-year
rule, with the most dramatic adjustments coming during the broad deregulation initiatives of the
1980s (Soesastro 1989). Despite these adjustments, domestic retail fuel prices were never linked
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to market prices.
However, fuel subsidies never imposed significant financial strain on the government until the
Asian Financial Crisis hit Indonesia in 1997. Among many other devastating economic impacts,
the sharp devaluation of the Indonesian rupiah during the crisis caused the fiscal cost of fuel subsi-
dies to escalate tenfold, from 0.3 percent of GDP in 1996 to 2.9 percent of GDP in 1998 (Clements,
Jung, and Gupta 2007: 222). As for many developing countries facing financial crisis during the
1980s and 1990s, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) provided large loans to
the Indonesia government in return for commitment to implement policy reforms, including greater
austerity. One of the lending conditions was a severe reduction in government subsidies on fuel.
In early May 1998, Suharto therefore announced a 71 percent increase in the price of petrol. This
announcement served as the trigger for the widespread and violent riots that ultimately pushed
Suharto to resign from office in late May 1998, ending his 31-year rule. The double shock of the
Asian Financial Crisis and the reduction in basic commodity subsidies was devastating for Indone-
sia’s poorest citizens: the poverty count in Indonesia doubled from 23 million in 1996 to almost
50 million in 1998 (World Bank 2012a).
To address the poverty crisis in Indonesia, newly-inaugurated President Habibie moved quickly
to initiate Indonesia’s first social safety net programs. Most prominently, the government intro-
duced Beras Miskin (“Rice for the Poor”), commonly called Raskin, a subsidized rice program
targeted to poor households, just a few weeks after Suharto’s resignation.5 To date, Raskin is still
Indonesia’s largest social assistance program, accounting for 53 percent of all social expenditures
(Government of Indonesia 2012). The government framed Raskin as a means to help the poor cope
with the financial crisis and with higher fuel prices.
Like Raskin, nearly all social assistance programs in Indonesia were initially implemented to
coincide with government-imposed hikes in the price of fuel. In 2005, the government introduced
a health fee waiver for the poor and a temporary, unconditional cash transfer program to com-
pensate poor households for the effects of nearly doubling the price for gasoline. In 2008, the
5The government also introduced a temporary health fee waiver program for the poor, which was not widely
implemented and phased out within a few years (Rosser 2012).
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government again raised gasoline prices by another 29 percent and again implemented the tem-
porary, unconditional cash transfer program. In mid-2013, President Yudhoyono again raised the
price on subsidized fuel, accompanied by another temporary, unconditional cash transfer to poor
households and a doubling of Raskin benefits. In each of these cases, increases in social welfare
spending were clearly and publicly linked to decreases in spending on fuel subsidies. Thus, in
Indonesia, citizens have a relatively high level of awareness about the tradeoffs between spending
on social safety net programs for the poor and spending on fuel subsidies.
Figure 1.1: Indonesia Government Expenditures, 2012
Sources: Beritasatu.com, World Development Indicators, Energy Information Administration
Figure 1 shows a history of administratively-set gasoline prices in Indonesia against an inter-
national benchmark price.6 The gap between the benchmark and the administratively-set price of
gasoline in Indonesia represents the approximate size of the subsidy.7 The figure illustrates that
fuel subsidies indeed begin to become a sizable expenditure for the government of Indonesia after
the Asian Financial Crisis and the devaluation of the rupiah. The figure also illustrates a num-
ber of the reform events highlighted above, where the government of Indonesia raises the price
of gasoline at the pump. Differences between domestic prices and benchmark prices are driven
6I utilize the average price of gasoline in the U.S. as a benchmark, as this is frequently used as an international
benchmark price for gasoline since the U.S. imposes low taxes on the consumption of gasoline.
7The figure does not account for differences in transportation costs between Indonesia and the benchmark. In
reality, the size of the subsidy is likely larger than is depicted here.
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by the administratively-set price of gasoline, exchange rates, and changes in the market price for
gasoline. Also highlighted on the figure is the price of gasoline in Indonesia in March 2013, when
the survey used here was fielded. At the time, the price of gasoline in Indonesia was around $1.60
per gallon, while the benchmark price was around $3.65 per gallon.
Figure 2 illustrates how the subsidy translates into government spending. Despite the reform
efforts over the past decade, fuel subsidies in Indonesia remain substantial. In 2012, the gov-
ernment of Indonesia spent around US$14.5 billion on fuel subsidies, accounting for around 13
percent of government expenditures (IISD 2012: 5). This number is even higher when you include
electricity subsidies. Both fuel and electricity subsidies accounted for around 20 percent of govern-
ment expenditures in 2012, and climbed to around 25 percent of expenditures in 2013 (ibid.). High
international crude prices, a weak Indonesian rupiah, and the exponential expansion of domestic
energy consumption contribute to the enormous cost of the subsidies. The opportunity costs of the
spending are staggering: spending on fuel subsidies exceeded spending on capital expenditures by
10 percent, a fundamental driver of long-term growth, and spending on eduction, health care, and
social protection combined (see Figure 2).
Figure 1.2: Indonesia Government Expenditures, 2012
Source: Government of Indonesia, 2012.
Before proceeding, it is worth understanding who the primary beneficiaries of fuel subsidies
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within Indonesia are. Although the richest households are the primary consumers of fuel, poor
households in Indonesia are increasingly becoming direct consumers of automotive fuel due to
expansion in motorbike ownership. In the survey sample used here, 40% of poor households8
report owning vehicles. Figure 3 calculates the effect of a 25% fuel price increase on household
welfare by household consumption decile using the survey sample collected for this project.9 The
direct impact of a fuel price increase is the product of the projected fuel price increase by the share
of fuel costs in household consumption. For the purposes of this analysis, the indirect impacts of
fuel price increases have been vastly simplified as the effect of a fuel price increase on the price
of food. In reality, the price of fuel would also enter into many non-food consumption goods,
and households could respond to price increases by substituting across products. I assume that a
25% increase in the price of fuel leads to a 1.5% increase in the price of food.10 Figure 3 shows
that poorer households are less affected by fuel price hikes than richer households, consistent with
the fact that richer households consume more fuel directly. However, poor households are clearly
benefitting economically (both directly and indirectly) from fuel subsidies and experience negative
welfare effects from price hikes. This analysis merely shows that all households in Indonesia have
an economic stake in fuel subsidy reform and not just the rich. All analysis going controls for
vehicle ownership and fuel costs as a share of household consumption.
8Defined as the 30% of the households in the country with the lowest consumption levels.
9The analysis employs entropy balancing to reweight the survey sample to reflect national demographics, discussed
below.
10This assumption is based on analysis done in Arze del Granado, Coady, and Gillingham (2012) on the indirect
effects of fuel price increase (see Table 10).
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Figure 1.3: Economic impact of a 25% fuel price increase by consumption decile
Source: Authors’ calculations
Attempts to compensate poor households for the welfare losses from fuel price reform through
new social programs have been implemented imperfectly. For one, overall spending levels on so-
cial assistance programs are low. Public expenditures on social assistance programs account for
only 0.5 percent of GDP, in comparison with other developing countries that spend an average
of 1.5 percent of GDP on social assistance (World Bank 2012a). Second, because it is difficult
to directly observe household income, the government determines eligibility for social assistance
programs using proxy-means tests (PMT). Alatas et al. (2012) find that PMTs resulted in erro-
neously excluding 53 percent of poor households from social program eligibility and including 20
percent of non-poor households.11 Thus, from the perspective of poor citizens, it may be difficult
to anticipate whether they will receive benefits from social programs or not, and the criteria for
inclusion seem opaque. Third, social assistance programs are delivered through local bureaucrats,
who may be corrupt. Indeed, Olken (2006) finds that corruption in the delivery of Raskin entirely
offsets the redistributive value of the program. This is in accordance with much of the literature on
politics in contemporary Indonesia, which argues that the centralized corruption of the Suharto era
has been replaced with pervasive, decentralized corruption within local governments (e.g. Hadiz
11Note that this is still significantly better than random targeting as the poor represent only 30 percent of the popu-
lation.
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2010). The remainder of the paper explores how this corruption within local governments shapes
citizens attitudes towards the prospect of fuel subsidy reform.
1.5 Data and Measurement
1.5.1 Data Collection
The data presented here was collected as part of a project conducted jointly with the Govern-
ment of Indonesia designed to reduce leakages and corruption in the Raskin program (Banerjee et
al. 2015). Raskin is designed to provide 15 kg of heavily-subsidized rice to eligible households,
who represent the poorest 27 percent of the population. With an annual budget of US$1.5 billion,
and a targeted population of 17.5 million households, it is Indonesia’s largest targeted transfer pro-
gram. The program is also substantial from the beneficiary’s perspective: the subsidy provided
through the program equals around 4 percent of the average beneficiary household’s monthly con-
sumption.
Eligible households, however, do not necessarily receive those benefits. The process by which
households receive subsidized rice illustrates how local officials can divert resources for private
gain. Each month, the village government is responsible for picking up the village’s allotment of
rice (15 kg per month for each eligible household in the village) from a government warehouse,
usually located in the sub-district capital. Village governments are then responsible for dividing the
rice (usually received in 60 kg packages) into 15 kg sacks, for distributing it among the targeted
beneficiaries within the village, and for collecting copayments. The village government is then
responsible for remitting the copayments back to the government logistics agency that coordinates
rice distribution nationally. This payment from the village government to the logistics agency is
the only form of top-down monitoring over the program.
Local officials have two opportunities to divert program resources for private gain: (1) they can
divert a portion of the village’s rice quota to sell on the side at market prices (which are on average
5 times higher than the official copay price) and (2) they can sell Raskin rice to eligible households
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within the village at a price higher than the official copay price and pocket the difference. The first
amounts to diversion along the quantity dimension and would be reflected in lower rice purchases
by eligible households. Olken (2006) estimates that at least 18 percent of rice goes missing in
this manner, before it ever reaches villages, a cost that offsets the redistributive benefits of the
program. The second amounts to diversion along the price dimension and would be reflected in
higher Raskin purchase prices among households within the village. Fieldwork we conducted in
2012 indicated that, anecdotally, substantial leakage occurs along the price dimension as well. In
one village, the value of the price mark-up equaled around US$30,000 annually. In this sample,
households report on average paying a copay price 40 percent higher than the official copay price.
The data presented here is based on two surveys administered by SurveyMetre, a survey com-
pany based in Indonesia.12 The sample consists of six districts, two districts each in the provinces
of Central Java, Lampung, and South Sumatra. These districts provide important heterogeneity in
institutions and culture, particularly by being located on- and off-Java. Within these districts, we
randomly sampled 58 sub-districts (kecamatan). For each sampled sub-district, we included all vil-
lages in the study (n = 572).13 These 572 villages comprise the final survey sample. We conducted
two surveys in these villages: one in October-November 2012 and one in March-April 2013. For
each round of surveying, we randomly selected a hamlet within the village. For the first round of
surveying, we targeted 8 households per village. For the second round of surveying, we targeted
an average of 10 households per village, depending on geographic area. During each survey, we
randomly sampled from two overlapping sampling frames. First, we randomly sampled from a
full hamlet census (on average, 70 households). Second, we randomly sampled households from
the official government registry of Raskin-eligible households, which roughly corresponds to the
poorest 27 percent of the population.14 This is the same list of households that are eligible for all
12SurveyMetre was selected through an official public procurement process conducted by the Government of In-
donesia. They are also the survey company that conducts the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS).
13There were originally 600 villages in the sample, but 28 were dropped due to safety concerns.
14We later machine-matched the households randomly-sampled from the census to the registry of Raskin-eligible
households so that we could fully identify which households in the sample were eligible for targeted transfer programs
in the sample. Around 9 percent of the households randomly-sampled from the census were reclassified as Raskin-
eligible using this method.
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targeted assistance programs in Indonesia, including the unconditional cash transfers granted when
the government imposes fuel price hikes. In both surveys, we asked questions about household rice
purchases and household economic status. Questions about attitudes on government spending were
only asked in the second round of surveying.
While this sample is not nationally representative, sample demographics are similar to na-
tional averages (Table 4, Appendix). Compared to national averages, the sample is slightly skewed
towards rural areas, and, despite oversampling the poor by sampling directly from government
registries of poor households, contains fewer households in the lower consumption deciles. To
correct for sampling imbalances, I use entropy balancing to reweight the survey data to match de-
mographic information from the population (Hainmueller 2012; Hainmueller and Xu 2013). Table
4 (Appendix) presents demographic information in the weighted and unweighted data.
1.5.2 Research Design
I investigate the relationship between corruption in the implementation of targeted transfer pro-
grams and support for fuel subsidies in two stages. First, I examine the relationship between level
of corruption in the implementation of Raskin and support for fuel subsidies in an observational
study, examining only villages randomly-assigned to the control group in the field experiment
(n=194). This analysis enables me to test whether the existence and level of corruption in Raskin
is correlated with individuals’ support for fuel subsidies. I control for a battery of household and
village characteristics in the analysis.
The idea that corruption diminishes trust in governments has been extensively explored in the
literature, yet it is difficult to establish a causal relationship between corruption and attitudes. Cor-
ruption is notoriously difficult to measure, primarily because corrupt officials have strong incen-
tives to conceal their activities. Thus corruption is often measured based on citizens’ perceptions
of corruption. Several studies document a negative partial correlation between perceptions of cor-
ruption and confidence in public institutions cross-nationally (e.g. Anderson and Tverdova 2003)
and at a household-level (e.g. Chang and Chu 2006). However, it is possible that the same un-
derlying characteristics causing individuals to report high levels of corruption also cause them to
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report low confidence in public institutions. Indeed, Olken (2009) finds that while there is a strong
correlation between perceptions of corruption and real levels of corruption, individuals are biased
in their perceptions.
To mitigate endogeneity concerns with using perception-based corruption measures, other stud-
ies utilize self-reported data on personal experiences with corruption (e.g. Clausen, Kraay and
Nyiri 2011; Seligson 2002). Although it may seem like using experience-based measures of cor-
ruption alleviate endogeneity concerns, there is still the larger issue that unobserved factors might
cause both corruption and attitudes. Personal experiences with corruption can be distributed among
the population in non-random ways. This would be true, for example, if both levels of corruption
and attitudes varied systematically within countries, caused, say, by variations in local political
culture. Self-reported experiences with corruption can also be subject to personal bias related to
political attitudes.
This paper takes endogeneity concerns seriously by making two methodological improvements
on previous work on the effect of corruption on political attitudes. First, rather than relying on self-
reported perceptions of or experiences with corruption, I estimate corruption at the village level
using a “gap measurement” method. This ensures that estimates of corruption are not subject
to bias and are not systematically related to individual characteristics. Although this improves
inferences from past studies, it is still possible that other village-level characteristics cause both
political attitudes and corruption.
In order to strengthen my argument that the relationship between corruption in local governance
and political attitudes is a causal one, I use matching methods to ensure that corrupt and uncorrupt
villages are comparable in a second set of analyses.
1.5.3 Dependent Variable: Opposition and Support
Our survey asked about attitudes towards social policies across multiple policy domains using
two main questions. The first asked respondents whether funding should be increased for existing
social policy programs in eight areas: direct cash transfers, subsidized rice, health fee waivers,
hiring teachers, improving roads in rural areas, community-driven development funds, reducing
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the price of automotive fuel (gasoline and diesel)15, and reducing the price of LPG gas.16 These
policies were selected as the primary ways that the Government of Indonesia allocates budget to
promote the welfare of poor citizens. The second question asked respondents whether funding
should be decreased for the same set of policies. Question wording was similar to that used by
Rehm, Hacker and Schlesinger (2012) in their cross-domain analysis of social policy support in
the United States.17
I measure support for automotive fuel subsidies using a three-category outcome variable: where
“1” indicates that the respondent selected to increase spending on fuel subsidies, “0” indicates
that the respondent selected neither to increase nor decrease spending on fuel subsidies, and “-1”
indicates that the respondent selected to decrease government spending on fuel subsidies. I focus
on support for automotive fuel subsidies (rather than on cooking fuels like LPG) because these are
the most environmentally and fiscally damaging form of fuel subsidy; they are also the largest in
terms of government budget and the most salient to citizens.18 My argument about fuel subsidies
bypassing local institutions is also less applicable in the case of cooking fuel subsidies. LPG
subsidies are distributed through a combination of public and private channels, and the price to
users is set by distributors. This makes the subsidy less obvious to end users and more susceptible
to local price mark-ups. There has also been the most political debate about the role of automotive
fuel subsidies in the government budget. In 2012, 2013 and 2014, the government attempted
(in 2012, unsuccessfully, and successfully in 2013 and 2014) to increase the price of subsidized
automotive fuel. Debates about whether and when to reduce automotive fuel subsidies was also
a key topic in debates leading up to the 2014 presidential election in Indonesia. These political
15Subsidies on both gasoline and automotive diesel are collectively called Subsidi BBM in Indonesia, a widely used
and understood term.
16Question wording: “The government has a number of programs to help the poor. Imagine that you could plan
the government’s budget this year. If the government could increase [had to decrease] the budget for only three of the
following programs, which programs would you select?” [eight potential answers].
17It is worth noting that the question primes the idea of “programs to help the poor.” Thus, it may be difficult to tell
whether the respondent is answering the question from the perspective of which programs benefit them as individuals
compared to which programs benefit the poor collectively. However, there is unlikely to be much difference between
these interpretations in this sample as 96% of respondents self-identify as being “less well off” compared to others.
18Indonesia has already made significant progress in phasing out environmentally harmful kerosene subsidies, see
Pertamina (2012).
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debates hinged on the financial strain imposed by automotive fuel subsidies (e.g. Suryowati 2014)
and the potential to increase spending on pro-poor policies and economic development if spending
on automotive fuel subsidies were reduced (e.g. Rakhma and Setiawan 2014). Thus, in the rest
of the paper, when I use the term “fuel subsidy,” I am referring specifically to automotive fuel
subsidies in Indonesia and not cooking fuel subsidies.
The question was designed to elicit a ranking of respondents’ preferences towards various
forms of government spending while eliciting the idea of a budget constraint. In theory, a respon-
dent could want to increase government spending on all policy areas. By limiting the respondent
to three policies on which to increase government spending and having the respondent additionally
select three policies on which to decrease government spending, we can get a sense of their most
and least-preferred policies. So, I interpret a respondent selecting to increase spending on auto-
motive fuel subsidies as having a greater preference towards government spending on automotive
fuel subsidies than a respondent selecting to increase government spending on other policy areas
and greater still than a respondent selecting to decrease government spending on automotive fuel
subsidies.19
To ensure that a respondent who strongly prefers spending on social assistance programs to
spending on fuel subsidies could be accurately represented, I included the three largest targeted
transfer programs–Raskin, cash transfers for the poor, and health fee waivers for the poor–in the
question. These policies receive comparatively low levels of baseline support from the government
(see Figure 2). Further, it is possible that a respondent prefers to receive income assistance through
fuel subsidies but does not support automotive fuel subsidies, which have the greatest fiscal and
environmental costs. Including LPG subsidies as a spending category allows households that value
fuel subsidies to select greater spending in this area while still not selecting to increase spending on
19We piloted several versions of this question to ensure that respondents understood the question and that it was
successful in eliciting political attitudes. Initially, the question asked individuals to rank policies by the degree to
which they wished to increase or decrease government spending. However, the ranking exercise proved to be too
complicated, and respondents did not always have a clear ranking of preferences over all eight programs. However,
respondents could readily provide the three programs on which to increase and three programs to decrease government
spending. I thank SurveyMetre, especially Cecep Sumantri, and J-PAL Southeast Asia, especially Nurzanty Khadijah,
for piloting the questions and providing valuable input.
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automotive fuel subsidies. Finally, I include three categories of public goods spending–community
development funds, building roads, and hiring teachers–to give options to those respondents pre-
ferring spending on public goods to targeted assistance programs and to fuel subsidies.
It is worth noting that supporting increased levels of spending on a policy is not the same as
supporting a policy generally, nor is supporting decreased levels of spending on a policy equivalent
to policy opposition. For example, an individual may prefer high levels of government spending
on education in a hypothetical world but in reality think that current forms of government spending
on education are ineffective. Therefore, on a question about how to allocate government spending,
they may select to decrease government spending on education, even if they prioritize education as
a policy area. Or, an individual may select neither to increase nor decrease government spending
levels on a high priority policy domain because they are already satisfied with spending levels. By
the same token, an individual’s selection to decrease government spending on fuel subsidies could
reflect that the individual would still like to receive a sizable fuel subsidy but not quite as sizable
as the status quo.
Preferences for more or less policy spending more accurately represents the difference be-
tween an individual’s preferred level of policy spending and the baseline level of policy spending
(Wlezien 1995). I therefore interpret individuals’ responses to the survey question as the disjunc-
ture between their preferences and status quo spending levels, given existing realities about the
quality of policy implementation, and not as either an overall indicator of support for a given pol-
icy. However, for convenience, I use the terms “support,” “neutral” and “oppose” in the discussion
of results to indicate whether the individual selected to increase, neither to increase nor decrease,
or to decrease government spending on gasoline subsidies.
These types of spending questions can be difficult to interpret in a cross-national setting, as
they ask people about spending preferences relative to different baseline spending levels. All of
the factors that purportedly explain differences in spending preferences also vary across countries
in addition to the variation in baseline spending levels across countries. However, this should not
be a concern when looking across policy domains within a single country. By looking at spending
28
preferences within a single country, I implicitly hold constant a wide range of factors that are
argued to cause cross-national divergences in spending preferences, including the overall structure
of government spending, popular attitudes, distribution of income and skills, and any legacies from
past policies that affect all citizens equally. This reduces concerns about confounders and enables
me to focus on how subnational differences in institutional performance in the implementation of
social policy shape attitudes.
1.5.4 Estimating Corruption
I use a “gap measurement” method to estimate corruption, which estimates corruption by iden-
tifying discrepancies between different data sources. This paper uses a method developed and
applied in Olken (2006), which estimates corruption in Raskin by comparing administrative data
on village rice quotas with household survey data on rice purchases.
To estimate the amount of missing rice, one needs two quantities: the amount of rice that is
supposed to arrive in a village each month and the amount of rice actually received by villagers.
The difference between these two quantities represents an estimate for how much rice goes missing
during the distribution process. However, as noted above, selling rice on the side is not the only
way that local officials can skim benefits from the program. They can also sell rice to beneficiaries
at a price higher than the official copay price. Thus, I estimate the amount of corruption as the
amount of “missing subsidy” in the village, where the value of the intended subsidy for a village
is the village’s monthly rice quota multiplied by the difference between the local market price for
rice and the official copay price for Raskin and the value for the subsidy actually received is the
amount of rice actually received by villagers multiplied by the difference between the local market
price for rice and the price actually paid by the villagers for Raskin. Thus, I estimate corruption
both on the price and on the quantity dimension. In the Appendix, I replicate all the analysis from
the paper using just the quantity dimension, and the results are similar.
To estimate the village’s intended subsidy, I use administrative data on the village’s monthly
rice quota (in kg) and household survey data on local market price for rice of similar quality
to Raskin. The amount of the village’s monthly rice quota is equal to the number of Raskin-
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eligible households in a village according to government administrative data times 15 kg, each
household’s monthly rice allotment. However, this may not equal the amount of rice that the local
officials actually obtain from government warehouses. Skimming rice from the program could
happen anywhere between government procurement, delivery to warehouses, and delivery from
warehouses to villages. Yet, there is reason to believe that a significant portion of the rice goes
missing at the village level: Over 70% of the overall variance in missing rice is between villages
rather than between sub-districts (where warehouses are located).
To estimate the subsidy received by households within a village, I use household survey data on
rice purchases. I utilize data from both survey waves described above, conducted in two separate
hamlets within each village, covering a total of 19 households per village. In each survey wave,
households were asked about the prior three months of Raskin purchases, including whether they
purchased Raskin, the amount purchased, and the copay price. Obtaining purchase data across
multiple months is important in obtaining an accurate estimate of the amount of missing rice.
Local officials could skim rice either by taking a little off the top each month or by distributing rice
in some months but diverting the entire rice quota in other months. For each household, I average
rice purchases over the prior three months to obtain an average amount purchased each month.
Because households were randomly sampled from the village population, one can use household
rice purchases to estimate the total Raskin subsidy received by the village.20
Using this method, I estimate that 26% of the total intended subsidy for the villages in the
sample goes missing. This estimate is close to Olken (2006), who estimates that 18% of Raskin
rice goes missing. The estimate here is likely higher because it estimates corruption along the price
dimension as well as the quantity dimension. Also, similar to Olken (2006), I find that the majority
of missing subsidy is concentrated in a few villages. In 29% of villages in the sample, I estimate
no missing subsidy and, in an additional 12% of villages, I estimate skimming below 10%. The
10 villages with the most missing subsidy in the sample contain nearly 40% of the total estimated
20To estimate village-level program leakages, I use post-stratification weights for each household in the survey
sample, where wi = Np/Np̂, where N p is the number of Raskin-eligible households in the village and Np̂ is the number
of Raskin-eligible households in the survey sample. Weights for Raskin-ineligible households are calculated similarly.
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missing subsidy in the sample. Figure 4a shows the distribution of missing subsidy estimates.
Figure 1.4: Distribution of Missing Subsidy
(a) Missing Subsidy (Millions of Rp.) (b) Share of Village Subsidy Missing
However, estimates of total missing subsidy in the village does not necessarily measure the
degree of corruption in a village, since villages with larger populations of eligible households have
more subsidy that can potentially go missing. Thus, I measure corruption as the share of total
subsidy that goes missing in a village. Figure 4b shows the distribution of share of missing subsidy
estimates in the sample. On average, villages are missing 23% of the intended subsidy.
Several potential concerns arise with the accuracy of the corruption estimates. First, in some
villages, households report purchasing no Raskin at all during certain months, or, for three villages
in the sample, during any of the months asked about on the survey. On the one hand, this could
represent the maximum amount of corruption, when a local official is diverting 100% of the pro-
gram’s resources away from eligible households. On the other hand, failing to distribute rice at
all within a village could occur because of an issue with rice distribution or procurement that had
nothing to with actions by local officials. Thus, I also replicate all analysis recoding household
Raskin subsidy values from zero to missing if no households in the village reported purchasing
any Raskin in that month. This coding decision does not affect results (reported in Appendix Table
3).
Second, some villages exhibit quite high levels of corruption. To ensure that results are not
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driven by outliers, I take two precautions. I examine a simple binary indicator of whether any
corruption is estimated or not. I also perform a jackknife analysis, dropping one village at a time
and reestimating analysis. Third, due to the small number of households sampled per village, there
may be a high degree of variability in potential village-level estimates for corruption. I conducted
a second jackknifing exercise aimed to account for this variability, described in the Robustness
section.
1.5.5 Controls
I control, first, for individuals’ economic self-interest in fuel subsidies and their economic self-
interest in other forms of social assistance. I use three indicators of economic self-interest in fuel
subsidies, including: the share of households’ monthly consumption that is spent on transportation
costs, whether or not the households owns a vehicle (motorboat, car, truck, or motorbike), and
whether the household owns a field used for agriculture. Subsidized fuel is an important input
in agricultural production, so households that make their livelihoods from agriculture may derive
greater benefits from the subsidy. I calculate the share of household income used on transportation
rather than the total amount spent on transportation to capture how economically important sub-
sidies are from the perspective of the household balance sheet. Poorer households may consume
less fuel than richer households, but fuel subsidies may be more economically important to them
if fuel consumption represents a higher share of household income. Finally, I include the distance
between the village and the sub-district capital, a measure of village remoteness. More remote
villages tend to derive greater value from fuel subsidies as transportation costs represent a higher
share of the cost of goods and as it costs more to to distribute fuel to these areas.
I also include three dimensions of household economic status which may make have a greater
economic self-interest in transfer programs as compared to fuel subsidies. These include house-
hold per capita monthly consumption (logged), whether the head of household is female (a strong
predictor of poverty in Indonesia), and whether the household has experienced a death, a major
illness, a job loss, or a crop failure in the past 12 months. Table 1 reports household summary
statistics for the sample.
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Table 1.1: Household Summary Statistics
Sample Eligible Ineligible
Economic Interest in Fuel Subsidies
- Transportation as a share of monthly consumption 0.055 0.044 0.059
(0.061) (0.054) (0.063)
- Household owns a vehicle? 0.624 0.405 0.708
(0.484) (0.491) (0.455)
- Household owns a field? 0.318 0.211 0.359
(0.466) (0.408) (0.480)
Household Economic Status
- Household per capita monthly consumption (logged) 13.00 12.75 13.09
(0.612) (0.503) (0.625)
- Female head of household 0.083 0.099 0.077
(0.275) (0.298) (0.266)
- Death in household in past 12 mos. 0.026 0.025 0.026
(0.159) (0.158) (0.159)
- Major illness in household in past 12 mos. 0.158 0.201 0.142
(0.365) (0.401) (0.349)
- Job loss in household in past 12 mos. 0.095 0.113 0.089
(0.294) (0.317) (0.284)
- Crop failure in past 12 mos. 0.178 0.189 0.174
(0.383) (0.391) (0.379)
Observations 1940 1187 753
Standard deviations in parentheses.
I also include several control variables that may be associated with attitudes towards fuel sub-
sidies, including the education of the head of household and a host of village characteristics. These
include: village population (logged), the number of schools per capita in the village, the number
of religious buildings per capita in the village, whether the village head is elected or appointed,
the tenure of the current village head (in months), and ethnic and religious fragmentation in the
village. Table 2 reports village-level summary statistics.
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Table 1.2: Village Summary Statistics
Mean SD Min Max
- Distance to sub-district 6.48 9.10 0.20 93.89
- Number of households in village (log) 4.20 0.46 3.09 5.38
- Number of schools per 1,000 households 2.74 1.39 0.00 9.13
- Number of religious buildings per 1,000 households 4.88 3.61 0.37 18.09
- Village Head is elected 0.67 0.47 0 1
- Village Head tenure (months) 36.06 38.02 0 182
- Ethnic fragmentation 0.76 0.30 0.15 1
- Religious fragmentation 0.92 0.12 0.34 1
N 194
1.6 Results: Observational Analysis
1.6.1 Levels of Support for Fuel Subsidies
Figure 5a shows the level of support for fuel subsidies among all households in the sample,
among households eligible for social programs, and among households ineligible for social pro-
grams. Figure 5b reports the level of support for fuel subsidies among all households within each
consumption decile. Several facts stand out. First, the distribution of responses shows an overall
minority of respondents support increasing government spending on fuel subsidies (28%), and 39%
of respondents support decreasing government spending on fuel subsidies. Thus, a greater overall
share of respondents select to decrease spending on fuel subsidies than to increase spending on
fuel subsidies. This is true for all income groups except for the richest 20% of households (Figure
5b). The poorest households in the sample exhibit the lowest levels of support for the policy: Only
20% of households eligible for social programs select to increase government spending on fuel
subsidies, and 45% select to decrease government spending on fuel subsidies. But support among
ineligible households is not overwhelming, either. 37% of ineligible households select to decrease
spending on fuel subsidies, and 30% select to increase it.
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Figure 1.5: Support for government spending across policy domains
(a) Support for gas subsidies by eligibility status (b) Support for gas subsidies by consumption decile
(c) Support for subsidized rice by eligibility status
(d) Support for unconditional cash transfers by eligibil-
ity status
(e) Support for health fee waivers by eligibility status
Figures 5a-e shows the share of respondents that select to increase government spending (“support”), decrease gov-
ernment spending (“oppose”), or do not select the specified policy as one of the 3 policies on which to either increase
or decrease government spending (“neutral”). Figures 5a, and 5c-e show this by eligibility status, and Figure 5b
shows the share of respondents within each consumption decile that select either to increase or decrease government
spending on fuel subsidies. The line shows the share of the sample within each consumption decile. Consumption
deciles are defined based on World Bank (2012b). 35
Levels of support for fuel subsidies can be better contextualized when compared to support for
targeted transfer programs. Figures 5c, 5d, and 5e show mean levels of support by household eligi-
bility status for Raskin, unconditional cash transfers, and health fee waivers respectively, the three
largest forms of targeted social assistance. Support for targeted transfer programs is considerably
stronger than support for fuel subsidies: 78% of all households would like to increase government
spending on Raskin, 53% of all households would like to increase government spending on uncon-
ditional cash transfers, and 69% of all households would like to increase government spending on
health fee waivers. Taken together, these summary statistics indicate that fuel subsidies are only
moderately popular as compared to targeted transfer programs, and less so among the poor than
the non-poor. This runs against the idea that the social contract within oil-producing countries is
premised on the receipt of visible and tangible benefits from oil wealth. A substantial portion of
citizens support scaling back government spending on fuel subsidies.21
1.6.2 Corruption and Support for Fuel Subsidies
How does corruption affect attitudes towards fuel subsidies? Table 3 examines the relationship
between corruption in the delivery of the Raskin program and support for gasoline subsidies for
those households eligible to purchase Raskin.22 The relationship between local corruption and at-
titudes towards gasoline subsidies is highly significant. This is true whether corruption is measured
as the share of overall subsidy that goes missing, a binary indicator that any subsidy goes missing,
the amount of the overall subsidy that goes missing, or the amount of the overall subsidy that goes
missing with values top-coded at the 90th percentile to account for the influence of outliers.
Figure 6 illustrates the magnitude of this effect. When corruption levels are near zero, poor
households are more than three times more likely to oppose rather than to support gasoline subsi-
dies. As the share of missing subsidies approach 100%, households become more likely to support
rather than to oppose gasoline subsidies, although, due to the relatively small number of villages
21Ideally, to derive the most accurate picture of patterns of support, I would have randomized the ordering of the
policies on the list. However, this was not logistically possible for this survey. Thus, it is possible that the ordering on
the list affected the response rates to certain policies.
22These are the households affected by corruption in the delivery of targeted social assistance programs.
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with such high levels of corruption, the confidence intervals are wide.
Table 3: Corruption and Support for Fuel Subsidies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of subsidy missing (%) 1.02 (0.36)***
Any subsidy missing (dummy) 0.51 (0.19)***
Amt of subsidy missing (’000s Rp) 38.7 (12.9)***
Amt of subsidy missing, top-coded (’000s Rp) 12.3 (3.35)***
Vehicle ownership 0.21 (0.16) 0.22 (0.16) 0.21 (0.16) 0.23 (0.16)
Transportation as a share of consumption 1.41 (1.09) 1.45 (1.08) 1.44 (1.04) 1.26 (1.04)
Household has agricultural field 0.05 (0.16) 0.06 (0.16) 0.05 (0.15) 0.04 (0.15)
Log per capita consumption 0.34 (0.15)** 0.34 (0.15)** 0.37 (0.15)** 0.39 (0.15)***
Female-headed household -0.03 (0.21) 0.04 (0.22) -0.01 (0.22) -0.15 (0.20)
Death in household 0.19 (0.41) 0.17 (0.40) 0.21 (0.40) 0.24 (0.41)
Major illness in household -0.23 (0.17) -0.21 (0.17) -0.25 (0.17) -0.28 (0.17)
Job loss in household -0.70 (0.27)*** -0.74 (0.27)*** -0.66 (0.27)** -0.67 (0.27)**
Crop failure in household -0.25 (0.19) -0.26 (0.19) -0.26 (0.19) -0.25 (0.19)
Head of HH education 0.08 (0.07) 0.08 (0.07) 0.09 (0.07) 0.08 (0.07)
Village population, # HH (logged) -0.11 (0.15) -0.08 (0.16) -0.20 (0.16) -0.24 (0.16)
Distance to sub-district capital (km) 0.02 (0.005)*** 0.01 (0.004)*** 0.01 (0.005)*** 0.02 (0.005)***
Schools per 1,000 HH 0.09 (0.06) 0.09 (0.06) 0.10 (0.06)* 0.09 (0.06)
Religious buildings per 1,000 HH 0.005 (0.03) 0.007 (0.03) 0.006 (0.03) -0.003 (0.03)
Village head is elected 0.08 (0.25) 0.14 (0.24) 0.10 (0.24) 0.13 (0.25)
Village head tenure (in months) -0.002 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) -0.001 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002)
Ethnic fragmentation 0.33 (0.42) 0.11 (0.38) 0.32 (0.41) 0.40 (0.42)
Religious fragmentation -2.12 (0.74)*** -1.91 (0.71)*** -1.99 (0.71)*** -2.39 (0.77)***
N 1,186 1,186 1,186 1,186
Note: *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value < 0.10. Standard errors clustered by village in parentheses.
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Figure 1.6: Impact of Corruption on Predicted Probability of Support for Fuel Subsidies
Note: Figure 4 plots the predicted probabilities from an ordered logit models using a 3-category outcome variable
where “-1” = decrease government spending on fuel subsidies (“oppose”), “0” = selected neither to increase nor
decrease spending on fuel subsidies (“neutral”), and “1” = increase government spending on fuel subsidies
(“support”). Standard errors are clustered by village. Dotted lines are 90% confidence intervals. Predicted
probabilities are estimated based on Model 1 in Table 3. All other variables are held at their means.
Corruption matters on the extensive margin as well: An individual living in a village with
corrupt local officials is 13 percentage points more likely to support increasing spending on fuel
subsidies, a 62% increase from the sample mean for eligible households in villages with no cor-
ruption (calculated based on Table 3, Model 2). The relationship between corruption and attitudes
towards fuel subsidies is robust to a number of alternative specifications, including the inclusion
of district fixed effects (Table 5, Appendix) and dropping observations for months in which no
one in the village reports purchasing any rice (Table 6, Appendix). Table 7 (Appendix) replicates
the analysis looking only at the quantity dimension of corruption, and the substantive results are
consistent.
Further, one may be concerned that because local officials exert high influence over the dis-
tribution of social programs within villages, a household’s eligibility status may not be a perfect
indicator for whether or not the household is affected by corruption. This is because local leaders
may use their discretion to redistribute program benefits to poor households within the village that
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are erroneously left off of targeting lists. If village leaders use their discretion over program imple-
mentation to both distribute program benefits more widely than intended by government targeting
lists and to skim program benefits, then corruption may affect a wider population than just eligible
households. Thus, Table 8 (Appendix) and Figure 7 replicate analysis by testing the hypothesis on
all households in the sample below the median sample household consumption level rather than
just on households eligible for Raskin. Substantive results are similar: for poorer households, as
corruption rises, so does support for gasoline subsidies.
Figure 1.7: Impact of Corruption on Predicted Probability of Support for Fuel Subsidies, for
Households Below Median Consumption Levels
Note: Figure 7 plots the predicted probabilities from an ordered logit models using a 3-category outcome variable
where “-1” = decrease government spending on fuel subsidies (“oppose”), “0” = selected neither to increase nor
decrease spending on fuel subsidies (“neutral”), and “1” = increase government spending on fuel subsidies
(“support”). Standard errors are clustered by village. Dotted lines are 90% confidence intervals. Predicted
probabilities are estimated based on Model 1 in Table 3. All other variables are held at their means. Only households
below median consumption levels for the sample are included in the analysis.
Figure 8 probes this relationship further by attempting to distinguish between the two mecha-
nisms proposed in the theory section for how corruption could influence support for fuel subsidies.
The first is simply that corruption could shift the economic value of fuel subsidies above the eco-
nomic value of targeted assistance programs, while the second is that individuals with corrupt local
institutions prefer fuel subsidies because they lack trust in the local politicians and bureaucrats re-
sponsible for implementing targeted social assistance programs. It is also possible that corruption
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affects attitudes through both mechanisms.
I investigate this by examining whether corruption induces support for fuel subsidies even
among those households that are eligible for social programs but do not own vehicles. In other
words, does corruption influence only those individuals that could benefit the most economically
from fuel subsidies? If corruption were only working through this economic mechanism, then we
would expect corruption to primarily influence individuals with vehicles. However households
without vehicles are just as affected by corruption. This provides some evidence that corruption
affects attitudes in ways beyond simply altering the relative economic benefits of various policy
domains.
Figure 1.8: Impact of Corruption on Predicted Probability of Support for Fuel Subsidies, by Vehi-
cle Ownership
Note: Figure 8 plots the predicted probabilities from an ordered logit model of selecting to increase spending on fuel
subsidies using the 3-category outcome variable, where “-1” = decrease government spending on fuel subsidies
(“oppose”), “0” = selected neither to increase nor decrease spending on fuel subsidies (“neutral”), and “1” =
increase government spending on fuel subsidies (“support”). Dotted lines are 90% confidence intervals. The blue
line plots the predicted probabilities from a model on households eligible for social programs that do not own
vehicles, and the orange line plots the predicted probability for a separate model on households eligible for social
programs that own vehicles. All other variables are held at their means.
1.6.3 Extending the Argument: Corruption and Support for Other Programs
If this argument presented in this paper is correct, and the primary reason that corruption shapes
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attitudes towards fuel subsidies is that subsidies are less vulnerable to local corruption, then cor-
ruption should also affect attitudes towards many forms of government spending, depending on
how vulnerable each spending category is to local corruption. Thus, I examine the effect of cor-
ruption on support for each category of government spending listed in the survey questions that
form the dependent variable. Figure 9 assesses the relationship between the binary measure of cor-
ruption (“any subsidy missing”) and support for different forms of government spending. Figure 9
plots the coefficients and standard errors from eight separate ordered logit models. The dependent
variable in each model is the three-category outcome variable indicating whether the respondent
chose to increase, neither to increase nor decrease, or to decrease spending on a given policy area.
All models include the same controls as reported in Table 3.
Figure 1.9: Effect of Corruption on Attitudes Towards Government Spending
Note: Figure 9 plots the coefficients and standard errors for “any subsidy missing” in 8 separate models. In each
model, the dependent variable is a 3-category outcome variable (“-1” = decrease government spending on “x”
policy, “0” = selected neither to increase nor decrease spending on “x” policy, and “1” = increase government
spending on “x” policy). All models control for vehicle ownership, transportation as a share of consumption, field
ownership, household per capita consumption (logged), female-headed household, death in household, major illness
in household, job loss in household, crop failure, head of household education, village population (logged), the
distance between the village and the sub-district capital, the number of schools per 1,000 households in the village,
the number of religious buildings per 1,000 households in the village, whether the village government head is elected
or appointed, the tenure of the current village head (in months), and ethnic and religious fragmentation in the village.
Standard errors are clustered by village. The dotted reference line indicates statistical significance at the 90% level.
The theory predicts attitudes across a broad range of government spending areas. Corruption
tends to increase support for expanding government spending on programs that are less vulnerable
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to local corruption, like gasoline subsidies, building roads, and LPG subsidies. By contrast, cor-
ruption tends to diminish support for expanding government spending on programs that are more
vulnerable to local corruption, like Raskin, health fee waivers for the poor23, and cash transfers to
the poor.
1.6.4 Robustness
To ensure that results are not driven by outliers, I take two precautions. First, I perform a
jackknife analysis, dropping one village at a time and reestimating the main model 194 times (Table
3, Model 1). Figure 10 plots the coefficients and standard errors from this exercise. Coefficients
are similar, and all are statistically significant.
23Although there are not rents to capture in the implementation of health fee waivers in the same way that local
officials can capture rents from the distribution of in-kind food aid and cash transfers, local officials still exert a high
degree of discretion in deciding who within the village will have access to the program.
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Figure 1.10: Jackknife Estimates of Effect of Corruption on Support for Gasoline Subsidies
Note: Figure 10 plots the coefficients and standard errors for share of subsidy missing in 194 separate models. Each
model drops one village. Each model is an ordered logit model for share of subsidy missing on a 3-category outcome
variable (“-1” = decrease government spending on fuel subsidies, “0” = selected neither to increase nor decrease
spending on fuel subsidies, and “1” = increase government spending on fuel subsidies). All models control for
vehicle ownership, transportation as a share of consumption, field ownership, household per capita consumption
(logged), female-headed household, death in household, major illness in household, job loss in household, crop
failure, head of household education, village population (logged), the distance between the village and the
sub-district capital, the number of schools per 1,000 households in the village, the number of religious buildings per
1,000 households in the village, whether the village government head is elected or appointed, the tenure of the
current village head (in months), and ethnic and religious fragmentation in the village. Standard errors are clustered
by village. The dotted reference line indicates statistical significance at the 90% level.
Second, due to the small number of households sampled per village, there may be a high degree
of variability in potential village-level estimates for corruption. To account for this variability, I
conduct an exercise which asks the hypothetical question: what would the estimate of corruption
be for this village if this household had not been selected into the sample? Dropping one household
at a time and reestimating corruption values results in 19 different potential values for corruption
for each village. I then randomly select one of these 19 values for each village and reestimate
all analyses 500 times. If results are similar across models, this lends confidence to the overall
relationship between corruption and attitudes and mitigates concerns that findings are driven by
outliers and variability due to sampling a relatively small number of respondents per village. Figure
11 plots the coefficients and standard errors from this exercise. Although the coefficient estimates
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are noisy, the estimates are consistently positive and significant even accounting for the sampling
variability. Table 9 (Appendix) replicates the main analysis using the maximum and minimum
possible corruption values for each village, and the main relationship holds.
Figure 1.11: Coefficients and Standard Errors with Sampling Variability
Note: Figure 8 plots the coefficients and standard errors for share of subsidy missing for 500 separate models. The
dotted reference line indicates statistical significance at the 90% level. Each point represents the coefficient and
standard error for estimated missing rice in a village calculated from a random draw for each village of one of the 19
potential values for missing rice in each village. I first calculate the 19 potential estimates for missing rice in a
village by randomly dropping one survey respondent per village and reestimating missing rice, imagining that
respondent hadn’t been selected into the sample. Second, I randomly draw one of the 19 estimates for missing rice
for each village and reestimate the ordered logit model in Model 1, Table 3. I do this 500 times. Each point on the
graph represents the coefficient and standard errors on missing rice for 500 draws.
Together, these exercises lend evidence that the estimated relationship between corruption and
attitudes is not drive by outliers or by imprecise corruption estimates.
1.7 Matching to Improve Inference
A problem with the empirical analysis in this study, as in others that assess the effects of corrup-
tion, is that corrupt villages may be different from uncorrupt villages along other dimensions. For
example, villages in Indonesia vary in the extent to which they are ethnically heterogeneous. Eth-
nically diverse villages may be less capable of collective action to monitor local officials, enabling
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higher levels of corruption. Olken (2006) finds evidence that more diverse villages are more cor-
rupt. And, ethnic diversity could independently affect attitudes towards government spending, say,
by affecting individuals’ willingness to redistribute wealth. When differences between treatment
and control units are of concern, matching can be used to balance the distribution of covariates to
help reduce bias in the estimates.
The objective of matching is to compare cases in which all other causal variables are as sim-
ilar as possible (except for corruption) so that differences in the outcome can be attributed to the
treatment (corruption). The original data contains 138 villages that experience corruption in the
implementation of transfer programs, compared to 56 villages with no estimated corruption. I use
propensity score matching to construct the matched sample. To estimate propensity scores, I run
a logistic regression with all village-level covariates as predictors. Two treatment villages that lie
outside the common support of the estimated propensity score are discarded.24 I then conduct
one-to-one nearest neighbor matching25 based on the estimated propensity score, allowing for re-
placement of control villages.26 The matching performs well, with 79% of the matches having an
absolute propensity score difference of less than 0.01 and all having a difference of less than 0.03
(the caliper used). Preprocessing the data in this way discards 16 control villages. The matched
data set then contains 176 villages (136 treatment villages and 40 control villages).
Matching leads to a balance improvement for most covariates (see Table 13, Appendix). An
exception is that matching actually reduces balance in whether village heads are elected or ap-
pointed, a key difference in local institutions in Indonesia (see Martinez-Bravo 2014). Although
whether village heads are elected or appointed is not significantly correlated with corruption in the
sample, democratic institutions are theoretically linked to both corruption and political attitudes,
making balance along this dimension important. Interestingly, the raw data exhibits almost no bias
on this dimension. I thus conduct an additional matching exercise which forces balance on whether
24I use a caliper of 0.03 to ensure that poor matches are not included. Using a caliper of 0.02 would mean that 12
treatment villages are off the common support. Results are robust to using the smaller caliper (available upon request).
25Results are robust to 2:1 and 3:1 matching as well (available upon request). I show the results from the 1:1
matching since not many observations are discarded.
26This allows a given “control” village to match to more than one “treatment” village, useful when the number of
control units is fewer than the number of treatment units (Ho et al. 2007).
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village heads are elected vs. appointed (see Table 14, Appendix). The tradeoff with this exercise
is that additional villages are discarded from the sample, resulting in a sample of 160 villages.
Finally, to reduce concerns that unobservables that are spatially correlated cause both corruption
and political attitudes, I match within districts. The tradeoff with forcing matches within districts
is that additional villages are discarded from the sample, resulting in a sample of 125 villages, and
the quality of the matches along observables is not as high.27 I show the results from all three
matching exercises.
Figure 1.12: Coefficients and Standard Errors with Sampling Variability
Note: Figure 12 plots the coefficients and standard errors for whether any subsidy is missing (any corruption) for
three separate ordered logit models. All models control for vehicle ownership, transportation as a share of
consumption, field ownership, household per capita consumption (logged), female-headed household, death in
household, major illness in household, job loss in household, crop failure, head of household education, village
population (logged), the distance between the village and the sub-district capital, the number of schools per 1,000
households in the village, the number of religious buildings per 1,000 households in the village, whether the village
government head is elected or appointed, the tenure of the current village head (in months), and ethnic and religious
fragmentation in the village. Standard errors are clustered by village. The reference line indicates statistical
significance at the 90% level.
Following Ho et al. (2007), I then estimate a parametric model using only the data in the
matched sample.28 I run the same model as reported in Table 3, incorporating the weights from
the matching. The coefficients and standard errors for the effect of corruption from each of the
three matching exercises are plotted in Figure 12. Across the three matching exercises, corruption
27The average difference between propensity scores doubles (although still small in absolute value, from 0.006 to
0.012).
28Using the preprocessed data (which compares only like units) ensures that results are not very sensitive to model
specification (Ho et al. 2007).
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increases support for gasoline subsidies.29 Relying on the first matching exercise, an individual
living in a village with corrupt local officials is 12.5 percentage points less likely to support de-
creasing spending on fuel subsidies, a 28% decrease from the sample mean. Corruption increases
the likelihood that an individual supports increasing spending on fuel subsidies by 68% compared
to the sample mean. The substantive effects from the matching exercise are almost identical to
those reported in the observational analysis. If anything, the effect of corruption is a little larger
using the preprocessed data.
1.8 Conclusions
Using household survey data from Indonesia, this paper tests how variation in local institu-
tional performance in the delivery of targeted social assistance programs shapes citizens’ support
for fuel subsidies. This paper measures local institutional performance by estimating corruption
in the delivery of Indonesia’s largest targeted social assistance program, Raskin, using a “gap”
measurement method. Higher levels of corruption are associated with increased support for fuel
subsidies. I argue that this is because whereas targeted social assistance programs require the in-
volvement of potentially corruption local officials, individuals can access fuel subsidies without
going through bureaucratic channels. Thus, when their local officials are corrupt, citizens will
prefer for the government to channel economic benefits to the population via fuel subsidies, by-
passing local institutions. I increase confidence in the finding through a host of robustness checks
and through matching methods.
This finding has important implications for current policy discussions on fuel subsidy reforms.
In its recent guide on how to successfully implement energy-pricing reforms, the IMF (2013)
argues that compensating the poor for increases in fuel prices through improved social policy is
key to successful reform. However, many countries utilize fuel subsidies as a redistributive tool
precisely because they lack the institutional capacity to execute alternative forms of social policy
(Victor 2009). My analysis suggests that institutional weakness in implementing social policy
29The coefficient on corruption is not statistically significant at conventional levels for the sample where matching
is forced within districts (p-value=0.15). However, the sample size is also smaller (N=780).
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is an important cause of public support for fuel subsidies among the poor. Initiatives to replace
fuel subsidies with social policy are unlikely to receive much support while institutions are weak.
Thus, strengthening institutional capacity to deliver alternative forms of social assistance for the
poor may be an important prerequisite for fuel subsidy reforms.
The paper also has several broader implications. First, the results show that energy and en-
vironmental policy cannot be studied in isolation from other governmental initiatives to provide
income support and relief from market risks. Because energy consumption represents a significant
share of households’ overall consumption, any governmental interventions in energy pricing affect
household consumption patterns. Removing government price ceilings on energy also subjects
households to the substantial price fluctuations in international commodity markets. Thus, the po-
tential effects of changes in energy pricing must take into account the other ways that governments
intervene in the economy that affect household income and risk exposure. Second, the findings
illustrate that local policy implementation can significantly shape support for national policies.
The way that individuals experience social policies may vary significantly depending on how local
politicians and bureaucrats implement those policies, even in developed countries. This is an im-
portant and understudied dimension of understanding individuals’ attitudes towards redistribution
and social policy generally.
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1.10 Appendix Tables and Figures
Table 1.4: Sample Demographics
Raw Weighted
Population Sample Eligible Ineligible Sample Eligible Ineligible
Overall
- % hh in urban areas 48.3 30.6 30.6 30.7 48.1 48.5 48.0
- % hh eligible for Raskin 27.0 61.2 100.0 0.0 27.6 100.0 0.0
- % hh in bottom 40% 40.0 31.1 37.0 22.0 39.9 54.1 34.5
- % hh in bottom 10% 10.0 4.5 5.7 2.7 10.0 17.8 7.0
Urban
- % hh in bottom 40% 32.5 23.1 26.7 17.3 32.5 46.4 27.2
- % hh in bottom 10% 7.4 2.0 3.0 0.4 7.4 18.5 3.2
Rural
- % hh in bottom 40% 47.1 34.8 41.5 24.1 46.8 61.4 41.3
- % hh in bottom 10% 12.5 5.6 6.9 3.6 12.3 17.0 10.5
Note: Table 4 provides population demographics, raw summary statistics from the sample, and weighted summary
statistics using entropy balancing. Population demographic statistics come from the World Bank (2012) and reflect
population demographics from 2010. I count households in the bottom 40% (10%) if their reported monthly per capita
expenditures are closer to the average per capita monthly expenditures for the bottom 40% (10%) than to the bottom
50% (20%) by province. Note that average by-province monthly per capita expenditure by consumption decile are
from 2010.
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Table 1.5: Corruption and Support for Fuel Subsidies, with District Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of subsidy missing (%) 1.04***
(0.38)
Any subsidy missing (dummy) 0.49**
(0.20)
Amt of subsidy missing (M Rp) 0.04***
(0.01)
Amt of subsidy missing, top-coded (M Rp) 0.01***
(0.00)
N 1,186 1,186 1,186 1,186
INCLUDES CONTROLS YES YES YES YES
INCLUDES DISTRICT FE YES YES YES YES
Note: *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value < 0.10. Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients and
standard errors come from ordered logit models using a 3-category outcome variable (“-1” = decrease government
spending on fuel subsidies, “0” = selected neither to increase nor decrease spending on fuel subsidies, and “1” =
increase government spending on fuel subsidies). Standard errors are clustered by village. All models contain
household- and village-level control variables as in Table 3 and district fixed effects.
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Table 1.6: Corruption and Support for Fuel Subsidies, Recoding Months with No Rice Purchases
as Missing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of subsidy missing (%) 0.99***
(0.36)
Any subsidy missing (dummy) 0.39**
(0.18)
Amt of subsidy missing (M Rp) 0.04***
(0.01)
Amt of subsidy missing, top-coded (M Rp) 0.01***
(0.00)
N 1,186 1,186 1,186 1,186
INCLUDES CONTROLS YES YES YES YES
Note: *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value < 0.10. Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients and
standard errors come from ordered logit models using a 3-category outcome variable (“-1” = decrease government
spending on fuel subsidies, “0” = selected neither to increase nor decrease spending on fuel subsidies, and “1” =
increase government spending on fuel subsidies). Standard errors are clustered by village. All models contain
household- and village-level control variables as in Table 3. Months with no reported Raskin purchases for the entire
village are recoded as missing in all corruption estimates.
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Table 1.7: Corruption and Support for Fuel Subsidies, Measuring Corruption Along Quantity Di-
mension Only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of rice missing (%) 1.05***
(0.37)
Any rice missing (dummy) 0.43**
(0.19)
Amt of rice missing (’000s of kg) 0.30***
(0.10)
Amt of rice missing, top-coded (’000s of kg) 0.08***
(0.02)
N 1,186 1,186 1,186 1,186
INCLUDES CONTROLS YES YES YES YES
Note: *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value < 0.10. Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients and
standard errors come from ordered logit models using a 3-category outcome variable (“-1” = decrease government
spending on fuel subsidies, “0” = selected neither to increase nor decrease spending on fuel subsidies, and “1” =
increase government spending on fuel subsidies). Standard errors are clustered by village. All models contain
household- and village-level control variables as in Table 3.
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Table 1.8: Corruption and Support for Fuel Subsidies, Among Below Median Consumption HH
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of subsidy missing (%) 0.70*
(0.38)
Any subsidy missing (dummy) 0.41*
(0.23)
Amt of subsidy missing (M Rp) 0.02
(0.01)
Amt of subsidy missing, top-coded (M Rp) 0.01
(0.00)
N 992 992 992 992
INCLUDES CONTROLS YES YES YES YES
Note: *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value < 0.10. Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients and
standard errors come from ordered logit models using a 3-category outcome variable (“-1” = decrease government
spending on fuel subsidies, “0” = selected neither to increase nor decrease spending on fuel subsidies, and “1” =
increase government spending on fuel subsidies). Standard errors are clustered by village. All models contain
household- and village-level control variables as in Table 3. The sample includes all households under the median
consumption level for the sample, regardless of whether they are officially eligible or ineligible to purchase Raskin.
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Table 1.9: Corruption and Support for Fuel Subsidies, Min-Max Corruption Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Share of subsidy missing, min (%) 0.99***
(0.37)
Share of subsidy missing, mean (%) 1.04***
(0.36)
Share of subsidy missing, max (%) 1.07***
(0.35)
N 1,186 1,186 1,186
INCLUDES CONTROLS YES YES YES
Note: *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value < 0.10. Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients and
standard errors come from ordered logit models using a 3-category outcome variable (“-1” = decrease government
spending on fuel subsidies, “0” = selected neither to increase nor decrease spending on fuel subsidies, and “1” =
increase government spending on fuel subsidies). Standard errors are clustered by village. All models contain
household- and village-level control variables as in Table 3. Model 1 estimates the relationship between corruption
and support for gasoline subsidies using the minimum possible value for corruption using the household-level
jackknifing exercise. Model 2 estimates the relationship between corruption and support for gasoline subsidies using
the mean value for corruption using the household-level jackknifing exercise. Model 3 estimates the relationship
between corruption and support for gasoline subsidies using the maximum possible value for corruption using the
household-level jackknifing exercise.
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Table 1.10: Logit Models for Selecting to Increase Spending on Fuel Subsidies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of subsidy missing (%) 0.57
(0.45)
Any subsidy missing (dummy) 0.37
(0.22)
Amt of subsidy missing (M Rp) 0.03**
(0.02)
Amt of subsidy missing, top-coded (M Rp) 0.01**
(0.005)
N 1,186 1,186 1,186 1,186
INCLUDES CONTROLS YES YES YES YES
Note: *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value < 0.10. Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients and
standard errors come from logit models using a 2-category outcome variable (“1” = increase government spending
on gasoline subsidies, “0” = did not select to increase spending on gasoline subsidies). Standard errors are clustered
by village. All models contain household- and village-level control variables as in Table 3.
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Table 1.11: Logit Models for Selecting to Decrease Spending on Fuel Subsidies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of subsidy missing (%) -1.33***
(0.45)
Any subsidy missing (dummy) -0.57***
(0.22)
Amt of subsidy missing (M Rp) -0.04***
(0.02)
Amt of subsidy missing, top-coded (M Rp) -0.01***
(0.005)
N 1,186 1,186 1,186 1,186
INCLUDES CONTROLS YES YES YES YES
Note: *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value < 0.10. Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients and
standard errors come from logit models using a 2-category outcome variable (“1” = decrease government spending
on gasoline subsidies, “0” = did not select to decrease spending on gasoline subsidies). Standard errors are
clustered by village. All models contain household- and village-level control variables as in Table 3.
62
Table 1.12: Correlates of Corruption, Village-Level
(1)
Village population, # HH (logged) -0.958**
(0.295)
Distance to sub-district capital (log) 0.257
(0.214)
Religious buildings per 1,000 HH -0.079**
(0.139)
Schools per 1,000 HH -0.104
(0.048)







Note: *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value < 0.10. Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients and
standard errors come from logit models using a 2-category outcome variable (“1” = village estimated to have
corruption, “0” = no estimated corruption).
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Table 1.13: Differences in Means between Corrupt and Un-corrupt Villages Before and After
Matching
Mean
Std. % Bias % Improvement
Corruption No Corruption
Village population, # HH (logged) Unmatched 6.84 7.20 -49.9
Matched 6.84 6.66 26.6 46.6
Distance to sub-district capital (logged) Unmatched 1.51 1.30 23.6
Matched 1.49 1.21 31.5 -33.4
Religious buildings per 1,000 HH Unmatched 4.54 5.71 -31.2
Matched 4.54 5.49 -22.2 28.7
Schools per 1,000 HH Unmatched 2.70 2.82 -8.1
Matched 2.71 2.73 -1.5 81.7
Village head is elected Unmatched 0.66 0.70 -7.9
Matched 0.66 0.74 -15.7 -98.7
Ethnic fragmentation Unmatched 0.75 0.79 -15.3
Matched 0.75 0.77 -5.8 62.3
Religious fragmentation Unmatched 0.93 0.90 20.3
Matched 0.93 0.95 -14.5 28.5
Table 13 shows shows the means in the village-level covariates before and after matching as well as the percent
balance improvement over the raw data. Matching improves balance on most dimensions, except for whether or not
village heads are elected and the distance to the sub-district capital.
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Table 1.14: Differences in Means between Corrupt and Un-corrupt Villages Before and After
Matching, Forcing Balance on Village Elections
Mean
Std. % Bias % Improvement
Corruption No Corruption
Village population, # HH (logged) Unmatched 6.84 7.20 -49.9
Matched 6.85 6.77 10.6 78.7
Distance to sub-district capital (logged) Unmatched 1.51 1.30 23.6
Matched 1.51 1.32 21.6 8.5
Religious buildings per 1,000 HH Unmatched 4.54 5.71 -31.2
Matched 4.68 5.24 -14.8 52.6
Schools per 1,000 HH Unmatched 2.70 2.82 -8.1
Matched 2.88 2.64 17.0 -109.9
Village head is elected Unmatched 0.66 0.70 -7.9
Matched 0.75 0.75 0 100.0
Ethnic fragmentation Unmatched 0.75 0.79 -15.3
Matched 0.79 0.78 5.2 65.9
Religious fragmentation Unmatched 0.93 0.90 20.3
Matched 0.93 0.94 -7.1 64.9
Table 14 shows shows the means in the village-level covariates before and after matching as well as the percent
balance improvement over the raw data. To force balance in whether or not village heads are elected, I match within
elected vs. appointed villages. Matching improves balance on most dimensions, except for the number of schools per
capita.
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Table 1.15: Differences in Means between Corrupt and Un-corrupt Villages Before and After
Matching Within Districts
Mean
Std. % Bias % Improvement
Corruption No Corruption
Village population, # HH (logged) Unmatched 6.84 7.20 -49.9
Matched 6.83 6.75 10.6 78.7
Distance to sub-district capital (logged) Unmatched 1.51 1.30 23.6
Matched 1.57 1.39 21.0 11.0
Religious buildings per 1,000 HH Unmatched 4.54 5.71 -31.2
Matched 5.14 5.21 -1.9 93.7
Schools per 1,000 HH Unmatched 2.70 2.82 -8.1
Matched 2.96 3.20 -16.5 -104.1
Village head is elected Unmatched 0.66 0.70 -7.9
Matched 0.77 0.86 -18.9 -140.2
Ethnic fragmentation Unmatched 0.75 0.79 -15.3
Matched 0.81 0.79 6.7 56.1
Religious fragmentation Unmatched 0.93 0.90 20.3
Matched 0.93 0.95 -13.6 33.0
Table 15 shows shows the means in the village-level covariates before and after matching as well as the percent
balance improvement over the raw data. Matching improves balance on most dimensions, except for whether or not




Risks and Rewards: How Political
Institutions Shape Oil Income
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2.1 Introduction
Why are some countries flush with cash from oil? The most common answers to this question are
geology and oil prices. Countries that combine favorable geology with high oil prices will expe-
rience wealth windfalls, with oil revenues falling like “manna from the heavens” into government
coffers. In other words, random chance shapes the distribution of oil wealth across countries and
determines which governments are fortunate enough to receive revenues that are, in theory, easier
to collect and conceal than ordinary tax revenues.
Recent literature has begun to question this assumption, recognizing that politicians can enact
policies that increase or decrease the state’s oil income. For example, governments can delib-
erately court investment in the oil sector, seeking to launch discovery efforts and to increase oil
production (Menaldo, forthcoming). Policy choices about the taxes and royalties that are assessed
on oil production determine the division of oil rents–the surplus of oil revenues after subtracting
costs of extraction–between government coffers and private oil companies. These choices can be
heavily influenced by politics, as political competition can shape whether or not politicians seek to
maximize or reduce the state’s claim to rents (Dunning 2010). Politicians also design the structure
of the relationship between the government, nationally-owned oil companies (NOCs), and interna-
tional oil companies (IOCs), determining whether, for example, oil endowments are state-owned
and whether NOCs will participate in oil development (Jones Luong and Weinthal 2006, 2010).
In line with these contributions, this study advances an understanding of oil income as the out-
come of deliberate policy choices. In doing so, I bring together many of the policy choices about
how to govern natural resource endowments that are typically examined separately. By examining
these factors jointly, I show that governments are forced to make trade-offs. For example, govern-
ments can increase their participation in oil development (by claiming ownership stakes in projects
for NOCs) as a means of increasing their claim to oil rents. In doing so, however, they are also
increasing their exposure to the risks of oil exploration and oil price volatility. Or, governments
can secure higher investment guarantees from IOCs in order to intensify oil exploration activity,
but they must sacrifice their overall claim to oil rents to do so. A key contribution of the paper
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is to identify how trade-offs between rent collection, risk exposure, and investment levels work in
theory and in practice (section 3). Using original data on 825 historically confidential oil contracts
and pieces of legislation governing the hydrocarbons sector from 55 countries (1974-2004), I show
empirically that countries that maximize their claims to oil rents do so by increasing their risk
exposure and reducing investment levels. This first finding motivates a second question: why do
politicians make different trade-offs in designing a regime to govern the oil sector?
I argue that differences in resource governance can be understood more broadly as different
balances of risks and rewards over time (section 4). A taxation regime relying more heavily on
forms of taxation that are not linked to the profitability of oil discoveries enables governments to
collect revenues more quickly and with less risk. However, heavily weighting taxes towards the
present constrains the overall amount of taxation that a government can impose while still securing
investment in the oil sector, reducing future oil income. Governments able to assume some risk
over the level of oil income may have to wait to collect revenues but can end up with higher shares
of oil rents and higher shares of windfall profits.
Beyond the importance of oil income itself due to its centrality in comparative politics and its
significant share of the global economy, examining how governments make trade-offs over time in
oil governance offers an opportunity to test classic theories about what types of leaders are more
likely to make policy choices that maximize long-run welfare. In particular, I focus on how polit-
ical regimes and politicians’ security in office shape trade-offs over time in the design of taxation
regimes. There are two views on how political regimes may influence taxation regimes. First,
democracies and autocracies differ systematically in terms of their ability to make credible com-
mitments not to expropriate from investors. This could reduce the need for democracies to offer
tax incentives to investors, for example, and enable them to secure overall better deals vis-a-vis
multinational companies. Alternatively, democracies could have lower optimal tax rates than au-
tocracies because they have a more encompassing interest in long-run economic growth. However,
differences within regimes can be as important as differences between them in shaping the gov-
ernment’s relationship to investors. New democracies may be especially predatory towards private
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property (Przeworski 1991), and stable autocracies can successfully protect private property (Ol-
son 1993). Therefore, I also consider the effect of leaders’ time horizons on how they balance the
risks and rewards of oil development over the long-term.
In evaluating these arguments, I focus exclusively on middle- and low-income (non-OECD),
oil-producing countries. Many studies of the effect on oil on political and economic development
focus on the difference between Norway and Nigeria in the management of oil endowments, but we
know comparatively less about why Colombia manages its resource endowment better than, say,
Ecuador. Many new discoveries over the next years will be in new rather than mature producers.
These new producers are making policies over resource governance for the first time, and there
is significant room for improvement. Paul Collier dramatically claims that “the countries of the
bottom billion have one lifeline: nature,” or, more precisely, natural resources (2010: p. 3). He
argues that optimally managing resource extraction is the biggest development opportunity for
the world’s poorest countries. Examining differences among developing countries in resource
management offers the opportunity to offer more policy insights about how developing countries
can improve resource governance with a realistic benchmark.
I find that democracies and autocracies pursue two distinct strategies with regards to developing
their oil sector. More democratic countries, that should be better able to commit to long-term
contracts and thus secure better up-front deals, in fact set lower tax rates and collect fewer up-front
revenues, enabling them to assume lower levels of project risk and to increase the commercial
viability of marginal fields. They utilize exogenous increases in their bargaining power to secure
higher levels of foreign investment. In other words, they are taking a long view with regards to
their oil sector, enacting policies that can increase the overall size of their reserves over time. To
do so, they set lower tax rates. More autocratic countries, by contrast, tend to ratchet up tax rates
on large oil fields, frequently assuming some of the project risk themselves, often at the expense of
investment levels and the commerciality of smaller fields. In other words, they extract more from
the existing resource base but they do less to increase the size of the resource base over time.
Further, I find differences within democracies based on the maturity of democratic institutions:
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democracies led by more institutionalized political parties (with longer time horizons) are less
likely to front-load taxation regimes, enabling them to secure relatively higher overall tax rates
compared to democracies led by less mature parties. They are also more likely to design taxation
regimes that anticipate potential changes in market conditions and enable governments to reap
the benefits of windfall profit scenarios. Instead, autocratic leaders with shorter time horizons
use exogenous increases in their bargaining power to front-load taxation regimes rather than to
secure more investment. Whereas the benefits of higher tax rates can take years to pay off in
the oil sector, acts that front-load tax regimes (e.g. collecting signatory bonuses), by comparison,
offer comparatively quick revenue turn-arounds for insecure leaders looking for immediate revenue
increases.
Overall, these findings suggest that democracies and autocracies are pursuing fundamentally
different strategies in governing natural resources. Democracies tend to manage their resource
endowments with an eye towards the long-term, adopting policies that encourage investment in
order to increase the size of the resource base over time. More institutionalized democracies pursue
this strategy to an even greater extent. By contrast, autocracies tend to focus on extracting higher
shares of rents from the existing reserve base, and leaders with shorter time horizons focus even
more narrowly on front-loading their claims to rents.
In summary, I address how political regimes and leader time horizons shape natural resource
governance. In doing so, I engage several academic and policy debates. First, I establish that
governments can and do make policy choices that influence the level of oil income in government
coffers both today and in the future, implying that oil income is endogenous to many of the polit-
ical outcomes that oil is thought to cause. I show that many of the characteristics of oil rents that
are theorized to affect political outcomes–including their size, timing, and volatility–are shaped by
policy choices. Indeed, many studies of the political economy of oil argue that oil affects political
development through its influence on policies without actually examining the policies themselves
or acknowledging that political development also influence the policies. Even among studies that
explicitly theorize the relationship between oil, political development, and policy choices, the con-
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tributions tend to be theoretical rather than empirical (e.g. Robinson et al. 2006). This study both
theorizes the relationships and offers new data to illustrate how they work in practice.
Second, I enter into the debates on the role of regime type and time horizons in host country
relationships with multinational corporations. Often, these relationships are studied by looking at
foreign direct investment (FDI) flows generally or FDI flows within sectors, but this is muddled by
differences in quality and price of products produced in different countries. It can be difficult to
compare tax regimes across countries that govern essentially different products traded in different
markets. By focusing on these relationships in the context of a single commodity traded in a single
international market, we can more clearly identify the relationship between political regimes and
time horizons and differences in taxation regimes. Further, by examining the full menu of poli-
cies that governments use in designing ownership regimes–including government participation, tax
levels, and flexibility of tax regimes–rather than focusing on a single dimension, I can elucidate
the overall strategies that different governments are using to govern resource endowments. These
strategies can be obscured by focusing on a single dimension of revenue collection, such as tax lev-
els. In broadening the scope of FDI policies that I examine, I also offer a different interpretation of
government participation than is typically seen in the literature. Rather than viewing government
ownership as a zero-sum shift of benefits from multinational companies to host country govern-
ments, I argue that government participation also reallocates risk between parties, implying that it
is a strategy with both costs and benefits for both parties.
Third, decisions about natural resource governance parallel a broader class of political phe-
nomena. Essentially, deciding how to tax oil production requires balancing short-term against
long-term revenues. Governments face many decisions which require balancing the short-term
against the long-term—such as, whether to forego current consumption to invest in education,
whether to enact costly environmental regulations now in the hopes of reducing the effects of
climate change, or whether to undertake costly pension reform (Jacobs 2011). A theory of in-
tertemporal allocation of oil rents should shed light on other policies that require similar trade-offs
over time. These questions of time are relatively understudied—but essential—to governance.
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The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I describe the bargaining environment between
host country governments and multinational oil companies, focusing on time inconsistency dilem-
mas inherent to FDI, particularly in the extractive industries. Given the bargaining environment,
section 3 outlines the trade-off between maximizing oil revenues in the short-term and securing a
greater share of oil income over the long-term. In doing so, it offers an overview of different tax
regime designs and the nuts and bolts of how governments tax the oil sector. I then empirically
establish that trade-offs exist in designing tax regimes by analyzing the design of real oil contracts.
In the fourth section, I offer a theory for how political regimes and time horizons shape tax regime
design based on the time horizons over which the costs and benefits of various tax regime designs
will accrue. The fifth section outlines the data collection process, defends the strategy for using
the information in oil contracts and legislation to assess tax regimes, and addresses concerns about
missing data on oil contracts. Section 6 evaluates the argument. The final section concludes and
offers ideas on how the paper advances theoretical and policy debates.
2.2 Oil investments and credibility of commitments
Oil contracts are long-term arrangements between governments and companies negotiated to gov-
ern projects with a specific economic structure. In particular, extraction and development of oil
requires large outlays of capital during early years. These investments in oil exploration are large
and highly specific. It is difficult to use an oil well to do something other than drill for oil, and, once
sunk, oil wells are difficult to move. There is then a lag between investments and returns; investors
must wait several years before oil discoveries come online and even longer before enough oil has
been produced to fully recover sunk costs. And, there is no guarantee that investments in oil explo-
ration will yield returns. Ninety percent of oil exploration efforts result in a loss (Radon 2005: p.
62). Governments typically lack the large sums of capital, the ability to withstand significant risk
to this capital, and the technical capacity to undertake these investments on their own. As a result,
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governments often rely on international oil corporations (IOCs), which could be privately-owned
or publicly-owned entities investing abroad1, to develop oil endowments.
Having a second party develop oil endowments introduces a conflict of interest. IOCs need to
recover the costs of oil exploration and development and wish to retain as many of the rents as
possible. Host countries (HCs), on the other hand, want to collect as many of the rents as possible
while still attracting and maintaining foreign investment. Additionally, each party would like to
secure its goals while absorbing as little risk as possible. When parties are responsible for paying
the costs for sinking exploration wells, they assume the risk that the amount of oil discovered will
be below what would be necessary for a commercial discovery.
Parties also have to manage oil price volatility. In the past 10 years alone, oil prices have
swung from $54 a barrel in 2005 to an all-time high of $147 a barrel in mid-2008 to below $50
barrel today. Take Cote d’Ivoire as an example, a minor oil producer at 37,000 barrels of oil per
day. In 2013, the difference between $147 a barrel and $47 a barrel amounts to a difference in gross
revenues from oil production of $3.7 million per day, or $1.3 trillion per year and 6% of GDP.2
Governments could collect a fixed amount of revenue each year, forcing IOCs to bear all the risks
of price volatility. However, when IOCs bear all the risks from low oil prices, they also capture
all the upside when prices rise. Conversely, governments can pay IOCs a fixed amount to extract
oil each year, assuming all of the risk of price volatility themselves as well as the opportunity to
capture all of the upside from price booms. More commonly, governments and IOCs share the
risks of price volatility but to varying extents.
HCs and IOCs negotiate oil contracts that allocate the risks and rewards from oil extraction
between parties. A central issue in the negotiation of these contracts is that contracts negotiated
1Some nationally-owned oil companies are increasingly behaving like privately-owned oil companies and investing
in oil exploration and production outside of their home states. Jones Luong and Sierra argue that whether state-owned
oil companies invest abroad depends on whether the company emerged from a consensual or conflictual national-
ization process and whether company managers’ and governments’ interests regarding internationalization converged
(forthcoming).
2This is an incredible amount of volatility for governments to manage. Indeed, van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009)
find that natural resources can have a positive effect on growth, but that this effect is overshadowed by a larger, indirect
and negative effect of commodity price volatility on growth. This volatility is one of the primary reasons, they argue,
that we tend to observe low average growth rates in commodity-exporting developing countries.
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with a sovereign government are difficult to enforce. Contracts between private parties can appeal
to courts when contractual terms are reneged upon or renegotiated without proper compensation.
However, IOCs have limited means to force governments to abide by contractual terms. MNCs can
seek international arbitration through the International Chamber of Commerce or the International
Centre for the Settlement of Disputes to demand compensation for adverse changes to contractual
terms, but state ownership of oil is often enshrined in the constitution, meaning that states can
invoke sovereign immunity by arguing that changes to petroleum laws are “an issue of public
interest and not subject to foreign arbitration” (Witten 2008-9: p. 72). For example, the Venezuelan
Constitution enacted in 1999 directly links hydrocarbons ownership and the public interest:
[F]ields of minerals and hydrocarbons existing in the national territory, in the ter-
ritorial sea, in the exclusive economic zone, and on the continental shelf belong to
the republic, are under the regime of public ownership, and hence give rise to inalien-
able and imprescriptible national rights (Constitucion de la Rcpublica Bolivariana de
Venezuela art. 12, as cited in Witten 2008-9: p. 72).
Adding to the limited enforceability of contracts, the economic circumstances that shaped the
initial contractual agreement shift over the life of an oil field. When initial bargains are struck,
investors have the upper hand in bargaining, as host countries can rarely command the capital and
technology required for oil development. Because investors are putting their capital at high risk,
they require a high rate of return to make this initial outlay worthwhile, forcing host governments
to offer attractive terms to attract foreign capital.
Once investments are sunk, however, the initial terms of the bargain to “obsolesce” (Vernon
1971). Since initial capital outlays are sunk costs for companies, companies have incentives to
continue to produce oil even if the terms of the initial bargain shift.3 Further, domestic actors
3However, we may overestimate IOCs’ willingness to continue to produce when initial contractual terms are ad-
versely changed, and this willingness may vary among IOCs. In September 2006, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez
demanded increased ownership in oil production for Venezuela’s state-owned oil company, PDVSA (from an average
of 40% to 60-83%). Chevron, Statoil, BP, and Total agreed to these new terms, but ConocoPhillips and ExxonMobil
walked away from their investment to seek compensation through international arbitration. This process took 7 years,
and ExxonMobil was awarded about 10% of what they claimed the value of the project was ($1.6 versus $16.6 billion)
(Vyas and Gilbert 2014).
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begin to gain expertise in oil extraction, making threats of full or partial nationalization of the oil
industry more credible. Knowing this, host governments can essentially hold investments hostage
under the threat of taking full control over the oil industry, and, using this threat, can extract higher
shares of profits. Given the shift in bargaining power after the initial bargain is struck combined
with lack of contract enforceability, governments have difficulty credibly committing to long-term
contractual arrangements.
In theory, the time-inconsistency problems should determine how HCs and IOCs divide prof-
its. If IOCs anticipate expropriation, then they will only offer a contract that compensates them
for this risk. However, this only makes expropriation more likely, as such a contract would put
governments in the position of receiving especially low gains in a windfall profit environment.
Moreover, if IOCs signed the initial terms expecting that the HC would expropriate, then they are
essentially receiving a windfall profit if the government fails to expropriate.4 Thus, it is possible
for governments to fall into a cycle. The inability to credibly commit leads to contracts that are
more vulnerable to expropriations (because they fail to fairly compensate the government), and a
history of expropriations increases government’s reputation for expropriations, further reducing the
credibility of the governments’ commitments (Hogan et al. 2010; Summers 2010). This problem is
exacerbated because it is not just that parties must deal with the anticipated shift over time in bar-
gaining power between IOCs and HCs but also with potentially large changes in market conditions
(e.g. swings in oil prices, shifts in demand, or supply shocks).
These vicious cycles of granting overly permissive contractual terms, followed by expropria-
tions, followed by even more permissive contractual terms and more expropriations should deter
the kind of large investments required to develop oil resources. However, investment in natu-
ral resources is even higher in countries with weak administrative capacity and insecure property
rights compared to stronger states (Menaldo, forthcoming). One explanation is that an increase in
resource reserves creates a more attractive investment climate, allowing governments of resource-
rich countries to maintain higher average levels of both expropriation and investment compared
4One could argue that if expropriation is anticipated and it is factored into the initial deal, then it is not really
expropriation in the sense that an IOCs’ assets are seized without fair compensation.
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to resource-poor countries (Jensen and Johnston 2011). However, expropriation in a resource-
rich country should still reduce investment compared to a counterfactual in the same resource-rich
country that never expropriates.5
Conflating this discussion is the idea that expropriations contain purely upside for governments
and purely downside for IOCs. But, assuming greater ownership stakes in oil development also
means assuming some of the risk inherent in oil exploration and development. Even if the explo-
ration costs are already sunk for an expropriated asset, governments often reimburse IOCs for their
share of the costs already sunk as well as the book value of the expropriated assets (see Maurer
2013 on compensation in the Mexico nationalizations). Going forward, greater ownership also
means less stability of income for governments, more exposure to oil price volatility, and respon-
sibility for remaining capital investments and lifting costs. After partial or full nationalization, to
the extent that governments decide to explore and develop any new fields, then they bear explo-
ration risks (which means putting large sums of capital at risk). In other words, expropriations
enable government to increase their claim on the profits of oil extraction, but, in doing so, they
increase their exposure to risks. So, by expropriating, governments not only potentially reduce
future private investments, they also put their own capital at greater risk.
Counterintuitively, expropriations can also provide benefits to IOCs. HCs now bear a portion
of the risk and pay some of the costs of oil development. Further, financial arrangements in which
the HC takes an ownership stake could actually allow for more credible commitments as compared
to an arrangement where the HC has no stake. Government equity stakes function as a progressive
form of revenue collection: governments collect higher shares of profits as profits grow.6 This
has two effects, both of which reduce the likelihood that the bargain will be renegotiated. First,
5In theory, acts of expropriation in the oil industry could have spillover reputation effects on other industries.
Indeed, Jensen and Johnston (2011) argue that natural resource wealth decreases a country’s incentives to uphold any
contract with private investors (not just in the resource sector) and find that natural resource wealth increases political
risks for firms generally. Tomz and Wright (2010), on the other hand, argue that the costs of expropriation are mostly
confined within sectors. Expropriations in the oil industry are rarely punished in international debt markets, and vice
versa.
6This isn’t always the case. In some arrangements, state ownership functions financially more similar to a royalty
(if the state pays its share of costs out of its share of production after the costs are incurred). I show how different
forms of equity affect the progressiveness / regressiveness of the fiscal regime in the Appendix.
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governments with higher claims to profits have lower incentive to expropriate (Jensen and Johnston
2011). Second, progressive taxation regimes, in which the governments’ claim to profits rises with
profits, are more stable because they are less likely to result in a windfall profit situation in which
the government is receiving an unfairly small share (Stroebel and van Benthem 2013). Under this
logic, expropriations could result in regimes that offer lower but more stable returns for IOCs.
IOCs recognize these benefits. As an example within the extractives sector, Kennecott mining
in Chile offered to sell the Chilean Copper Corporation, the state-owned copper company, a 51
percent interest in the El Teniente mine as a “strategy of protection” (Moran 1973: p. 277). Future
investments in the mine would be financed from the proceeds of the sale. Thus, Kennecott was
able to expand the mine at no additional financial risk to themselves. Further, by offering the gov-
ernment a partial ownership stake in the mine, Kennecott hoped to satisfy the growing demands for
national sovereignty in the mining sector while maintaining a return on investment. In fact, Moran
argues that increasing government ownership in a joint venture is a good strategy to protect cor-
porate assets abroad in the absence of the gunboat diplomacy that once provided private property
protections for oil companies operating abroad (ibid.).
Expropriation events offer IOCs opportunities for low risk investments. At the extreme, coun-
tries that have fully nationalized oil industries but need private capital to finance exploration can
offer risk service contracts. Under these arrangements, HCs pay IOCs a flat fee to explore and de-
velop oil fields, leaving HCs to bear all of the investment risk. Iran’s well-known “buyback” con-
tracts functioned like this. Under the buyback contracts, the IOC provides the capital and develops
an oil or gas field; they are subsequently repaid from sales revenues based upon an agreed-upon
rate of return that is specified within the contract. Once production begins, control of the field
reverts to the National Iranian Oil Company. Thus, Iran captures any profits that accrue in excess
of the remuneration to the IOC. However, Iran also bears the risk that oil or gas discoveries will be
below expectations (they still have to reimburse contractors).7
7IOCs have argued that they bear risk under the buyback agreements as well. They are responsible for cost overruns
beyond the agreed-upon expenditure levels, and they have uncertain payment timelines given that payments are made
out of a percentage of production. If production is below expected levels or if oil prices sink too low, this may
significantly delay cost reimbursement (van Groenendaal and Mazraati 2006).
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The literature on expropriation views it as an opportunistic grab by HCs that financially harms
IOCs. As such, it considers only one dimension of the fiscal regimes that govern oil extraction, the
division of profits. However, expropriations are also reallocations of risk between parties. Consid-
ering risks and rewards together–and the trade-offs that can be made along these dimensions–yields
a fuller picture of how HCs vs. IOCs benefit from the development of oil endowments. Looking
at both who bears the risk and who captures the rewards also helps explain why IOCs continue to
invest in oil development in countries with insecure property rights.
The main focus of this paper is how the fiscal regimes that govern oil extraction–defined within
oil contracts between IOCs and HCs as well as by HC laws and regulations–divide risks and re-
wards between parties. In the following section, I discuss the dimensions of a fiscal regime that
confer value to HCs and MNCs, the most common types of contracts, the terms within contracts
that determine how the risks and rewards of oil investment are allocated between parties, and the
trade-offs between different types of risks and rewards in both theory and practice. In Section 3, I
offer an explanation for why governments pursue contractual arrangements with different weight-
ings of risks and rewards.
2.3 Oil income: Risks vs. rewards
2.3.1 Are governments getting a good deal?
Oil contracts are notoriously complex. Given the complexity of oil contracts, there is no simple
way to tell whether governments received a good value for their resources. There are at least
five key dimensions of contracts that reflect the extent to which the HC’s interests are secured.8
However, there are trade-offs among these dimensions, and governments cannot pursue all interests
8Some of the value of an oil contract could also be contained within non-fiscal clauses, such as how liabilities are
determined for environmental damages, companies’ obligations with regards to local employment and training, and
utilization of local materials and services. However, these social and environmental obligations are often omitted from





First, the most common statistic used to evaluate contracts is government take, the govern-
ment’s share of the economic profits from resource extraction over the life of the contract. In other
words, government take is the effective tax rate on (undiscounted) oil rents, reflecting the effects
of the many means that governments use to collect revenues, including corporate income tax, roy-
alties, production-sharing, and government participation, among other instruments. Calculating
government take is a complicated exercise; it requires making assumptions about production lev-
els, costs of extraction, and oil prices, among other things. Government take can be sensitive to
these assumptions, as will be discussed more in depth in Section 4.
Overly high or low government take statistics can be deceptive. The governments’ claim to
profits influences whether or not an oil discovery is commercial: with very high levels of govern-
ment take, oil fields will not be developed that would be under different fiscal arrangements. Even
if a contract allowed governments to collect 99% of profits, they can only collect these profits if oil
is actually developed. Oil would only be developed in that scenario if the field size was very large
and the geological and market conditions made profit levels extraordinarily high (either because
costs of extraction are very low or prices are very high).
A low government take statistic, on the other hand, can look like a bad deal for governments.
However, low tax rates can make marginal discoveries commercial and encourage higher levels
of investment, potentially increasing the overall size of discovered reserves down the line. Low
government take could be necessary to attract investment when costs are very high or prices very
low.9 Further, even if a particular level of government take could secure a positive net present value
for IOCs, they are less induced to invest if the government take means that they will yield a lower
return than if they had invested the same capital in another country.
The trade-off between government take and investment can be seen in practice in Ecuador
9Chad is often cited as an example of a country that got a bad deal during initial contract negotiations because the
government take statistic was lower (around 40%) than other countries. However, this does not take into consideration
the fact that the transportation costs in Chad were very high and the quality of oil relatively low (Johnston 2007).
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during the recent oil price boom. Between 2006 and 2010, Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa
increased the windfall profits tax to 99%, nationalized the assets of a French energy company
(Perenco), and undertook a wave of contract renegotiations. These actions increased the gov-
ernments’ claims to oil rents from 70% to 80%. However, the contract renegotiations secured
investment obligations of only $1.2 billion in Ecuador’s oil industry over the next four years, the
same amount that had been invested in 2006 alone. Reduced investment was rapidly reflected in
declining oil production: between 2006 and 2010, oil production fell from 255,700 barrels per year
to 162,000, a gap worth 4% of GDP (at 2010 oil prices) (“If It Ain’t Broke...” 2010).
2.3.1.2 Front-Loaded Payments
Second, governments want to secure their share of the economic profits from oil extraction
sooner rather than later. In other words, they care about the extent to which contracts are front-loaded.
Governments can collect revenues sooner rather than later by demanding signing bonuses and by
setting limits on IOCs’ ability to recover costs. The timing of revenues can be crucial both eco-
nomically and politically.
From an economic perspective, governments of developing countries may reasonably have
higher discount rates than the IOCs they bargain with. Returns on investment should be higher in a
capital poor environment if resource rents are invested in productive areas.10 Further, consumption
today is worth more in countries that are poorer (Collier et al. 2010).
From a political perspective, failing to front-weight revenues can create thorny political dilem-
mas. It can take years after production begins for IOCs to fully recover exploration costs and move
into a tax-paying position. Once oil starts flowing, however, citizens may expect to start benefiting
from oil revenues that are not yet materializing in government coffers. Ross (2012) argues that
if citizens believe their government is failing to deliver sufficient services relative to the revenues
they are collecting, they will seek to replace the ruler, either by rebelling (in autocracies) or voting
10If resource-producing countries deplete natural capital more quickly than they build up other forms of capital
(e.g. financial, human), then resource extraction makes countries poorer over time (Heal 2007). Said another way,
resource-rich countries can only maintain current consumption levels if rents from nonrenewable natural resources are
continuously invested. This is known as the Hartwick Rule (Hartwick 1977; Solow 1986).
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the incumbent out of office (in democracies). When citizens pay taxes, he argues, they can make
reasonable assessments of how much the government is collecting in tax revenue relative to how
much it is spending. The secrecy of oil revenues, however, enables governments of oil-producing
countries, particularly autocratic ones, to collect revenues that citizens cannot directly observe.
Thus, citizens could falsely conclude that governments of oil-producing countries are performing
well relative to the revenues they are collecting because they are underestimating these revenues
(Ross 2012: ch. 3).
However, citizens could just as easily overestimate the size of government revenues from oil,
causing their demand for government spending to exceed revenues. Jones Luong and Weinthal
(2010) cite overly high citizen expectations about their right to benefit from oil revenues as one of
the key causes of the resource curse: when resources are state-owned, citizen expectations about
benefiting from resource rents escalate, pushing the state to overspend on patronage and resulting
in the deterioration of institutions and the economy. Mismatches between citizen expectations and
the size of government revenues should be particularly high during early production years under a
fiscal regime that fails to front-load taxation obligations. Citizens can observe oil flowing, but do
not observe that oil projects are not yet profitable from an accounting perspective.11
Collecting revenues up-front is not costless. In theory, taxes that front-weight revenue collec-
tion for the government tend to delay capital investment and reduce total investments compared to
neutral taxes (Smith 2012). Front-weighting revenue collection can also be problematic because
it requires a more difficult intertemporal commitment from the government to the IOC. Resource
contracts are negotiated under conditions of imperfect information: neither governments nor com-
panies know for sure whether commercial reserves will be discovered. If no commercial reserves
are discovered, then up-front payments to the government can look like a smart strategy because
they secured payments to the government even in the absence of a valuable discovery. However,
if commercial reserves are discovered, then governments will be incentivized to renegotiate con-
tracts. Companies anticipate the risk of rising tax rates ex ante. So, oil contracts are typically
11Christensen (2015) applies a similar logic in the mining sector, arguing that overly high citizens expectations
about the profits from mining activities sow the seeds for local protests around mining sites.
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designed to address this commitment problem by compensating investors ex ante for the risks of
renegotiation of initial contractual terms, usually by offering generous depletion and cost recovery
allowances. To the extent that contracts instead front-load tax obligations, this requires companies
to put more initial capital at risk. They could compensate for this either by reducing early capital
investments or by demanding lower overall tax obligations.
2.3.1.3 Exploration Risk
Third, contracts allocate risk between parties. Significant risk is involved in the hydrocarbons
sector, and who bears the risk plays a major role in determining the value of the contract. In
general, HCs would like to secure greater shares of profits and secure those shares sooner and at
lower levels of risk. IOCs would like to do the same.
Much of the comparative politics literature takes government ownership of natural resources
as a foregone conclusion. Governments have long claimed ownership of subsoil mineral deposits;
Ross (2012) traces governments’ claim to mineral rights back to the Roman Empire (ch. 2). Indeed,
one of the defining features of the rentier state is that predatory leaders easily capture and control
resource rents (e.g. Karl 1997; Mahdavy 1970; Vandewalle 1998). However, it is important not
to conflate state ownership with state control (Jones Luong and Weinthal 2010). Even if states
own oil endowments in the sense that reserves in the ground are considered government assets
and only the government has the right to decide how and when oil is extracted, they may transfer
ownership to private companies at the wellhead (as soon as oil leaves the ground), transfer only
partial ownership to private companies (by taking an equity stake in a joint venture), or maintain
full ownership and control over extraction (by fully nationalizing the oil industry). In fact, very
few countries maintain full ownership and control over the entire life cycle of oil from exploration
to marketing. Mexico and Saudi Arabia are prominent examples, yet even these countries have
utilized private companies as subcontractors for varies parts of the value chain.12
Increasing government ownership provides benefits for HCs. They can use greater ownership to
12The tendency to over-estimate state ownership can be seen in the fact that empirical studies use the mere formation
of a state-owned oil company as evidence of expropriation within the oil industry (e.g. Mahdavi 2014).
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increase government take in a project. Further, government equity stakes function as a progressive
form of revenue collection: governments collect higher shares of profits as profits grow. Gov-
ernment participation in joint ventures with more experienced IOCs could also enhance domestic
technical and human capital capacity to explore and develop for oil over the long run.
However, government participation, in addition to increasing the government’s claim to profits,
also puts government capital at risk. Compared to IOCs, governments of developing countries may
have to pay more to borrow this capital and be less able to bear the risk. Different arrangements,
even at similar levels of government participation, entail different levels of risk for the govern-
ment. Under some arrangements, state-owned oil companies participate as an equal partner in oil
exploration from day one, covering their portion of exploration and production costs and bearing
their share of exploration risk. In this case, governments may face negative income streams during
early years, as the majority of capital costs are incurred in the first several years. Alternatively,
governments can “carry” a working interest during the exploration phase. In this case, companies
are usually responsible for covering exploration costs. Government participation kicks in in the
case of a commercial discovery, and state-owned oil companies may then reimburse companies for
their share of costs, depending on contractual provisions, either with or without interest.
The extent to which government participation entails risk for the government depends on how
participation is arranged within the contract. Contracts requiring state-owned oil companies to
cover their share of costs from day one entail more risk than contracts which make payment of costs
conditional on a commercial discovery. This has a large impact on the overall front-loadedness
of a contract: contracts that delay cost reimbursement are more front-loaded for governments.
Over the long run, government participation in oil development can also affect the size of the
resource base. If NOCs are less efficient at exploring for and developing oil than IOCs, then
government participation in the oil industry could lead to smaller discoveries, higher costs, and
lower production levels. Too much NOC participation could also reduce investment levels in oil
development if the state lacks the capital to invest at optimal levels13 or if IOCs invest below
13For example, Venezuela reverted all concessions to the state in 1971, dramatically increasing the government’s
take from oil production. In the near term, oil revenues to the state quadrupled, and companies continued to produce
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the levels they would otherwise invest under a similar taxation regime that did not include NOC
participation because they simply prefer not to partner with NOCs.
2.3.1.4 Investment Guarantees
Fourth, oil contracts can set investment requirements, as well as the time frame under which
these investments must be made. At a minimum, these requirements help governments ensure that
IOCs do not sign contracts and leave oil fields undeveloped for years. This is important for any
government managing an oil endowment on its citizens’ behalf. Before the 1970s, it was quite
common for governments to sign away the rights to large tracts of land to foreign oil companies,
giving them the right, but not the obligation, to explore for oil. Companies could then hold the
land for years, at high opportunity cost for the host country.
Investment requirements make this practice costlier: if IOCs fail to invest at the levels spec-
ified within the contract, they owe the government the difference between the amount that they
have invested and the investment guarantee. Larger investments guarantees can benefit countries
because higher investments in oil exploration can yield higher probabilities of oil discovery, po-
tentially increasing the overall size of the oil endowment over the long run.14 For this reason,
minimum investment requirements are often a key bidding item in auctions, with governments
judging potential deals based on IOCs’ willingness to guarantee higher levels of investment in oil
exploration.
Like other contractual terms, investment guarantees are not costless to secure. Lower taxation
levels and less front-loading should increase IOCs’ willingness to invest. Contracts usually require
IOCs to guarantee the investment requirement by depositing the amount in a bank account, which
will revert to the government should companies fail to invest at the required levels. Setting overly
high investment guarantees reduces the pool of companies that can bid on a project because only a
small number of companies can obtain such large sums of capital all at once.15 Reducing the pool
existing wells. However, investment in new wells declined; over the long term, production levels declined as well,
until per capital oil exports today are no more than 15% of what they were in 1970 (Philip 2010).
14These investment guarantees serve as a floor for investment; IOCs can always invest more in an oil project.
15Setting overly high signatory bonuses has the same effect.
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of potential partners reduces the governments’ bargaining power on other contractual dimensions.
2.3.1.5 Flexibility
Finally, oil contracts can be assessed based upon their ability to secure governments revenue
under a wide variety of market conditions. Oil price volatility confounds the design of fiscal
regimes. If fiscal systems are regressive, then governments are more protected against the possi-
bility of low oil prices. Claiming higher shares of revenue in low price environments and allowing
IOCs to claim higher shares in high price environments reduces governments’ exposure to price
volatility. This structure would theoretically be valuable to countries with low administrative ca-
pacity and low ability to credibly commit to revenue-smoothing through other mechanisms (e.g.
by making contributions to natural resource funds).
However, these regressive regimes can result in unfair divisions of resources when oil prices
exceed expectations. Consider an example from Humphreys et al. (2007: p. 323): If oil companies
were willing to make investments and produce oil when they expect prices to be $30 a barrel and
prices unexpectedly escalate to $90 a barrel, then companies are receiving three times the return
that would have been required for them to invest. When fiscal regimes are regressive, companies
capture these windfall returns. Progressive regimes–ones that increase the governments’ claim to
profits as profits increase–ensure that governments capture some of the upside of these windfalls as
well. This can reduce the frequency of bargains that are ex post unfair for countries. The fact that
governments capture lower shares of profits in high price environments may explain the finding
that contract renegotiations and expropriations are more likely during oil price booms (see, e.g.,
Guriev et al. 2011; Manzano and Monaldi 2008, 2010). Indeed, the perception that the division of
profits between parties is unfair may be a key motivator for nationalizations (Mahdavi 2014).
Thus, it is not surprising that contracts with progressive fiscal elements are less likely to be
renegotiated than contracts with regressive elements (Stroebel and van Benthem 2013). This goes
along with the more general argument that when there is uncertainty, flexible contracts are more
optimal than rigid ones (Hart and Moore 2008). Humphreys et al. (2007: ch. 12) identify designing
progressive taxation regimes as a priority for “escaping the resource curse.”
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If parties do not expect prices to rise, then governments should, in theory, be able to write pro-
gressive elements into a contract without affecting the value of the deal for IOCs. Thus, in theory,
they should not have to sacrifice overall level of government take in order to secure this flexibility.
Protecting government revenues when profits are low more obviously affects governments’ ability
to secure good terms along other dimensions of the contract. Regressive contractual elements tend
to be front-loaded, causing investment distortions.
2.3.2 Fiscal terms that define the allocation of risks and rewards between par-
ties
Below, I define the primary instruments that governments employ to collect oil revenues and
how these instruments allocate risk between parties:
• Signatory bonus: A signatory bonus is a fixed payment made by companies upon the signing
of a contract. These payments act as one-time windfalls for government. They receive them
irrespective of oil discoveries or field profitability. As such, these payments are highly front-
loaded (governments receive them immediately upon signing contracts), and they entail no
risk for governments. From the IOC’s perspective, signatory bonuses increase the amount of
capital they must have on hand (in addition to investment requirements).
• Royalty: A royalty is a tax based on a percentage of production.16 Because it is based
on production rather than profits, royalties are collected irrespective of when (or if) fields
become profitable. Thus, they are relatively front-loaded taxes, providing early revenue for
governments. Under a royalty system, governments received smaller and more fixed shares
of profits, while companies retain larger but more variable shares of profits. Thus, companies
retain the majority of the risk from oil price fluctuations.
• Cost recovery limits: After royalties are levied, governments may additionally set limits on
16I do not consider surface royalties–royalties based on the amount of land under development rather than on the
amount of production–here (also known as “land rentals”). They are relatively uncommon after the 1960s; to the
extent that they are still used, they represent a marginal share of government revenues.
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the percentage of gross revenues that can be allocated towards recovering the costs from oil
production. Recoverable costs consist of depreciation of capital expenses, the largest portion
of which are undertaken during the exploration phase, as well as operating costs. A country’s
accounting regulations set depreciation schedules, which can vary from a relatively accel-
erated depreciation schedule of 3 years to an extended depreciation schedule of 10 years.
Accelerated depreciation schedules enable companies to recover costs more quickly, making
projects profitable more quickly. However, they limit revenues to governments in early years
since revenues are used for recovering costs (meaning that neither income taxes nor profit
oil splits can kick in). The combination of depreciation timelines and cost recovery limits
have no impact on government take but play a major role in determining how quickly gov-
ernments can collect oil income. Low cost recovery limits and long depreciation timelines
ensure that governments can collect revenues before fields become profitable.
• Profit oil split: Any oil remaining after deducting royalties and costs can be subject to profit
oil splits, or production-sharing. Profit oil splits can be fixed or variable. Fixed profit oil
splits are financially equivalent to an income tax (though production-sharing contracts often
contain both profit oil splits and income taxes). Variable profit oil splits can be linked to
field profitability, e.g. by increasing the government’s share of profit oil as the field’s rate of
return rises, making them progressive taxes. Thus, profit oil splits can be a means to secure
more income for the government when prices are high, but they are also less front-loaded
(they cannot be collected until a field is profitable) and more risky (government income is
more variable).
• Domestic market obligation: Companies’ share of profit oil can additionally be subject to
domestic market obligations. Under these provisions, companies commit a share of their
claim to profit oil to be sold in domestic markets within the host country, usually at a reduced
price. For example, in Indonesia during the 1990s, companies were required to sell 7-25%
of their share of profit oil on the domestic market at 10-25% of the market price for oil.
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This obligation functions as the financial equivalent of a royalty17, so it offers a means of
collecting oil income with relatively low variability for governments. They are most useful to
governments that subsidize the domestic price of fuel and would be purchasing fuel products
at international prices to sell in domestic markets.
• Service payment: These are payments by governments to companies for services rendered
during the oil exploration and production process. Means of calculating service payments
vary widely, as does the allocation of risk between parties. In some cases, companies are
responsible for bearing exploration risk and only receive compensation when and if oil is
discovered and produced in commercial quantities. In other cases, governments reimburse
companies for exploration and production costs, subjecting government income to both ge-
ological risk and income variability from oil price fluctuations. In the latter case, service
payments can mean negative income for governments in early years but can secure high
overall shares of profits from oil extraction in the case of commercial production. As an ex-
treme example, Iranian “buy-back” contracts of the mid-1990s provided fixed payments to
companies for oil exploration. Under this arrangement, companies receive fixed income (and
a fixed return on investment), while the government receives the variable portion. The extent
to which this type of arrangement secures high profit shares for the government depends on
oil prices and geological conditions18, entailing high risk for the government.
• Income tax: Company’s revenues after deducting royalties, costs, and profit oil splits can
be subject to corporate income taxes. When service payments are involved, these could be
subject to corporate income taxes as well. Like profit oil splits, corporate income taxes can
be fixed or variable, are not front-loaded, and entail more variable income for governments.
In some cases, governments impose an additional layer of income tax often called a “wind-
fall profit tax” that raises the rate of taxation when profits from oil production rise above
17E.g. A domestic market obligation to sell 20% of production at 80% of market price is the financial equivalent of
a 4% royalty.
18Specifically, governments secure higher take when profitability rises, whereas companies secure high take under
low-profit conditions. In other words, it is the reverse of a royalty system.
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particular thresholds.
• Government participation: Many contracts provide the option for NOCs to participate to
varying extents in oil exploration and production. Under some arrangements, state-owned
oil companies participate as an equal partner in oil exploration from day one, covering their
portion of exploration and production costs and bearing their share of geological risk. In this
case, governments may face negative income streams during early years, as the majority of
capital costs are incurred in the first several years. Alternatively, government participation
can function as a working interest. In this case, IOCs are usually responsible for covering
exploration costs. Government participation kicks in in the case of a commercial discovery,
and NOCs may then reimburse companies for their share of costs, depending on contractual
provisions, either with or without interest.
• Minimum work obligations: Contracts typically define minimum work programs (capital
investments) that IOCs are obligated to fulfill by a timeline designated within a contract.
They could be defined based on a number of wells to be drilled or based on a minimum
amount to be invested in a field. Failure to meet minimum work obligations constitutes
grounds for HCs to end a contract with an IOC. The IOC would then owe the difference
between what they have invested and the investment obligation to the government.
This cursory review of the terms that can be used to collect oil income quickly reveals the com-
plexity of evaluating and comparing contracts. No single term within the contract reveals the share
of profits that governments will collect, how quickly they will collect them, nor the amount of risk
that they will bear over that income. Rather, one must look at the combination of terms as well as
the specific design of each individual term to understand the distribution of risks and rewards set
through the contract. Moreover, the overall effect of the terms varies with field conditions. The
same terms that secure high overall shares of profits for governments when oil prices are low may
secure low shares of profits when prices are high.
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Table 2.1: Summary of Fiscal Terms, 1974-2004
Fiscal Term # Country-Years Utilizing Term (% of sample) Mean SD Min Max
Signatory Bonus ($ M) 200 (9.6%) 8.9 28.2 0.004 225.0
Royalty (%) 1,462 (70.5%) 12.5 0.08 1.85 54.0
Cost Recovery Limit (%) 983 (47.4%) 50.2 16.8 12.4 95
Profit Oil Split (%) 1,064 (51.3%) 56.0 21.7 3.6 90.4
Income Tax (%) 1,372 (66.2%) 34.3 13.5 1.67 74.3
Government Participation (%) 1,270 (61.2%) 40.5 31.1 2.5 100
Minimum Work ($ M) 207 (10.0%) 61.0 417.5 1.1 6,000
Table 1 reveals that there is considerable variation in the fiscal terms that governments utilize to
collect oil revenues. While over 70% of the country-years in the sample utilize royalties as a means
of revenue collection, for example, royalty rates range from less than 2% (Nigeria, early-2000s)
to 54% (Trinidad and Tobago, early-2000s). Similarly, around two-thirds of the sample collect
revenues through corporate income taxes, but the rates range from 1.67% (Malaysia, mid-1990s)
to 74.3% (Saudi Arabia, early 1970s). To assess the extent to which governments are securing
their interests in contract negotiations, we need to not only know what fiscal terms governments
are utilizing, but also the rate defined within the fiscal term.
Even knowing the rates and looking at these terms in isolation, however, can be misleading.
For example, though Malaysia set a low income tax rate in the mid-1990s, it actually commanded
a government take of around 78% because of a high profit-oil split and a royalty. Thus, to fully
understand how governments are managing oil endowments, it is necessary to examine how the
fiscal terms work together to shape the government take, the front-loadedness of the tax regime, the
government’s risk exposure, and the progressivity of the tax regime and to understand how these
factors interact with each other and with investment levels.
2.3.3 Understanding relationships among fiscal terms
Table 2 examines the relationship among the five dimensions of oil contracts that confer value
for governments–government take, front-loadedness, risk, investment guarantees, and flexibility.
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In this analysis, I examine whether or not trade-offs really exist between dimensions of contracts.
To do so, I use an original dataset of oil contracts and pieces of national legislation that govern the
oil sector within oil-producing, non-OECD countries between 1974 and 2004. I fully describe the
dataset and data collection process in Section 4.
The unit of observation for this analysis is a set of commercial fiscal terms, whether defined by
a contract or a national law. Sets of fiscal terms are at least initially defined by real oil contracts
signed between HCs and MNCs. However, countries can then pass national laws that change the
fiscal terms within the country. In that case, a new observation is defined, where the fiscal terms
are those within the contract but including the adjustment made by law. This yields 779 distinct
sets of fiscal terms.19 Multiple sets of fiscal terms could be observed within a single country
in a single year. In regressions that examine investment guarantees, the unit of observation is
a contract, as investment guarantees are only defined within contracts and not within laws. In
regressions that examine progressiveness of the fiscal terms, it includes only those contracts that
are commercial (i.e. yield a positive net present value for MNCs) for both low profitability (costs
are 45% of revenues) and high profitability (costs are ~0% of revenues) scenarios. Thus, the
number of observations for these sets of analyses are lower.
19Although 825 oil contracts and national laws are used to define the sets of fiscal terms, in some cases, fiscal terms
are defined across multiple pieces of legislation. Thus, the set of distinct fiscal terms is lower than the number of
contracts and legislation used to code them.
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Table 2.2: Trade-offs Among Fiscal Terms
Gov’t Take Front-Loading Gov’t Risk Investment Flexibility
(% profits) P(1st) / P(8th) (% ownership) (min. inv. / oil prod.) (take high profit -
take low profit)
Gov’t Take -0.24 (0.06)** 0.22 (0.04)** -0.23 (0.10)* 0.18 (0.03)**
N 668 668 412 356
Front-Loading -0.11 (0.02)** -0.11 (0.023)** -0.07 (0.06) -0.09 (0.02)**
N 668 668 412 356
Gov’t Risk 0.17 (0.03)** -0.20 (0.05)** -0.12 (0.18) 0.03 (0.03)
N 668 668 412 356
Investment -0.06 (0.02)* -0.04 (0.04) -0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.03)
N 412 412 412 197
Flexibility 0.45 (0.08)** -0.52 (0.13)** 0.11 (0.10) 0.18 (0.20)
N 356 356 356 197
Note: ** p-value < 0.01, * p-value <0.05, + p-value < 0.10. Table 2 shows the results from 20 separate bivariate
regressions. For each regression, the dependent variable is reported at the top of the column and the independent
variables in the rows. For each contractual term, the term is calculated using the “most-likely” scenario for oil
prices and costs of extraction for each contract, as described in Section 4. Observations are sets of fiscal terms,
either oil contracts signed between HCs and IOCs or national laws that fully define fiscal terms. Standard errors in
parentheses.
Several things can be noted from Table 2. First, there is a significant trade-off between contract
front-loadedness and government take. The earlier in the life of an oil field the government collects
its share of revenue, the lower the overall tax rate that they can collect over the life of a field. If
governments of poor countries were making this trade-off in order to make high-return investments
in human and physical capital, then perhaps it would be worthwhile to make this trade-off. How-
ever, if governments are front-loading fiscal regimes and squandering the revenues on patronage or
personal gain, then this is especially bad for the populations of resource-producing countries: not
only are governments wasting oil revenues, but they are giving up some of the country’s share of
oil revenues in order to waste them more quickly.
Second, there is a trade-off between the minimum investment guarantees that governments can
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secure within contracts and government take. Higher tax rates yield lower investment guarantees.
This is not surprising, but it is important for policy. Some countries demand high levels of gov-
ernment take, but risk declining production levels over the long-term. They get a larger share of
a shrinking pie. Other countries, it seems, demand lower shares of economic profits but secure
higher levels of investment, potentially growing the size of the oil endowment over the long-term.
Which is better is a matter of perspective. Oil is a nonrenewable resource: governments only have
one chance to capture its value as it is being extracted. It could be a reasonable position to claim
the highest share of profits possible for the country’s endowment as it is being extracted. But, it
is difficult for governments to capture these high shares without sacrificing investments in reserve
replacements.
Third, governments gain larger overall shares of profits when they assume some of the explo-
ration risk. Again, this is a trade-off: governments are increasing their take but also increasing
their risk exposure.20We can see that progressivity and front-loadedness of the regime are also
negatively correlated: this is because methods of collecting revenues early are also regressive (i.e.
they can be collected when profits are low). This is the cost of setting royalties, for example. Roy-
alties are helpful to secure the government early revenues, but they put the government in a poor
position when windfall profit scenarios arise.
Overall, these correlations confirm reasonable intuitions about the relationship between tax
rates and investments. However, these relationships have not previously been established empiri-
cally as there is so little publicly available information on the fiscal terms for oil extraction. Secrecy
has been one of the hallmarks of oil contract negotiations (Rosenblum and Maples 2009). Indeed,
contract transparency is now at the center of the global transparency movement in the extractives
industry, with the International Monetary Fund (2007), the Extractives Industries Transparency
Initiative (2013), Publish What You Pay (2013), and the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (2013) all identifying contract transparency as essential for good resource gover-
20It is surprising that assuming risk is not also ensuring that the overall taxation regime is progressive. This is
because governments are using multiple and offsetting taxation methods to collect revenues. By combining equity
stakes with royalties, for example, the government can reduce the progressive effect of the equity stake.
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nance.
Beyond providing heretofore unknown information about the structure of oil contracts, these
relationships also paint a different characterization of oil rents than is typically taken within the lit-
erature. Whereas much of the literature on oil rents assumes that rents flow easily into government
hands, the fact that there are significant trade-offs in designing a tax system illustrates that collect-
ing rents is in fact a challenging endeavor. Even among studies that recognize that governments
can take deliberate efforts to increase oil rents, it is often assumed that it is easy for governments
to do so (e.g. Menaldo, forthcoming). In fact, governments can grab early revenues in the form of
signing bonuses and royalties, but they will be sacrificing on other dimensions.
2.4 Political Regimes, Time Horizons, and Oil Income
The finding that governments make trade-offs between risks, total rewards, and timing of re-
wards begs the question of why they make these trade-offs. To explain the design of fiscal terms,
I focus, first, on political regimes and, second, on differing preferences among political leaders
over the structure of fiscal terms. I argue that political regimes exert an indeterminate effect on
tax levels. On the one hand, democracies should be able to make more credible commitments to
investors, giving them more bargaining power to secure better overall deals vis-a-vis multinational
companies. On the other hand, democracies should have lower optimal tax rates than autocracies
because they prevent significant extraction of surplus by their leaders. However, differing pref-
erences among governments can induce them to make trade-offs between different dimensions of
contract value. I argue that time horizons shape these preferences.
2.4.1 Political Regimes: How do democracies and autocracies differ in natural
resource governance?
A significant literature in international political economy considers the effect of regime type
on FDI. Time-inconsistency dilemmas, highlighted in section 1, provide insight into why political
institutions shape relationships between host country governments and multinational companies.
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Once investments are sunk, firms are left vulnerable to policy changes that could adversely af-
fect returns on investment (Vernon 1971). The fact that firms’ elasticity to taxation reduces once
investment decisions have been made leaves them vulnerable to contract renegotiations and asset
expropriations. These concerns are heightened in the extractives industry due to the high levels and
specificity of investments required to develop natural resources. Vulnerability to opportunistic be-
havior is factored into investment decisions (Kobrin 1984). The anticipation of future opportunistic
behavior by governments by firms means that governments will have to offer favorable terms to
attract investors; otherwise, they would not invest at all. Prominent theories exist linking regime
type to political risk for investors, yet they disagree on exactly how HC-IOC relations would vary
across regime types.
In the first line of thinking, all else equal, democracies should be better able to make cred-
ible commitments to foreign firms. Democratic institutions increase the number of veto points,
reducing the power of the executive to unilaterally change policies. Raising the costs of policy re-
versal makes commitments to rule of law and protection of private property more credible (Henisz
2002; Jensen 2003). This reduces risks for foreign investors (Jensen 2008). It also extends the
timeline over which parties can confidently make contracts. To the extent that democracies offer
more policy credibility and better protections to investors21, they should better be able to bargain
for higher fiscal terms vis-a-vis foreign investors. Using this logic, Li argues that “lower levels of
[tax] incentives in more democratic hosts are as attractive as higher levels of [tax] incentives in less
democratic hosts” (2006: p. 64). In essence, democracies offer better institutional environments
for investment, and better institutional environments increase host country bargaining power (Ko-
brin 1987). This should enable democracies to command higher overall tax rates and better deals
vis-a-vis IOCs.
21The idea that democracies offer greater policy stability is by no means settled. Normal electoral turnover can
result in unstable policies. Politicians seeking to tie the hands of future governments may increase government debt
(Alesina and Tabellini 1990; Persson and Svensson 1989), increase withdrawals from natural resource savings funds
(Humphreys and Sandbu 2007), or even manipulate oil rents (Dunning 2010). Thus, it is not obvious that democratic
institutions in fact provide policy stability. However, democracies do offer more transparency over potential policy
changes compared to autocracies (Hollyer et al. 2011). So, IOCs attentive to policy changes would likely see these
debated within legislatures and subject to public debate within democracies, whereas autocracies could more easily
enact “surprise” policy reversals.
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However, the same qualities of democracies that should enable them to better bargain with
multinational companies also reduce their incentives to over-extract from the resource sector.
Whereas autocratic leaders may seek to grab whatever they can from the resource sector with-
out regard to future consequences for government oil income, democratic leaders, with more en-
compassing interests in the health of the economy, should limit taxation to levels that can sustain
investment levels and the resource base over time. The effect of democratic institutions in limiting
taxation levels may be heightened in the resource sector compared to other sectors, as resource
rents are immobile and more easily taxable. This means that an autocratic leader–even one with
long time horizons (Olson’s “stationary bandits”)–of a resource-rich state can generate significant
tax revenues over the short- and medium-term without developing the economy (Acemoglu et al.
2000).22
The effect of political regimes could thus pull in two directions. On the one hand, democratic
institutions could enhance investment climates, enhancing HC bargaining power and improving
the overall bargain that democracies can obtain compared to autocracies. This should enable them
to capture higher government take, more front-loaded contracts, and more progressive tax regimes
with less risk and at higher levels of investment compared to autocrats. On the other hand, demo-
cratic institutions can enhance incentives to provide economic growth over long time horizons.
This could mitigate incentives to increase tax rates. Instead, democracies would lower tax rates
and reduce forms of taxation that are distortive to investment (like front-loaded taxes) in order to
increase investment in the resource sector, potentially increasing the size of the resource base over
time. Lowering the tax rate also serves to increase the size of commercial investments that can be
made in the oil sector in the present, as the tax rate influences whether or not developing marginal
oil fields will yield a positive net present value for investors.
2.4.2 Time Horizons: Differences within regimes
To explain governments’ preferences over the design of fiscal regimes (and the trade-offs they
22Over the long term, reduced investment levels resulting from high tax levels would translate into lower oil pro-
duction and fewer new oil discoveries, reducing oil income and the size of the resource base.
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make between different elements of the regime), I further emphasize differences in the timing of
the costs and benefits that accrue to governments for each of the 5 dimensions of contract regimes
that I describe above. For example, securing higher levels of investment guarantees provides a
benefit to HCs, but these benefits will only accrue over time. And, if HCs had to reduce the
front-loadedness of contracts in order to secure the higher investment guarantee, the opportunity
cost of foregone revenue would be born in the near term. I argue that when governments place
a higher value on the long-run, they will design fiscal regimes that have more benefits over the
entire life of the contract, and that the sensitivity to long-run payoffs increases with the length of
the governments’ time horizon. By contrast, governments with shorter time horizons will design
fiscal regimes that ensure greater benefits in the near term, even if the overall deal leaves countries
worse off in the long run.
A leader’s incentive to design different fiscal regimes depends, first, on the difference in costs
and gains between different financial arrangements and, second, on the timing of those costs and
gains. If the government finds the short run benefits of a large signing bonus to be more attractive
than the long run benefits of higher investment levels, then they have an incentive to design a front-
weighted fiscal regime. Hence, the leader’s time horizons influences the incentives to design fiscal
regimes with benefits that concentrate in the short- vs. long-run.
A long literature identifies time horizons as critical in shaping government preferences and,
through shaping preferences, in shaping government policies. A government’s time horizon is the
length of time over which it considers the costs and benefits of its policy choices. Government
time horizons come from their expectations about being in power in the future as well as their
expectations about the possibility of return to power in the future, should they lose office. These
expectations are shaped by the institutions that govern executive turnover as well as domestic
politics. I thus measure time horizons separately in democracies vs. non-democracies.
Within democracies, I focus on the time horizon of the political party rather than of the indi-
vidual leader.23 The extended time that it takes between developing a fiscal regime, negotiating
23In a study of how time horizons affect the design of bilateral investment treaties, Blake (2013) also argues that
within democracies, the time horizons of political parties rather than of individual leaders shape time horizons.
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and signing contracts, sinking investments, and reaching production mean that, under democratic
regimes, fiscal regimes developed today may only begin to yield revenues across election cycles.
No leader can stay in power forever. However, in democracies, the ruling parties that leaders repre-
sent can regain office, even if the current incumbent loses. Not all parties face equal opportunities
of regaining office. Some parties are long-lived, while others dissipate when the incumbent loses
office.
Huntington (1968) famously argued that parties are key in organizing mass involvement in
mobilized societies; without them, societies risk turmoil. Huntington laid out three dimensions of
party institutionalization: adaptability, complexity, and autonomy. Fundamentally, an institutional-
ized party is one which has faced (and survived) a range of difference contingencies and scenarios,
one which has multiple overlapping generations of cohorts, and are not beholden to a single family
or social group (ibid.). These features are most easily indicated by the party’s age: “the logic is
that... effective institutions grow slowly, and the older an organization is, the more likely it is to
endure even longer” (Dix 1992: p. 491). A party formed in the more distant past is more likely
to have faced and survived a variety of political and economic conditions. Older parties are more
likely to have be organizations of overlapping generations, with some party members nearing the
end of their career and others just beginning, extending the time horizons of the organization (Bates
and Shepsle 1997).
Within autocracies, by contrast, the chances of successfully returning to office after losing it
are substantially diminished. Thus, the time horizons of autocratic governments are more likely
to be aligned with its expectations about remaining in office. Most notably, Mancur Olson (1993)
argues that the time horizons faced by autocratic leaders determines whether they establish efficient
or extractive institutions. If leaders have a long expected tenure in office, they will behave as
“stationary bandits,” setting up efficient institutions to promote economic growth over the long-run
as a means of increasing the tax base. Leaders with a short expected tenure in office, by contrast,
behave as “roving bandits.” Their short expected hold in power motivates them to set up extractive
institutions to facilitate private gain in the short-term. Leaders with longer tenures in office expect
100
to gain more from future interactions with oil companies, preventing them from seeking short-term
gains at the expense of the long-term.
Whereas the age of parties in democracies is linked to the possibility of returning to power,
the age of the regime in autocracies does not link straightforwardly with time horizons. Time
horizons within autocracies may be independent of the age of the regime. An autocratic leader
gaining office on the back of a powerful anti-colonial revolution may be quite secure in office in
his first year, whereas a leader with many years in office could face insecurity from challengers.
Thus, I follow Wright (2008) and Blake (2013) in additionally measuring the time horizons of an
autocratic government based on the perceived security in office. To proxy for security in office,
I measure the probability of regime survival using institutional and environmental factors which
correlate with autocratic regime survival. The measurement strategy is discussed in Section 4.
2.4.3 Hypotheses
In sum, I predict that both political regimes and government time horizons will influence how
governments collect oil income. The effect of political regimes could cut both ways, with more
democratic countries either setting higher tax rates due to better policy credibility and enhanced
bargaining power or setting lower tax rates due to greater sensitivity to the size of future oil income.
The effect of government time horizons is more straightforward: Governments with longer time
horizons will prioritize elements of the fiscal regime that enhance government revenues over the
long-term, while governments with shorter horizons will prioritize elements of the fiscal regime
that help to secure early returns. The main hypotheses are thus:
Hypothesis 1: Democratic institutions will help countries to secure more favorable terms with
investors, including higher government take, more front-loadedness, more progressive tax regimes,
higher investment levels, and less project risk.
Hypothesis 2: Democratic institutions will incentivize countries to reduce claims on oil rents
and minimize taxes that distort investment (i.e. front-loaded taxes) to enhance investment in the
oil sector.
Hypothesis 3: Governments with shorter time horizons will favor fiscal terms will prioritize
fiscal terms that guarantee early revenues, including more front-loadedness and less take, less
investment, less risk, and less progressive taxation.
Hypothesis 3a: Democratic governments with a less institutionalized incumbent political party
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will design fiscal regimes that prioritize early revenues.
Hypothesis 3b: Autocratic governments with lower probabilities of survival will design fiscal
regimes that prioritize early revenues.
2.4.4 Alternative Explanations
There are several potential objections to the explanation presented here. Even if we accept that
oil rents are the product of policy choices, the incentives to shift policies could be unrelated to
regime type or time horizons. I identify other sources of incentives for governments to vary oil
rents and discuss how I account for these in the empirical models.
First, the attractiveness of the investment site, beyond the institutions that govern it, may shape
the government’s ability to claim oil rents. Namely, a higher quality of the oil endowment should
attract higher investment levels at a higher tax rate compared to a lower quality oil endowment.
To the extent that the quality of the endowment varies with regime type, this would confound my
analysis.
The size and quality of a country’s oil endowment at a given period depends on its history of
production. Investment in exploration can increase the value of an oil endowment over the long
term, even if the size of discoveries diminishes over the lifespan of oil production (Pindyck 1978).
This is reflected in the fact that the value per square kilometer of subsoil assets in OECD coun-
tries—with long histories of oil production—is $114,000 whereas the value per square kilometer
of subsoil assets in Africa—with shorter histories of oil production—is a mere $23,000 (Collier
2010: p. 66). This difference is even more stark when we consider that OECD countries have
been depleting their assets for much longer and that the difference cannot be accounted for by geo-
logical chance (ibid.). Rising prices and technology can also render resource basins commercially
exploitable that were not before. “In reality, there is no ‘fixed’ reserve base (in an economically
meaningful sense) for any resource. If the price of oil were to rise to $200 per barrel (and the
demand for oil did not drop to zero), oil would probably be found in some rather strange places”
(Pindyck 1978: p. 2). In other words, we should not think of the size of a resource endowment
as a fixed element but rather as something that may increase or decrease over time depending on
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investment in exploration and discovery (Wright and Czeluska 2007).
There is less geological risk in investing in a country with more proven reserves, or even in
a region with more proven reserves, than in an unproven region (Smith and Wells 1993). Lower
levels of geological risk imply that investors will be willing to accept a greater share of the total
project risk. To see this, consider an example. Assume that exploration costs are $10 million
and, conditional on discovery, the expected revenues from oil production are $40 million. The
company receives the same expected returns from an investment with an 80% likelihood of making
a commercial discovery when it assumes 100% of the exploration costs as when it faces a 60%
likelihood of making a commercial discovery when it assumes 20% of the exploration costs.24 All
else equal, countries with more proven reserves and longer histories of oil production–which mean
less uncertainty about the size and quality of oil endowments–should secure better deals.
While the size of the oil endowment and the history of exploration are related to the govern-
ment’s claim to oil rents, there is still considerable unexplained variation in government take, even
accounting for other features that shape the attractiveness of oil endowments, like costs of extrac-
tion. Overall, these factors explain less than 10% of the variation in government take statistics
across countries. Figure 1 graphs the residuals from a regression of size of oil reserves, years of
oil production, costs of oil extraction, and whether oil resources are primarily onshore or offshore
on government take. It reveals that looking at the attractiveness of the oil endowment alone leads
to both large positive and large negative differences between observed and expected values of gov-
ernment take. I control for these factors in my empirical analysis. I also examine the effect of
within-country changes in regimes through fixed effects models that hold constant features of the
country’s oil endowments that do not change over time, enhancing confidence in results.
24Return = probability of discovery * ($40 - $10) + (1-probability of discovery) * (-$10).
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Figure 2.1: Variation in Government Take, Controlling for Quality of Oil Endowment
Figure 1 graphs the residuals from a regression of (logged) size of proved oil reserves, total years of oil production,
and costs of extraction on government take using the “most-likely” scenario described in Section 4.
Second, many scholars have noted that governments tend to increase their share of rents as oil
prices rises and to decrease their share of rents as oil prices decline. If countries nationalize when
oil prices are high to increase their claim to rents (e.g. Guriev et al. 2011), they then decrease their
share of rents when oil prices are low in order to attract investment (Monaldi 2002). This would
be a rational response to the fact that oil prices and tax rates jointly determine whether oil fields
are commercially producible. When oil prices are high, tax rates can be high as well, and fields
can still yield positive returns for investors. When oil prices are low, by contrast, the same tax rate
can render marginal fields uncommercial. Thus, to stabilize production levels, governments would
adjust tax rates accordingly. To the extent that oil prices are related to regime type (e.g. Dunning
2008), this would confound the ability to separately examine the effect of regime type on taxation
strategies.
There are several reasons to think that governments are not just adjusting tax rates in response
to changes in oil prices, however. For one, decreases in the governments’ claim to rents are nearly
as prevalent as increases between 1974 and 1986, a high oil price environment (Figure 2). Further,
when oil prices are low, increases in claims to oil rents are far more prevalent than decreases.
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This suggests that, in changing their claim to oil rents, governments are responding to more than
changes in prices.
Figure 2.2: Changes in Claims on Oil Rents, High vs. Low Oil Prices
Figure 2 shows the frequency of increases vs. decreases within countries in either level of ownership or tax rates in
high vs. low oil price environments. Ownership increases are coded by combining information from coding national
laws and oil contracts as described in Section 4 and data on nationalizations from Guriev et al. (2011). Other
changes are coded using information from national laws and oil contracts presented in Section 4. A change in tax rate
or ownership level could be reflected either by the passage of new hydrocarbons legislation or by the signing of new
contracts on different terms. In other words, tax and ownership increases do not necessarily signal expropriations.
Studies of oil expropriations do not typically find this because they focus solely on increases
in ownership stakes that adversely affect current investors. However, this is not the only way that
governments can increase their claim to oil rents. They can also conduct “creeping expropriation,”
i.e. increasing tax rates on existing contracts without nationalizing, or offer new contracts under
different terms. This is not observed by expropriation studies because they typically only have
information on public expropriation events and not on oil contracts. Further, studies looking at
the relationship between oil prices and ownership often just look at increases and not decreases
(e.g. Guriev et al. 2011). In the Appendix, I show that the type of act (increase vs. decrease)
also relates to the way it is pursued (through public laws or through private contracts). Increases
in the government’s claim to rents are more often pursued through public changes in laws while
decreases in the government’s claim to rents are more often pursued through more easily concealed
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contracts.
A second way of looking at this is by whether countries increase oil production, another means
of increasing oil rents, in response to increases in oil prices. However, countries vary substantially
in how production levels respond to changes in oil prices, with some countries increasing produc-
tion levels with prices (e.g. Trinidad and Tobago) and some countries decreasing production levels
with prices (e.g. Venezuela).25 These examples suggest that at least some of the policy choices
regarding oil rents must be explained by factors beyond fluctuations in oil prices and the need to
attract investment. However, I also control for oil prices in the empirical analysis.
Third, it is possible it is countries’ varying reputations for expropriation, which vary with
regime type, that shape bargaining outcomes with IOCs rather than regime type itself. IOCs may
punish countries with histories of expropriation within the oil sector, irrespective of whether they
have democratic institutions or not. Thus, I control separately for histories of expropriation in the
analysis.
2.4.5 Reverse Causation
Most seriously, relationships between political regime or expected leader tenure and taxation
strategies may suffer from reverse causation: the taxation strategies that countries employ vis-a-
vis the oil sector could themselves cause political regimes. Whether or not oil rents affect political
regimes is hotly contested in the literature (see, for example Haber and Menaldo 2011, Andersen
and Ross 2014, and Ross 2012). However, if higher levels of oil rents are indeed associated with
reduced likelihood of democratic transitions and greater autocratic longevity, then policy choices
promoting higher claims to oil rents could reduce democratic transitions.
I utilize several strategies to mitigate concerns that reverse causation alone is shaping results.
First, measures of political regimes and time horizons are lagged in the models.26 Second, I show
the results of fixed effects models, which rely only on the variation in regime type within countries
25See Appendix for graphs of production vs. prices.
26As an exception, I do not lag the predicted probability of autocratic regime failure, which I use as one of the
measures of time horizons within autocracies. This is because I expected that year-to-year changes in expected regime
failure incentivize immediate changes in behavior (e.g. opportunistic resource grabs to buy support or to fund repres-
sion).
106
to explain outcomes. This allows us to see whether changes within countries in political institutions
affect differences in the various dimensions of tax systems in the following year. Indeed, Haber
and Menaldo (2011) argue that including country fixed effects eliminates the correlation between
oil rents and regime type. In other words, concerns about reverse causation between oil rents and
political development should be less severe when looking just at variation within countries.
Third, I examine the interaction effect of time horizons with oil prices. Whereas a fixed ef-
fects estimator can help identify the relationship between political regimes and fiscal regimes by
relying on differences in levels of democratic institutions between countries, a fixed effects es-
timator forces us to bypass the most interesting potential effect of time horizons. Fixed effects
would ask, in essence, how does an additional year in party age in the same country shape policy
choices, rather than how differences between countries in party institutionalization shape policy
choices. Nearly 90% of the overall variation in party institutionalization is between rather than
within countries. Instead, I take a different strategy to address the fact that leader tenure may be
endogenous to oil rents. Higher oil prices should (exogenously) increase the bargaining power of
all HCs relative to IOCs: they can command higher tax rates while holding returns to the investor
constant. Essentially, this analysis asks: Does a difference in government time horizons have a dif-
ferent effect depending upon different levels of HC bargaining power? Then, rather than looking
at the direct effects of time horizons, I look at whether differences in time horizons differentially
shape how countries react to improvements in their bargaining position. Given bargaining power,
how do time horizons affect what governments do with it? The potential for reverse causation
should be less serious in examining this interaction effect as compared to the direct effects.
2.5 Data and Measurement
In order to evaluate the hypotheses, a database was created of fiscal regimes governing the oil
sector within non-OECD oil-producing countries between 1974 and 2004. This time period covers
both boom and bust periods in the global oil industry; thus, it covers fiscal regimes designed under
a wide range of market conditions. I define oil-producing countries based on whether they have
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ever produced more than or equal to $100 per capita (measured in 2013 dollars) per year between
1974 and the present. If they have ever produced this amount, then I include them in the sample
for the entire period. Including countries that eventually produce $100 per capita in oil per year27
but have not yet reached that level enables me to include countries with a wide range of geological
uncertainty in the sample with both countries that have well-explored and well-defined oil reserves
and countries with relatively unexplored basins. This yields a sample of 56 countries (listed in the
Appendix).
The unit of observation for the analysis is the country-year. For each country-year in the sam-
ple, I gather information on the fiscal regimes governing oil extraction. Fiscal regimes are defined
both within the oil contracts signed between HCs and IOCs and within national laws (often within
both). Resource exploration and production is supported by tens (if not hundreds) of contracts
between contractors and subcontractors, between contracts and financing institutions, and between
contractors and governments. Fiscal terms for oil extraction, however, are defined within the pri-
mary contract between the state and the companies involved in extraction. Primary contracts can
vary from 10-page agreements that define the obligations of states and companies by referenc-
ing existing laws to 150-page agreements in which every term is separately specified within the
contract. These contracts can comprehensively cover most of the issues that may arise with oil
exploration and production, or can remain silent on key issues such as whether governments are
committing to tax stabilization over the life of the contract, how the oil price will be calculated to
determine a company’s taxable income, and who is liable for environmental cleanups.
Typically, it is necessary to know both the contents of the fiscal terms within primary contracts
as well as the fiscal terms within the national laws that govern the private sector generally and
the resource sector specifically. For example, the government may determine in a national hydro-
carbons law that the NOC is authorized to enter into production-sharing agreements with IOCs to
develop oil. In a separate law, the government will define the corporate income tax and the depre-
ciation schedule for capital investments that affect an IOC investing in the country in any sector. A
27I adopt this cutoff from Ross (2012).
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second law may define extra taxes that apply only to oil companies, such as windfall profit taxes.28
However, it is typically only within the contract itself that the profit-oil split and cost recovery
allowances are defined. Different countries use different combinations of laws and contracts to
govern oil extraction. Thus, to get a full picture of the fiscal regime, it is necessary to examine all
of the laws that govern foreign direct investment generally as well as foreign investment in the oil
sector specifically as well as the primary contract between HCs and IOCs.
These primary contracts have historically been confidential and remain confidential in many
oil-producing countries. Thus, defining the full universe of fiscal terms that have ever been signed
within every country that has ever explored for oil is a difficult, if not impossible, exercise. No
international records exist of all primary contracts setting the fiscal terms for oil extraction ever
signed between governments and contractors. Adding to the complexity is that governments may
enable multiple fiscal terms during a single time period within the same country. For example,
governments often offer different fiscal terms for marginal fields vs. producing fields with existing
pipeline infrastructure or for onshore vs. offshore fields.
I gather these contracts from two sources. First, I utilize the fiscal terms from specific contracts
and national laws as published in Johnston (2001). In the source, Johnston defines each of the fiscal
terms that affect the value of the contract. I rely on his interpretation of the contractual language,
and how this language defines the fiscal terms in each contract. The fiscal terms contained in this
volume come from the author’s consulting business, which consults governments and companies
on how to economically model the fiscal regimes governing oil extraction. The source contains a
total of 283 sets of fiscal terms covering a total of 143 distinct country-years.29 These are listed in
the Appendix.
Second, I utilize the Basic Oil Laws & Concession Contracts collection at the Barrows Com-
pany, an international reference library for oil, gas, and mineral laws and contracts.30 The collec-
28Defining more of the obligations within national laws rather than contracts may be preferable. When every fiscal
term and social and enviromental obligation is defined within contracts, this could encourage horse-trading during
contractual negotiations (e.g., offsetting higher environmental obligations with lower government take) (Radon 2007).
29The source contains more fiscal terms that do not apply to the set of countries and time period considered here.
30I thank the Columbia Law Library and the Library of Congress for providing access to this source.
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tion contains the complete texts of petroleum laws and contracts. I reviewed 1,369 national laws
and 996 oil contracts from the collection by hand to determine whether the document was relevant
to understand the country’s fiscal regime (e.g. does the contract govern upstream or downstream
activities, does the law contain fiscal terms that affect the oil industry, signed during the relevant
time period). From this, I culled a total of 345 relevant contracts signed between HCs and IOCs
covering a total of 235 distinct country-years. I included all contracts signed between HCs in the
sample of non-OECD oil-producing countries between 1974 and 2004, inclusive. In case the HC
signed no contracts in 1974, I included the contract signed most recently before 1974 in order
to define the status quo fiscal regime in 1974. Additionally, I culled a total of 197 national laws
passed by HCs that affected the fiscal terms facing IOCs between 1974 and 2004. These laws
include expropriation events, such as increases in government participation and changes in the tax
rate, that affect the fiscal regime. I read each of these laws and contracts individually and coded the
fiscal terms by hand. I reviewed the codebook with industry experts and legal scholars to ensure
that it accurately reflects how both companies and countries understand fiscal terms.31
In all, this yields a total of 779 separate sets of fiscal terms. To get a sense for how the dataset
is created, it helps to use an example. Imagine a country signs 3 contracts in a given year. For this
year, I take the average fiscal terms to define the country’s “fiscal regime.” By this, I mean I take the
average of the government take statistic and not the average profit oil split, for example. Then, this
government take statistic is carried forward until the government changes the fiscal regime, either
through enacting a new law or by signing new contracts. Now lets say the government enacts a
higher income tax but does not change any other fiscal terms. I then reevaluate the 3 contracts with
the same fiscal terms, changing only the income tax. I then take the average of those calculations
to define the fiscal regime in the year the government passes the new law.
2.5.1 Missing Data?
Oil contracts and the fiscal terms within them are notoriously secret. One of the reasons that
31I am particularly grateful to the Vale Center for Sustainable Investment at Columbia Law School and to David
Johnston for valuable comments. Codebook available upon request.
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oil revenues are so valuable to governments is that their size is easily concealed through keeping
contracts and fiscal terms confidential (Ross 2012). Thus, a concern with the data is that only
contracts from more transparent states are publicly available, or, that only contracts that reflect
better (or worse) deals for governments are available, depending on whether governments are more
concerned about getting punished for bad deals or about concealing revenues. How can we be
confident that the contracts collected here really represent the fiscal terms for the countries in the
sample?
First, I do not rely on government disclosure of fiscal terms. Both sources utilized were col-
lected by consulting companies through MNCs for the purpose of advising other MNCs are in-
vestment climates and fiscal terms in HCs. Thus, the sources had a financial incentive to get fiscal
terms right. Second, by using multiple sources, I can estimate the rate of missing data and look for
bias in the sample.
To estimate the rate of missing data, I use a method advocated by Hendrix and Salehyan (2015)
to assess underreporting in event data. Essentially, one of the sources can observe a contract and
include it in their database. I look at whether the sources capture the contractual terms from a
given bidding round, and not whether each source captures the same contracts within each bidding
round.32 These sources can be thought of as independent sources about the underlying population
of interest, the world of fiscal terms that have been signed over the time period. We can observe
how many sets of fiscal terms are included by each source but also whether some are included by
both sources. This information can be used to calculated the rate of missingness in both databases
as well as the overall rate of missingness. I examine the missingness for the period between 1980
and 2000, as this is the period covered by both databases.
Between 1980 and 2000, the Johnston database covered fiscal terms in 143 distinct sets of fiscal
32There is relatively little variation in fiscal terms within single bidding rounds. In other words, there is little
variation between contracts when multiple contracts are signed in the same year. For example, across the entire bidding
round in Venezuela’s famous 1996 apertura, estimated government take between the lowest and highest contract was
less than 3 percentage points. Similarly, within the complete 1999 deepwater bidding round in Brazil, the minimum
and maximum government take statistics varied by less than one percentage point (authors’ calculations). Further, the
sources are going to necessarily capture different contracts within the same bidding rounds because they are working
with different clients.
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terms (41 detected by Johnston + 102 detected by both Johnston and the Barrows Collection).
Of these, the Barrows Collection detected 102 sets of fiscal terms (the number detected by both
sources). Thus, we can say that the Barrows Collection has a detection probability of 103 / 143
= 72%. The Barrows Collection detected 235 separate sets of fiscal terms over the period (133
detected by the Barrows Collection + 102 detected by both). Thus, we can say that the Johnston
database has a detection probability of 102 / 235 = 43%. Thus, the Johnston database is less likely
to have captured fiscal terms. However, this does not take into account the quality of information
in each detection event. The Johnston database tended to provide less missing data within each set
of fiscal terms published in the database. The combined non-detection rate is the product of the
two non-detection rates: (1-.72 ) * (1- .43) = 16%. This suggests that the two sources combined
detected 84% of the total number of fiscal terms, a fairly high detection rate given the difficulty in
securing information on fiscal terms within the oil industry.33
We might be concerned that the detection rate is higher for some subsamples of the data than
others. In particular, the detection rate might be higher among democracies than autocracies. The
combined non-detection rate among democracies is 6.5%34 and the combined non-detection rate
among autocracies is 16%.35 Thus, the detection rate is about 11% higher among democracies
compared to autocracies. However, when we look at this in a regression framework, we can see
that more democratic states are no more likely to be included in the database (Table 3). Table
3 examines variables that could plausibly related to a country’s tendency to release information
on fiscal terms, including regime type, per capita income (richer states could have more capable
bureaucracies to manage and release data), and indicators of the size and history of oil production
(OPEC membership, years since first oil production, size of oil reserves). Poorer states are less
33This method is fully explained and developed in Hendrix and Salehyan (2015) and is applied to the reporting of
conflict-events in Africa.
34Among states with a Polity score greater than zero, the Johnston database detects 47 events (6 detected by John-
ston + 41 detected by both). Of these the Barrows Collection detected 41, thus the Barrows Collections’ detection
probability among democracies is 41 / 47 = 87%. The Barrows Collection detected 82 events (41 detected by the
Barrows Collection + 41 detected by both), giving the Johnston database a detection probability of 50%.
35Among states with a Polity score of less than or equal to zero, the Johnston database detects 93 events (34 detected
by Johnston + 59 detected by both). Of these the Barrows Collection detected 59, thus the Barrows Collections’
detection probability among autocracies is 59 / 93 = 63%. The Barrows Collection detected 141 events (82 detected
by the Barrows Collection + 59 detected by both), giving the Johnston database a detection probability of 42%.
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likely to be included in the Barrows Collection and to be included in both databases. States that
have been producing oil for longer periods of time are more likely to be included by the Barrows
Collection, as are states with smaller oil reserves and states that are not members of OPEC.
Table 2.3: Regression Analysis of Missing Data, 1980-2000
Johnston database Barrows Collection Included in Both
Polity 0.003 -0.019 -0.003
(0.023) (0.040) (0.024)
GDP per capita 0.130 0.289 0.266*
(0.130) (0.181) (0.132)
OPEC 0.155 -1.457** -0.401
(0.352) (0.530) (0.373)
Years Since First Production -0.007 0.026** 0.002
(0.004) (0.009) (0.004)
Oil Reserves (billions barrels) 0.005 -0.013+ -0.006
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
N 230 230 230
Note: *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value < 0.10. Models report coefficients from logit models with
standard errors in parentheses.
One would expect that rates of missing data would look substantially different if we were to rely
on self-reported information on oil contracts. However, by relying on two independent third-party
data sources, I am able to gather information on fiscal terms with a low level of overall missingness
and with relatively little bias. Although this analysis reassures us that the rate of missingness and
the potential bias caused by missingness are lower than would be expected given the heavy secrecy
surrounding oil contracts, the issue of missingness is by no means resolved. The dataset does not
contain the universe of oil contracts, and it is difficult to assess how large the potential universe
of contracts even is. Future iterations of this work will match the collected data onto a list of all
potential contracts that may have been signed in the oil sector (to be defined by the number of
global oil fields) to better assess rates of missingness and any bias that may result.
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2.5.2 Measurement: Dependent Variables
Even once we’ve collected the fiscal terms from oil-producing countries, including all the fiscal
terms defined within oil contracts and national laws, we still do not know whether the government
secured a high take or not or how front-loaded the tax regime is. In order to assess these key
aspects of the fiscal environment, it is necessary to perform cash flow analysis to assess the impact
of various fiscal terms. However, to analyze the fiscal terms, one must make assumptions about
both the geology, including field size and costs of extraction, and the profitability, including the
price of oil, of the field. Not only are these quantities unobservable ex post due to lack of field-by-
field data on project economics and field size, but these quantities are unknowable ex ante to the
contract signatories.
Therefore, I subject the sets of fiscal terms to a set of 36 different scenarios, based on differ-
ences in field size and field profitability.36 The scenarios are defined as follows. First, I establish
four different scenarios for possible field sizes: a small field size of 50 million barrels, a medium-
small field size of 100 million barrels, a medium-large field size of 500 million barrels, and a large
field size of 1 billion barrels. Within each field size scenario, I consider 9 different field prof-
itability scenarios, in which costs as a percentage of revenues are 0%, 7%, 15%, 30%, 45%, 60%,
75%, 90%, and 100%.37 So, a scenario in which costs represent only 7% of revenues, for example,
considers either the possibility that oil prices are exceptionally high or that costs of extraction are
exceptionally low. One of the first things to note is that fiscal terms are frequently not “commer-
cial” under some of the scenarios. I define whether or not fiscal terms are commercial–meaning
whether the MNC would invest at all given the expected returns–based solely on whether the net
present value of the IOC’s cash flow is greater than zero. In other words, I use the most permis-
sive definition possible. In fact, the fiscal terms define what constitutes a commercial discovery:
if the government set the tax rate at zero, then small fields with high costs of extraction could be
36All scenarios make the same assumptions about decline rate and field life, described in the Appendix.
37The profitability scenarios are not equally likely across field sizes. Large fields are much more likely to have low
costs of extraction as compared to smaller fields. In fact, the differences in field size only matter for the analysis in so
far as fiscal terms are explicitly linked to production levels.
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produced and still yield a positive rate of return, yet as the tax rate rises, fields must be larger and
more profitable in order to yield the same rate of return for the investor.
For the majority of the paper, I utilize the results of what I call the “most-likely” scenario for
each country, based on the estimated costs of extraction38 and the price of oil at the time of signing
the contract or enacting the law. However, I probe the results across the scenarios as well.
First, government take is “the government’s share of economic profits from almost all income
sources, including bonuses, royalties, profit oil, taxes, and government working interest” (Johnston
2007: p. 56). I include the NOCs’ share of profits as a part of government take. Thus, I do not make
a distinction between revenues accruing to the central government versus to NOCs. For countries
that have fully nationalized their oil industry, like Saudi Arabia, I assume that the government take
is 100%.
Government take calculations are sensitive to modeling assumptions. As a simple example, a
fiscal regime that consisted of just a 20% royalty would yield different government take statistics
depending on the profitability of the oil field. If costs were 40% of gross revenues, then the royalty
would secure the government one-third of the rents from oil production, whereas if costs were
merely 20% of gross revenues, then the same royalty would only secure the government one-
quarter of the rents from oil production. Making calculations more sensitive is the fact that fiscal
terms often vary depending on field size or project profitability. Holding field size constant, I
calculate government take based on the estimated costs of extraction and the real oil prices when
terms are initially set (the “most-likely” scenario).39
38Unfortunately, costs of extraction (or, “lift costs”) are not publicly available in cross-national time-series format.
As a proxy for costs of extraction, I estimate them using data from a Goldman Sachs report on the largest 125 oil
development projects (Waghorn et al. 2006). For countries for which there is no data at all, I assume that costs of
extraction are the same as for neighboring states based on the assumption that neighboring states will share similar
geographies. I thank Jeff Colgan for sharing this data.
39Field size primarily influences government take through its impact on field profitability: economies of scale
tend to make larger fields more profitable. Thus, different assumptions about field sizes do not have much effect on
government take calculations.
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of Government Take
Figure 3 shows the distribution of government take for the 779 separate sets of fiscal terms in the sample. Government
take is calculated using the “most-likely” scenario for oil prices and costs of extraction for each contract.
To assess the front-loadedness of the fiscal terms, or the extent to which the government’s share
of revenues is accrued early in the life of the contract, I look at the ratio between the government’s
cash flows in year 1 and the government’s cash flows in the peak year of field production. The
government’s cash flow in year 1 includes signatory bonuses, any taxes paid by the MNC that
are paid irrespective of whether the field is profitable yet (e.g. royalties based on a percent of
a production, profit oil splits paid because there are cost recovery limits), and government cash
outflow due to responsibilities for up-front capital costs. As such, it takes into account the effects of
governments’ equity stakes, accelerated depreciation schedules, cost recovery limits, royalties, and
bonuses on contract front-loadedness. A higher ratio means the contract is more front-loaded.40
40This measure is preferable to looking at the Effective Royalty Rate proposed in Johnston (2007) because it takes
into account the effects of government participation, bonuses, and depreciation schedules in addition to cost recovery
limits and royalties.
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Figure 2.4: Distribution of Front-Loadedness
Figure 4 shows the distribution of front-loadedness for the 779 separate sets of fiscal terms in the sample.
Front-loadedness is calculated using the “most-likely” scenario for oil prices and costs of extraction for each
contract and is the ratio between government cash flow in year 1 and government cash flow during the peak year of
production. Negative ratios result if the government’s cash flow is negative in year one (because of responsibility in
year 1 for exploration costs).
To assess government exposure to risk, I examine the contractual terms regarding government
participation. I look specifically at the extent to which the form of participation exposes govern-
ments to project risk. When contracts arrange for governments to carry a working interest through
the exploration phase and they only pay their share of exploration costs if there is a commercial
discovery, I consider this as a scenario of zero risk for the government. 48% of the 779 fiscal terms
in the sample contain a government ownership stake; of these, 39% involve the government taking
on exploration risk.
I measure investment guarantees using the minimum work clauses in contracts. I look at the
total of all of the minimum work obligations in the contract. I then divide the total minimum
work obligations by annual oil production in the country to account for the fact that $1 million
investment is more substantial in a minor producer compared to a major producer.
I measure the progressive of the fiscal regime using the scenario analysis. I examine the degree
of progressivity by taking the difference between the government take statistic for the scenario
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in which costs are 45% of revenues and the government take statistic in which costs are 0% of
revenues (a windfall profit environment). When the less profitable scenario yields a government
take statistic that is greater than the more profitable scenario, this indicates a regressive regime.
When the more profitable scenario yields higher government take, this indicates a more progressive
taxation regime.
2.5.3 Measurement: Independent Variables
To measure regime type, I use Polity IV. I measure time horizons within democracies and
autocracies separately. I differentiate between democracies and autocracies using Polity scores.
Countries with a polity score greater than four are included in the analysis of democracies, and
countries with a polity score of less than or equal to four are included in the analysis of autocracies.
To measure a democratic government’s time horizon, I focus on the institutionalization of the ruling
party. I follow Blake (2013) and Simmons (2008) in using the age of the ruling party as a proxy for
party institutionalization. Data on the age of the ruling party41 is from the World Bank’s Database
of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001).
To measure an autocratic regime’s time horizon, I follow Blake (2013) and Wright (2008) in
using the predicted probability of autocratic regime failure as a proxy for the leader’s time horizons.
These estimates come from a model of autocratic survival, as defined in Wright (2008). The model
includes (log) GDP, lagged growth (t-1 and t-2), Islam, civil war, region controls, and information
on autocratic institutions from Geddes et al. (2014). The model is reported in the Appendix.
2.5.4 Controls
All models control for factors beyond political regime and time horizons which might enhance
governments’ ability to secure better deals with IOCs. First, I measure the quality of the oil en-
dowment, or, the attractiveness of the HC as an investment site in the oil sector. I measure the
quality of the resource endowment based on the history of oil production in the country and the
41The age of the largest party in the government (the president’s party in presidential systems, otherwise the largest
party in the governing coalition).
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country’s geology. Countries with longer histories of commercial oil extraction42 should have less
uncertainty around the size and location of reserves, enabling less risky investments. I measure the
geology of the country’s endowment based on the costs of oil extraction43, whether the country is
a member of OPEC (countries which tend to have lower costs of extraction and larger oil fields),
and the size of proved reserves in the country.44 Because the size of oil reserves is only available
1980-present, I only include this measure in some of the models so as not to truncate the sample
in all of the models. I further control for international oil prices (2013 USD).45
I additionally control for factors which could shape credibility of commitments beyond regime
type. I control, first, for constraints on the executive. I measure constraints on the executive using
the Henisz’s Political Constraint Index, which measures the ability of political structures to support
credible policy commitments. It uses information on the number of independent branches of gov-
ernment, the degree of alignment across the branches of government, and the degree of preference
alignment within each legislative branch of government. For the index, each additional veto has
a positive but diminishing effect on the level of constraints on policy change.46 Finally, I further
measure the credibility of a country’s commitments to investors within the oil sector specifically
by looking at the history of expropriations and contract renegotiations within the country. I use two
main sources to gather information on the history of expropriations. First, I utilize data on nation-
alization events from Guriev et al. (2011). I supplement this with data from my own data collection
effort. I code national laws that unilaterally increase government ownership in oil projects or in-
crease tax on oil development as “expropriation events.” For each year, I take the cumulative sum
of the total number of past expropriation events.
42Data from Mahdavi (2014).
43Data from Waghorn et al. (2006). Discussed in footnote 38.
44Data from Ross (2012).
45Data from BP Statistical Review of World Energy.




When do countries get better deals in their negotiations with IOCs, and how do political in-
stitutions influence bargaining outcomes? Table 4 examines the determinants of government take,
front-loadedness, investment guarantees, government risk exposure, and progressiveness of the
fiscal regime. I find that more democratic countries receive lower government take and less front-
loadedness of payments, despite the idea that they should be able to make more credible commit-
ments to investors. A one-point change on the Polity scale is associated with a 1.2 percentage
point decrease in government take. A 14-point change in the Polity scale, the difference between
being a fairly autocratic state (with a score, say, of -7) and a fairly democratic state (with a score of
+7) is associated with a one-half of a standard deviation decrease in the level of government take.
This is substantial when one considers that, for a minor oil producer, like Cote d’Ivoire used as
an example earlier in the paper, the difference of a single percentage point in government take is
equivalent to nearly $7 million in foregone tax revenues annually if oil rents are at $50 a barrel.47
For a medium-sized oil field of 100 million barrels with $50 in rents per barrel, a single percentage
point difference in government take amounts to a $71 million difference in what the government
can expect to collect over the life of the field and a half a standard deviation difference in gov-
ernment take (17 percentage points) would amount to a $1.2 billion difference over the life of the
field. This is only for a single oil field. The foregone take would be multiplied the more oil that is
being developed within the country.
Not only do more democratic countries receive lower levels of government take, but they also
receive their shares less quickly. This is exactly the opposite of what would be desirable from
a policy perspective. To the extent that it is beneficial for citizens for governments to sacrifice
take in exchange for more front-loadedness, we would want more democratic countries to make
this trade-off, assuming that more democratic countries are more likely to invest in physical and





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































human capital compared to more autocratic ones.
Why would democracies tax oil production less than autocracies? This cuts against the idea
that democracies use their enhanced credibility of commitments to bargain for higher tax levels.
One explanation is that more democratic countries are pursuing a different strategy with regards
to the oil industry than more autocratic countries. More democratic countries may be securing
lower government take, but they by securing lower take they may be ensuring that oil fields are
worth developing commercially across a wider range of size and profitability scenarios. Figure 5
plots the coefficients from linear probability models for the effect of Polity score on whether or
not fiscal terms in place in the country at the time are commercial for the most-likely scenario (i.e.
they yield a positive net present value for the investor). All models include the same controls as
Table 4, Model 1.
Very few sets of fiscal terms are commercial in the low profitability scenarios. When costs are
75% of revenues, for example, only 9% of the observations in the sample would yield a positive net
present value for the investor. However, when we look at the global average profitability scenario–
with costs at 30% of revenues–and a fairly low but realistic profitability scenario–with costs at
45% of revenues–more democratic countries are indeed more likely to set more commercial fiscal
terms. At higher levels of profitability, there is no difference between regime types in whether
or not fiscal terms are commercial. Thus, it appears that democracies are developing fields with
higher costs of extraction and in lower oil price scenarios that simply would not be developed with
higher fiscal terms.
122
Figure 2.5: Effect of Polity on Commerciality of Fiscal Terms Across Profitability Scenarios,
Coefficients and 90% Confidence Intervals
Figure 5 graphs the coefficients and 90% confidence intervals from linear probability models for the effect of Polity
score on whether or not the fiscal terms in place in the country at the time are commercial or not (yield a positive net
present value for MNCs) at various levels of potential field profitability, All models include the same controls and
variables as Table 4, Model 1. Standard errors are clustered by country.
They are doing so at lower levels of risk exposure compared to autocracies. There are at least
two explanations. First, if democratic governments have more ability to make credible commit-
ments, then they do not need to take on as much risk in order to secure equal levels of take. In
this view, risk is a way to resolve credible commitment problems: states with less secure prop-
erty rights can reduce their own incentives to expropriate down the line by taking an equity stake
through a joint venture (Jensen and Johnston 2011; Henisz 2002). Autocracies with less secure
property rights take on more risk as a way of gaining more government take that they would not
otherwise be able to get in bargaining with IOCs.
Second, it is possible that revenues collected through the NOCs that take the equity stakes in
joint venture projects are more valuable to autocratic governments. Collecting revenues through
national oil companies could offer benefits to government officials that standard royalties and taxes
don’t. National oil companies can allow politicians to collect rents “off-budget,” as the budgets
of state-owned oil companies are frequently shielded from legislative and public oversight. If
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revenues collected through state-owned oil companies are more easily concealed than revenues
collected through royalties and income taxes, then they should be particularly valuable to predatory
politicians.48
Regime type plays a complex role in shaping relationships with IOCs. More democratic coun-
tries set lower overall tax rates, but this also means that they are making marginal oil fields com-
mercial. Thus, democratic countries may be better at replacing reserves over time, particularly as
costs of extraction tend to grow over the life of oil production. Indeed, if you consider countries
that are democratic in 1985 (with a Polity score >= 4), on average, they increase their reserves-to-
production ratio by 13 years between 1985 and 2000. The reserves-to-production ratio is simply
the amount of proved oil reserves over the amount of oil produced in a given year and represents
the length of time that reserves would last if they were produced at the current rate without re-
plenishment.49 The reserves-to-production ratio is inversely related to rate of extraction, meaning
that countries with higher reserves-to-production ratio are converting natural capital into financial
capital at slower rates, and positively related to reserves, meaning that countries that are better
able to replace reserves will maintain higher ratios. In other words, it is a measure of savings
in the ground. Autocratic countries, by contrast, during the same period on average decreased
their reserves-to-production ratios by 5 years.50 Thus, it appears that rather than using a position
of increased bargaining power to secure better terms in each individual deal vis-a-vis IOCs, more
democratic countries are lowering fiscal terms to produce fields under a broader range of profitabil-
ity scenarios and are doing so with lower risk exposure compared to more autocratic countries.
These findings hold in fixed effects models, enhancing confidence that the finding is not the
result of reverse causality (Table 5). Changes in levels of democracy within countries are also
associated with lower tax rates, less front-loadedness of taxation regimes, and less government
exposure to project risk.
Control variables also yield interesting findings. Countries that are more attractive sites for
48Although autocratic governments likely face little oversight for normal budgets as well.
49They are often falsely understood as the amount of time before a country runs out of oil. However, this does not
take into account the fact that countries can replenish reserves over time by making new investments and discoveries.



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































oil investments–as indicated by the history of oil exploration and production in the country and
the size of proved oil reserves–tend to receive higher levels of government take. Surprisingly,
these factors, all else equal, do not seem to help countries to secure more front-loaded contracts,
higher investment guarantees, or more progressive taxation regimes. For front-loadedness, instead
of history of exploration or size of reserves, what matters is costs of extraction.51 This makes
sense: IOCs are going to demand accelerated depreciation schedules and high cost recovery limits
in areas where the costs of extraction are especially high. A similar logic explains why oil prices
are positively related to countries’ ability to secure more up-front revenues: high oil prices help
companies to recover costs more quickly, reducing the cost to companies of front-loaded fiscal
regimes.
Credibility of commitments–apart from regime type–also play a role in shaping the design of
fiscal regimes, but not always in the expected direction. As expected, countries with greater inci-
dences of past expropriations and contract renegotiations secure lower levels of government take.52
For a medium-sized oil field of 100 million barrels with $50 in rents per barrel, a country with an
additional instance of past expropriation would secure $81 million less in revenues over the life of
the oil field. It is worth noting that the fiscal terms in my dataset incorporates information on both
contracts and renegotiations / expropriations. So, if a country that has expropriated in the past signs
a new contract with low fiscal terms in order to attract investment but later unilaterally increases the
tax rate, both of these events are incorporated into the annual dataset on fiscal regime design. This
means that countries with longer histories of expropriation are not just negotiating contracts with
lower take and then making up for this later through renegotiations. Every additional expropriation
means lower tax rates in the future, even allowing for contract renegotiations. Interestingly, coun-
tries with histories of expropriation do design more progressive fiscal systems. This could indicate
51Because costs of extraction are measured as a constant within countries, these coefficients are not terribly mean-
ingful in the fixed effects models. They vary only in countries that shift from developing onshore to offshore resources
over time (or vice versa).
52The effect is the opposite in the fixed effects models: with one additional instance of past expropriation associated
with increased government take. This make sense: an act of expropriation should immediately increase government
take. However, the fact that countries with higher reputations for extraction cannot set tax rates at levels comparable to
countries with reputations for protection of property rights is of more theoretical interest (the between-country effect).
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learning: countries that have renegotiated contracts in the past because they failed to receive a fair
share of profits in a windfall environment may design more progressive regimes going forward.
Surprisingly, none of the measures of attractiveness of the investment site or of the invest-
ment climate help to explain the minimum levels of investment secured within contracts. This is
true even if we examine investment guarantees measured in different ways (e.g. total minimum
investment guarantees, minimum investment guarantees during the first 5 years of the contract).
2.6.2 Time Horizons
Table 6 examines the effects of government time horizons on government take, front-loadedness,
investment guarantees, progressivity of taxation, and government risk exposure within democracies
and autocracies separately. Among democracies, time horizons play a significant role in shaping
how governments design fiscal regimes. As time horizons extend, democratic governments are
less likely to front-load contracts and collect higher levels of government take. They are also more
likely to design progressive fiscal regimes. All of these factors are exactly what is suggested by
the theory: governments with longer time horizons are more willing to give up some revenues now
in exchange for greater revenues in the long term. More forward-thinking governments are also
better at ensuring that their interests are secured should windfall profit scenarios arise (reducing
the need for contract renegotiations). However, time horizons do not seem to be playing a role in
securing higher investment guarantees. Among autocracies, differences in time horizons do not
have a significant direct effect on tax regimes.
In next examine how exogenous differences in oil prices condition the effects of time horizons
on outcomes. In doing so, I assume that oil prices make oil endowments more attractive for foreign
investment, conferring bargaining power to HCs. This question essentially asks, at different levels
of bargaining power, how do time horizons differentially affect policy choices about how to govern
the resource sector? Most interestingly, how do governments with longer vs. shorter time horizons
react differently to the opportunities provided by high oil prices? Do governments use greater





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































higher and more progressive tax rates? Secure higher investment guarantees?
Tables 6 and 7 report the interaction terms (as well as the constituent terms) between measures
of time horizons and oil prices within democracies and autocracies respectively. Among democra-
cies, governments with longer time horizons tend to sign new contracts seeking higher investment
guarantees when oil prices are high. Governments with longer time horizons within democra-
cies thus use their increased bargaining power to further induce foreign investment in exploration
and production. This finding is in line with the overall characterization of democracies presented
above. Democracies tend to use bargaining power as a means to attract investment and develop the
size of the oil reserves over the long-term. This is especially true among those democracies with
more established political parties that have higher prospects of returning to office in the future to
enjoy increased access to tax collections from a larger resource base. Figure 6a further elucidates
the effect by graphing the effect of party age on investment guarantees when oil prices are high vs.
low. When oil prices are at $120/barrel, countries with the least institutionalized political parties
garner $5 less per barrel in investment as compared to countries with the most institutionalized
parties, a 25% difference.
Among, autocracies, governments with shorter time horizons (higher predicted probabilities of
failure) tend to increase the front-loadedness of fiscal regimes and reduce their exposure to project
risk when oil prices are high. Reducing their exposure to project risk likely means that governments
are selling off nationally-owned oil fields and stakes in oil development projects, valuable ways of
filling government coffers with cash in the present. More directly, autocratic governments with
short time horizons are increasing the front-loadedness of their tax regimes with oil prices. This
means that autocratic leaders at risk of losing office–a set of leaders most likely to consume oil
revenues to shore up their regime and to fund repression and least likely to invest in physical and
human capital–are not only wasting irreplaceable oil revenues, they are also wasting the valuable
opportunity that high oil price environments provide to increase their government’s overall claim
to oil rents over the long term or to increase foreign investment levels. A government with a 20%
predicted probability of failure compared to a government with a near 0% predicted probability of
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failure increases the front-loadedness of the fiscal regime by 30%, holding oil prices constant at
$120/barrel (Figure 6b).
Figure 2.6: Interactions Between Time Horizons and Oil Prices
(a) Effect of Party Age at High vs. Low Oil
Prices
(b) Effect of Probability of Autocratic Regime
Failure at High vs. Low Oil Prices
Figures 6a-b graph the effect of party age and predicted probability of autocratic regime failure on investment
guarantees per barrel of oil produced ($ per barrel), front-loadedness of tax regimes (ratio between revenues in year
1 to year 8), and government risk exposure (the share of total exploration costs that the government must supply
up-front) when prices of oil are $20 per barrel and $120 respectively.
2.6.3 What do the findings mean for which countries are better managing re-
source endowments?
What do these results as a whole tell us about the kinds of countries that most optimally manage
their resource wealth? This question is difficult to answer, not least because it is hard to define
what we mean by optimal resource governance. Overall, I find that democracies and autocracies
pursue distinct strategies. More democratic countries, that should be better able to make credible
commitments not to expropriate from multinational companies and thus gain better ex ante deals,
in fact set lower tax rates and collect fewer up-front revenues, enabling them to assume lower
levels of project risk and to increase the commercial viability of marginal fields. These findings
hold whether we are considering differences between or within countries in levels of democracy.
Democracies with more institutionalized political parties (longer time horizons) tend to reduce
their claim to early revenues even more, but this does enable them to collect higher tax rates
compared to democracies with less institutionalized political parties. Longer time horizons also
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motivate democratic politicians to design more flexible fiscal regimes, planning for future potential
windfall profit scenarios and enhancing the government’s claim to these windfalls. They also seize
the opportunity offered by high oil price environments to secure higher levels of investment from
foreign companies.
More autocratic countries take a decidedly different approach to natural resource management.
They tend to ratchet up tax rates, frequently at the expense of putting the government in a risk-
bearing position, at the expense of the commerciality of smaller fields. Under these conditions,
only the largest oil fields with low costs of extraction would even be developed; others would be
considered unviable. Time horizons matter less in distinguishing behavior among autocracies as
compared to among democracies. However, autocratic politicians facing higher predicted probabil-
ities of regime failure do use high oil price environments to opportunistically grab early revenues.
This is particularly short-sighted because front-loaded taxation regimes are regressive, and, by
focusing on regressive taxation methods that enable quick revenue collection, governments are
missing the opportunity to secure windfall profits through progressive taxation.
I have characterized the strategy of democracies by saying that democracies are taking a long
view with regards to their oil sector, enacting policies that can increase the overall size of their
reserves over time. This may be true, but it is hard to pin down whether this represents “optimal”
resource governance. On the one hand, promoting investment enhances growth in the sector and
replenishes reserves, building up countries’ savings in the ground and passing along a larger natural
resource endowment to the next generation. This seems better than the typical characterization
of resource-rich governments plundering nationally-owned resources for private gain, consuming
resource capital more quickly than it can be built up, making countries poorer over time (Heal
2007).
However, in doing so, democracies may be foregoing opportunities to capture additional shares
of oil rents that are key contributors to national wealth in many developing countries. It is not
obvious whether setting the highest tax rates possible on a shrinking resource base–i.e. claiming
the maximum possible share on every unit of oil that comes out of the ground–will yield more
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or less income over time than setting lower tax rates on a (probabilistically) growing resource
base. Democracies may even have higher socially optimal tax rates on the extractives industry
compared to autocracies as they can better commit to investing oil income in physical and human
capital, harnessing resource revenues for growth. What constitutes good resource management is
a matter for continued discussion and debate and depends on political context. This paper shows
that political institutions shape resource governance strategies.
However, the findings do offer some policy insights into how countries can improve natural
resource governance. The fact that there are tradeoffs among different elements of oil contracts
suggests that governments can improve how they fare along one dimension, even if they have to
make sacrifices along another. So, for example, a government willing and able to assume some
project risk can secure higher claims to profits and automatically ensure that their claim to rents
increases as rents rise. Progressivity in fiscal regimes represents a unique opportunity to improve
how governments fare in bargaining outcomes as there do not seem to be tradeoffs between de-
signing a progressive fiscal regime, which can capture windfall profits, and other dimensions of
contract value. The costs to designing a progressive fiscal regime should be especially low in the
current low oil price environment, but doing so now would ensure that government’s better secure
their interests should market conditions change once again. It could diminish the incentives for
future renegotiations, which cost countries in the long run.
2.7 Conclusions
Using an original dataset on historically confidential oil contracts and pieces of hydrocarbons
legislation, this paper tests how political institutions shapes natural resource governance. I mea-
sure resource governance by looking at five dimensions of the financial arrangements between host
countries and international oil companies: the division of overall profits between parties, the ex-
tent to which the government secures its share of profits in early years, the minimum investment
guarantees that oil companies make to host country governments, the degree to which the govern-
ment is exposed to oil exploration risks, and the ability of the taxation regime to capture windfall
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profits. I describe theoretically and show empirically that governments face trade-offs along these
dimensions when designing fiscal regimes to govern oil extraction: higher taxes, for example, are
associated with lower investment guarantees. Although these relationships are intuitive, we are
typically reliant on highly aggregated cross-national data to assess them empirically. Comparing
investments levels and tax rates across countries is muddled by differences in product and prod-
uct quality across countries, even within sectors. I am able to show trade-offs between tax rates,
front-loadedness of tax payments, risks, progressivity, and investment not only within a single and
relatively homogenous commodity, but within the individual financial arrangements between host
countries and multinational companies.
I argue that political regimes as well as political time horizons affect both governments’ ability
to secure their interests in contract negotiations and the trade-offs that they make between various
dimensions of value. I find that democracies prioritizing increasing investment levels by reducing
tax rates and claims to early revenues; they also assume lower levels of project risk. As time
horizons lengthen, democratic leaders further reduce claims to early revenues, though they do
begin to increase tax rates, and they use the opportunity to further secure their interests offered by
high oil price environments to secure higher investment guarantees from foreign companies. More
autocratic countries, by contrast, emphasize collecting more revenues and more early revenues,
even if this implies attracting lower levels of investment, and autocratic leaders with insecure
tenure emphasize opportunistic early revenue grabs even more so. Democracies, in other words,
make policy choices that promote proving more units of oil in the ground, while autocracies make
policy choices that promote claiming higher shares of rents from each unit of oil that comes out of
the ground.
Although this is consistent with a long literature that argues that democracies have more en-
compassing interests and therefore fewer incentives to expropriate and more incentives to promote
economic growth (Olson 1993), it is at odds with a prominent literature in international political
economy linking democratic institutions to higher bargaining power vis-a-vis foreign investors via
their better ability to make credible commitments (e.g. Li 2006). Although democracies do behave
135
less opportunistically than autocracies within the oil sector, they do not necessarily capitalize on
improved credibility to set higher tax rates. Instead, democracies enact policies that should encour-
age even higher levels of investment, by setting low tax rates and by allowing companies to recover
sunk costs before taxing oil income. This is especially true among more institutionalized democ-
racies (which should have an even stronger ability to make credible commitments). While this
study has focused on oil, the theoretical discussion could be applicable to any dimension of policy-
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2.9 Appendix
2.9.1 Types of Fiscal Systems
To the extent that studies of oil consider differences between countries in methods of revenue
collection at all, most focus on whether or not resources are state-owned (e.g. Jones Luong and
Weinthal 2010).53 However, given that the state retains ownership rights under production-sharing
arrangements, joint ventures, service agreements, and full nationalization, ownership alone doesn’t
tell us much about the government’s claim to rewards and their exposure to risk. Instead, it is
necessary to look deeper at the actual fiscal terms that governments set to govern oil extraction to
understand the division of costs and benefits between MNCs and HCs. This is the strategy that I
employ in the paper. However, I can use the data collected to elucidate what types of fiscal systems
are employed across countries. There are four main ways that governments structure relationships
between governments and the companies extracting oil:
• Royalty / Tax Systems: Under royalty / tax systems, companies contract for the right to
explore for and produce oil in a particular geographic area. The HC is entitled to a share of
oil production, a royalty, and the IOC is entitled to ownership over the remaining share of
production. The IOC markets its share of production and pays income taxes on the profits
from the sales. Under these arrangements, ownership rights to the oil lie primarily with the
IOC, as does the exploration risk and the risk from oil price fluctuations.
53Jones Luong and Weinthal (2010) actually make a more nuanced distinction: they look at whether the states
owns the majority shares in the petroleum industry ( > 50 percent) and whether the state maintains operational and
managerial control throughout the project. However, this distinction still masks considerable variation and nuance.
For example, they code Brazil as having an ownership regime that qualifies as state (rather than private) ownership
with control, their least preferred ownership regime. Although Petrobras, Brazil’s state-owned oil company, operates
many of Brazil’s oil fields, Brazil has also opened up many of its bidding rounds to foreign, private investors as royalty
/ tax concessions (i.e. without any Petrobras participation), particularly those with more difficult geological conditions
(e.g. the 1999 deepwater round). Moreover, Petrobras itself isn’t fully state-owned. In 2000, Brazil sold shares of
Petrobras, reducing its stake in the company to 32 percent. In 2010, the government held another share offering and
purchased additional shares itself, raising its ownership to 54 percent. Although Petrobras has a monopoly on the
ability to grant licenses in the oil industry and is state-owned, the extent to which is has participated in projects has
varied, as has the extent to which the government actually owned Petrobras itself.
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• Production-Sharing Contracts: In a production-sharing contract, the HC collects revenues by
assuming a share of the total profit oil. Under these arrangements, the IOC still bears the risk
and covers costs. These contracts may additionally collect revenues through royalties and
income taxes. Ownership rights to the oil are shared between parties and reflect the share
of production accruing to each party. Division of risk depends on how the specific contract
allows for costs to be recovered (discussed below).
• Joint Venture Agreements: Joint venture agreements arrange for some degree of risk-sharing
between NOCs and IOCs. The degree of risk-sharing varies based on how the ownership is
allocated between parties and on the specific terms of the agreement. For example, many
joint venture agreements only obligate the NOC to pay their share of exploration costs in
case a commercial discovery is made. Joint venture agreements can also utilize royalties,
income taxes, and production-sharing to collect revenues.
• Service Agreements: In service agreements, the IOC provides the capital for exploration and
development, and, in return, the HC pays the IOC a fee for their services, usually based on
a percent of production. The HC retains ownership rights to all of the oil under a service
agreement.
• Full Nationalization: In a small number of countries, the oil industry has been fully national-
ized. In this case, NOCs bear all of the costs for exploration and development of oil field and
the risks of oil exploration. They also retain all of the profits from oil development. In this
case, there is obviously no contractual arrangement between IOCs and HCs, but the fiscal
system could be viewed as one where the HC assumes all of the risk and all of the rewards
from oil development.
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Figure 2.7: Prevalence of Fiscal Systems Over Time (1974-2004)
Figure 7 shows the share of countries in the sample that have each of the 5 main types of fiscal regimes in each year
between 1974 and 2004. In this figure, a joint venture agreement is defined as any contract where an NOC takes a
working interest in oil field development. When countries have multiple forms of fiscal regimes (e.g. both service
agreements and joint ventures), both are counted.
Globally, joint ventures are the most prevalent form of fiscal system among developing coun-
tries (Figure 7). In 2004, NOCs took a partial ownership stake in 42% of fiscal arrangements.
By contrast, service agreements and full nationalizations are the least prevalent form of fiscal
regimes. This is in contrast to many discussions of oil contracts and fiscal systems, which cite
production-sharing as the most prevalent arrangement (e.g. Aghion and Quesada 2010; Menaldo,
forthcoming; Johnston 2007). Which types of fiscal systems are more prevalent in fact depends
on how joint venture arrangements are defined. In Figure 1, a fiscal system is defined as a joint
venture as any in which governments take a working interest, whether up-front or as a “back-in”
option after a commercial discovery is made. Indeed, joint ventures are typically defined using this
broad classification (e.g. Johnston 2007).
In Figure 8, I show the prevalence of fiscal systems over time, classifying as joint ventures
only those projects in which NOCs take an equity stake from the very beginning of an oil project,
i.e. when they are responsible for paying their share of exploration costs even if no commercial
discovery is made. Under this classification, production-sharing arrangements are indeed the most
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prevalent type of fiscal system. In 2004, 45% of fiscal regimes would be classified as production-
sharing arrangements using this definition and only 15% as joint ventures. The differences between
Figures 7 and 8 reveal that state ownership in the oil industry can take very different forms across
countries, with different implications for the amount of risk born by the state.
Figure 2.8: Prevalence of Fiscal Systems Over Time (1974-2004)
Figure 8 shows the share of countries in the sample that have each of the 5 main types of fiscal regimes in each year
between 1974 and 2004. In this figure, a joint venture agreement is defined as any contract where an NOC takes a
working interest in oil field development and assumes exploration risk (i.e. the NOC pays its share of exploration
costs even if no commercial discovery is made). When countries have multiple forms of fiscal regimes (e.g. both
service agreements and joint ventures), both are counted.
Certain fiscal systems are more popular within different regions. Figure 9 graphs the preva-
lence of different fiscal systems across regions, classifying joint ventures only as those where the
government bears exploration risks (as in Figure 8). In all regions except for Latin America and
the Caribbean, production-sharing agreements are the most popular arrangement. Latin American
countries more frequently employ royalty / tax systems. State ownership is more prevalent in post-
Soviet states over the period, reflecting both that these states had fully nationalized oil industries
during the Soviet period and are more likely to set joint venture agreements in the post-Soviet
period.
However, all regions employ a variety of different fiscal systems over the period. Moreover,
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within fiscal systems, there are a wide range of differences in terms of the risks and rewards allo-
cated between parties. This goes against the idea that there is a single “model contract” or set of
fiscal terms that is diffused among HCs.
Figure 10 shows the distribution of government take under different fiscal systems. Average
government take is similar across systems, and there is wide variation in governments’ claim to
oil rents within each type of fiscal system. Thus, it is not the case that one type of arrangement is
automatically better for governments versus for companies. In theory, contracts in each of these
categories could be structured so that they are financially equivalent to each other (Johnston 2007).
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Figure 2.9: Prevalence of Fiscal Systems by Region
(a) Royalty / Tax Systems (b) Production-Sharing Agreements
(c) Joint Ventures (d) Service Agreements
(e) Full Nationalization
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Figure 2.10: Distribution of Government Take within Fiscal System Types
(a) Royalty / Tax Systems (b) Production-Sharing Agreements
(c) Joint Ventures (d) Service Agreements
Figure 10 shows the distribution of government take within each type of fiscal regime. Government take is calculated
using the “most-likely” scenario for oil prices and costs of extraction for each contract, described in Section X. Red
lines indicate the mean government take within fiscal regime type.
Moreover, contracts often do not fit neatly into one of these categories, as governments fre-
quently combine taxation instruments. Take Indonesia as an example. During the early 1990s,
Indonesian contracts, often referenced as prototypical production-sharing contracts, in fact com-
bined elements from all four categories. Contracts contained provisions for a royalty, an income
tax, and production-sharing. The contracts also allowed for a share of the royalty to go to the com-
pany, guaranteeing companies as well as governments early income from oil extraction. This is
financially equivalent to a service payment. Finally, Indonesian contracts allowed the Indonesian
state-owned oil company, Pertamina, to assume an ownership stake in projects, as in a joint ven-
ture agreement. This type of combination of taxation instruments is not unusual. Many countries
employ hybrid fiscal regimes.
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2.9.2 Frequency of Changes in Claims to Oil Rents by Law vs. by Contract
Figure 2.11: Increases in Oil Rents by Law vs. Contract
Figure 2.12: Decreases in Oil Rents by Law vs. Contract
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2.9.3 Oil Prices vs. Oil Production
Figure 2.13: Trinidad and Tobago: Oil Production Increases with Prices
Figure 2.14: Venezuela: Oil Production Decreases with Prices
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2.9.4 Defining the Sample
Table 2.9: List of Countries that Produce $100 Per Capita in Oil, 1974-2014
Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Brunei, Cameroon, Chad, Chile, China, Cote d’Ivoire, Colom-
bia, Croatia, Cuba, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Congo (Republic of), Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Egypt, Gabon,
Ghana, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mexico,
Mongolia, Nigeria, Oman, Peru, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Suriname, Syria,
Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen (North
and South)
Country-Years in Which Oil Contracts and Hydrocarbons Legislation are Observed
Country Years
Albania 1991*, 1993*
Algeria 1971, 1975, 1980, 1986, 1989, 1993, 1996, 1997*, 1999
Angola 1974, 1978, 1980, 1981, 1982*, 1984, 1989*, 1995
Argentina 1968, 1979, 1980, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991*, 2001, 2004
Azerbaijan 1993, 1994*, 1995*, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2003
Bahrain 1970, 1977, 1979, 1983*, 1990, 1998
Belize 1974, 1978, 1986, 1988, 1989, 1993, 1996*, 2000
Bolivia 1974, 1977, 1982*, 1985, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1996*, 1997*,
2004
Brazil 1978, 1980, 1997, 1998, 1999*
Brunei 1968, 1980, 1982, 1990, 2003
Cameroon 1964, 1978, 1980*, 1990, 1992, 1998, 1999
Chad 1970, 1990
Chile 1977, 1988, 1989, 1993, 1996, 1997
China 1970, 1979, 1982, 1983, 1985, 1990, 1993*, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997*
Colombia 1974, 1977, 1979, 1980*, 1981, 1982, 1987, 1990, 1992*, 1994, 1995*,
1998*, 2000*, 2002, 2004
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1969, 1984, 1987, 1990
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Congo, Rep. 1965, 1982, 1985, 1988, 1990, 1993, 1994*
Cote d’Ivoire 1970, 1980, 1983, 1988, 1990, 1992*, 1995
Croatia 2002
Cuba 1997
Ecuador 1973, 1974, 1975, 1978, 1982, 1983, 1985*, 1986, 1988, 1995*, 2002
Egypt 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1983*, 1984, 1985*, 1986,
1987, 1989*, 1993, 1994*, 1995, 1996, 1997*, 1998, 2002
Equatorial Guinea 1983, 1986, 1989*, 1992*, 1997, 1998*, 1999, 2000
Gabon 1974, 1982, 1987, 1988*, 1989, 1992*, 1994, 1997*
Ghana 1978, 1985, 1986*, 1988*, 1997*
Hungary 1993, 1995, 1999
Indonesia 1973, 1975, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1984, 1985, 1987, 1988,
1989, 1990, 1991*, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995*, 1997*, 1998, 1999, 2003
Iran 1974, 1977, 1987, 1997*
Iraq 1972, 1997, 2000
Israel 1976
Kazakhstan 1992*, 1993*, 1994*, 1995*, 1996, 1997, 2004
Kuwait 1974, 1976, 1997
Libya 1974, 1975, 1980, 1990*, 1999*, 2003
Malaysia 1968, 1980, 1987*, 1994*, 1997*
Mauritania 1971, 1988, 1996
Mexico 1938
Mongolia 1993*
Nigeria 1973, 1975, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1986*, 1988, 1991, 1994, 1995, 1998, 2000
North Yemen 1974, 1981*, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1990*
Oman 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1978, 1981, 1989*, 1992*, 1996
Papua New Guinea 1976, 1990*
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Peru 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1984, 1985, 1989*, 1990, 1991*, 1992*,
1993, 1994*, 1995*, 1996, 1997, 2001, 2004
Qatar 1974, 1976, 1977, 1985*, 1991, 1994*, 1996*
Romania pre-1974, 1993, 1996*
Russia pre-1974, 1991, 1992*, 1993, 1994*, 1995, 1999, 2001
Saudi Arabia 1972, 1974, 1980, 1997
South Yemen 1986, 1990
Sudan 1972, 1975, 1980, 1981, 1993*, 1997
Suriname 1965, 1993, 2000, 2003
Syria 1975, 1977, 1985, 1987, 1988*, 1989, 1990, 1992*, 1994, 1995, 1997
Thailand 1970, 1972, 1973, 1979, 1981*, 1982, 1985*, 1989, 1991*, 1994*, 1996*,
1997
Trinidad and Tobago 1973, 1981, 1985, 1988, 1989*, 1990, 1993*, 1996*, 1998*, 1999*
Tunisia 1972, 1978, 1980*, 1981, 1984, 1985*, 1987, 1990, 1993, 1994*, 1995,
1999, 2003
Turkmenistan 1993*, 1996*, 1999
United Arab Emirates 1972, 1974, 1975, 1978, 1979, 1980*, 1981, 1982, 1993*
Venezuela 1970, 1975, 1976, 1993, 1996, 1997*, 2001
Vietnam 1973, 1978, 1988, 1991, 1992*, 1993, 1994*, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001,
2003
Yemen, Rep. 1991*, 1992, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997
Bolded years indicate years in which multiple laws or multiple contracts are observed.
Asterisks indicate that the law or contract is observed in both the Johnston database and the Barrows Collection.
These sources only overlap in coverage between roughly 1980 and 2000.
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2.9.5 Calculating contract statistics
Table 2.11: Assumptions used for cash flow analysis of fiscal terms
Model Assumptions
Field and production assumptions
Field discovery size (4 scenarios) 50 MMBBL, 100 MMBBL, 500 MMBBL, 1000 MMBBL
Peak production rate 8.5% of field size, in years 7-9
Field decline rate 12.5%
Field life 25 years
Price and cost assumptions (9 scenarios)
Capital costs as a share of total costs 50%
Total costs as a share of gross revenue 0%, 7%, 15%, 30%, 45%, 60%, 75%, 90%, and 100%
Assumptions are influenced by discussion of average oil field characteristics in Johnston (2003) and Waghorn et al.
(2006).
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2.9.6 Autocratic Regime Survival
Table 2.12: Autocratic Regime Survival, 1960-2006
Regime Failure
GDP (log) -0.249 (0.072)**
Growth, t-1 -0.046 (0.011)**
Growth, t-2 -0.002 (0.013)
Islam 0.237 (0.341)
Civil War 0.667 (0.260)*
Military Regime 1.633 (0.302)**
Party Regime -0.926 (0.274)**
Monarchy -1.401 (0.580)*
Party-Personal-Military Hybrid -1.108 (0.768)
Military-Personal Hybrid 0.438 (0.335)
Party-Military Hybrid -0.263 (0.509)
Party-Personal Hybrid -0.728 (0.405)+
N 3,006
Note: ** p-value < 0.01, * p-value <0.05, + p-value < 0.10. Table report results of a logit model of regime failure.
Model includes regional fixed effects for Europe, Middle East / North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, Central
Asia, and Latin America / Caribbean and time splines to control for duration dependence. The excluded regime




The Struggle for Control Over Aid
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3.1 Introduction
By the turn of the twenty-first century, the world’s major donors faced a political crisis in aid
allocation (Haut 2007). Econometric studies found little evidence that aid achieved developmental
objectives (Roodman 2007) and emphasized that donors’ strategic interests often distorted the
amount of aid allocated to different countries.1 Additionally, mounting evidence indicated that
certain types of aid actually undermined public institutions in aid-receiving countries. In particular,
scholars emphasized the negative effects of project aid—aid allocated through relatively small
transfers, each with donor-specified objectives, implementing agents, and monitoring and reporting
requirements.
Unlike budget support, which finances policies and programs prioritized by aid-receiving gov-
ernments in national budgets, project aid increases donors’ control over aid expenditure (Clist,
Isopi and Morrissey 2012; Cordella and Dell’Ariccia 2007; Easterly 2007; Morss 1984). This
mode of aid allocation comes at a cost. When donors rather than recipients determine which
projects to fund, they short-circuit the “political and managerial processes by which governments
think through trade-offs, establish policy priorities, and are held accountable by citizenry” (van de
Walle 2001: 209). Profuse project aid also effectively constrains recipient country governments’
ability to self-rule: Between 2000 and 2002, for example, the Tanzanian government received more
than 1,300 individually specified aid projects requiring more than 3,000 donor meetings and 2,400
reports to donors each quarter. In the face of these crippling bureaucratic requirements, Tanzania
declared a four-month period during which it would not write donor reports or accept donor visits
so that it would have time to govern (Birdsall 2004).2
Additionally, aid reformers lament that Western economists have often imposed misguided
policy prescriptions on developing countries that obstruct critical opportunities for local actors to
innovate the most appropriate, contextually-specific paths to development (Easterly 2006). Aid
would be more effective, reformers argue, if donors delegated greater decision-making power to
1For overviews of this large literature, see Alesina and Dollar 2000: 34-35 or Neumayer 2003: 21-9.
2Tanzania is not anomalous. For discussion of other cases, see Frot and Santiso 2010: 27-29, and Acharya, Fuzzo
De Lima, and Moore, 2006: 2.
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local actors.
In response to this criticism, the World Bank and all 26 member states of the Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and In response to
this criticism, the World Bank and all 26 member states of the Development Assistance Commit-
tee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) introduced
a “new aid paradigm” (Dijkstra 2013). Above all, this new paradigm would put recipient coun-
try governments “back in the driver’s seat” (Wolfensohn 1999) and promote “aid ownership,” i.e.,
the ability of recipient country governments to influence and be held accountable for aid expendi-
tures within their borders (OECD 2005).3 Following the World Bank’s implementation of Poverty
Reduction Strategy Projects (PRSPs) in 1999, DAC donor country governments committed to im-
prove aid effectiveness in part by allocating more lump sum, sector-wide support or budget aid
(OECD 2005). Donors noted, however, that in extremely weak states or in states ruled by undemo-
cratic governments, it might be necessary to withhold aid ownership from country governments to
ensure that aid is actually spent on “broad-based” development (Oxford Policy Management/IDL
2008; World Bank 1998).
This paper evaluates the conditions under which donors have in fact been willing to allocate
greater aid ownership to recipient countries. Despite its relevance for aid policy, scholars have
only recently begun to investigate questions concerning why donors vary aid composition (i.e. aid
delivery tactics or modalities). As we explain below, this literature largely assumes that donors are
“outcome-oriented” and that their “development strategy seeks to maximize the impact of their aid
on recipient development” (Dietrich 2013, 698). Yet, this conflicts with the OECD’s (2011) “sober-
ing” self-assessment that DAC donors have failed to increase aid ownership for aid effectiveness.
What explains this divergence?
We argue that donors face conflicting incentives when they select aid delivery tactics. In addi-
tion to donors’ interests in promoting conventional development goals – such as economic growth
3Accordingly, the OECD favors the term “partner countries” over “aid recipients.” Below, we argue that donors
strategically vary the degree to which they treat country governments as partners. We therefore use “recipient,” “aid-
receiving country,” and “country government” interchangeably.
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and more effective, democratic governance – donors also face incentives to vary aid composition
in pursuit of foreign policy and security objectives. As these logics are not mutually exclusive, we
evaluate the relative weight of each. In accounting for donors’ diverse incentives, we provide a
comprehensive analysis of DAC donors’ allocation of aid ownership.
We also contribute by demonstrating that measures employed in recent studies are not reliable
indicators of aid ownership without also accounting for the extent to which aid is fragmented
across projects. Consistent with policymakers’ characterization of highly fragmented aid as low
ownership aid, we construct a Hirschman-Herfindahl index of aid concentration that evaluates the
extent to which donors allocate aid in lump sum versus fragmented transfers. Enlisting this measure
alongside of two alternative measures, we find robust evidence that donors’ foreign policy and
security interests are stronger and more consistent predictors of aid composition than recipients’
capacity or commitment to liberal development policy. Further, we find no evidence that donors
have become increasingly responsive to developmental concerns over time.
These findings have implications for aid policy. As Easterly and Pfutze (2008) have under-
scored, successful aid reform depends on our understanding of donors’ (in)ability to meet their
public commitments in the past. It is to this end that we examine donors’ ability to adhere to their
own commitments and seek to identify the obstacles that they face. We do not, however, assume
that adherence to donor-specified best practices would positively affect development. While there
is evidence that highly fragmented aid harms developing countries’ institutions, we lack evidence
that “high ownership” aid is effective. Below, we discuss how bilateral aid is allocated and intro-
duce recent research on aid composition. In Sections 3-5 we develop and test the argument that
donors face conflicting incentives when allocating aid ownership. We conclude in Section 6 with
discussion of the policy implications of our findings.
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3.2 Aid, selectivity, and composition
When allocating aid, donor country governments make decisions over aid targeting and aid com-
position. First, donors identify the countries to which they will allocate aid and in what amount.
Second, donors specify aid composition (i.e., delivery tactics) by indicating how donors will com-
mit, disburse and evaluate aid to each recipient. On the first question, U.S. congressional leaders,
for example, routinely earmark large sums of money for politically salient recipients, while simul-
taneously allocating funds for development agencies, such as USAID, which distributes its funds
according to criteria developed in part by the State Department. Although additional funds are tar-
geted to multilateral organizations, such as the World Bank, bilateral government-to-government
transfers accounted for roughly 75% all development aid between 2000-2010 (OECD 2011).
What drives donors’ aid targeting decisions? Although OECD donors have often claimed to
condition aid amount on recipient country policy, numerous studies have found that they are gener-
ally unable or unwilling to do so. This may be caused by information and agency problems inherent
in foreign aid (Martens et al. 2002; Easterly 2006); the moral imperative and “warm glow” that
many donor country citizens feel when allocating aid, which makes aid difficult to withdraw (An-
dreoni 1990); or the strength of donors’ strategic interests in recipient countries (Dunning 2004;
Stone 2006; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009; Fleck and Kilby 2010). While there is evidence
that some donors target aid towards relatively poor countries (Clist 2011), there is only weak ev-
idence that donors allocate more aid to recipient countries with better policy environments for
development.
Yet, even if donors do not effectively condition aid amount on recipient country policy, they
may still exercise selectivity by varying the composition of their aid (Radelet 2004, Birdsall, Kha-
ras and Perakis 2010). As Clist and coauthors note, “the policy lever for dealing with low levels of
governance is the type of aid delivered, specifically the amount of control a recipient is granted”
(2012:268; Radelet 2004:12, Birdsall and Kharas 2010:4). By varying aid composition, donors
can effectively constrain the ability of country governments to divert aid expenditure from donors’
objectives.
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How do donors vary aid composition? Historically, scholars have identified budget aid and
project aid as two “extremes of control” (Clist, Isopi, and Morissey 2012:269; Cordella and
Dell’Ariccia 2007). At one extreme, donors allocate large, lump sum transfers of general budget
support, which enable country governments to allocate and administer aid. At the other extreme,
donors spread aid across a large number of small projects. Project aid increases donor control
over expenditure because donors specify the intended objectives, beneficiaries, and disbursement,
monitoring and reporting requirements associated with each project. Empirical evidence confirms
that more precisely targeted projects experience less diversion of funds from donors’ preferred
objectives (Winters 2014).
Given the prominent view that greater recipient country ownership increases aid effectiveness,
a surprisingly low share of foreign aid is allocated as budget support. The OECD (2011) estimates
that most donor countries direct less than 10% of foreign aid to general or sectoral budget sup-
port. Instead, since the end of the Cold War, donors have dramatically increased the percentage
of bilateral aid allocated as project aid. Simultaneously, the average size of DAC donors’ projects
decreased: Over the last 20 years, the average value of an OECD bilateral foreign aid project has
fallen from roughly $10 million in 1991 to less than $1 million in 2011.4 Moreover, even when
allocating budget aid, Dijkstra (2013) notes that DAC donors increasingly allocate small budget
aid transfers alongside high volumes of project aid. After endorsing a PRSP in 2001, for example,
Mozambique received 85 budget aid transfers between 2001 and 2010, but this accounted for only
18% of the country’s total bilateral aid (Batley 2005).5
Why have donors increasingly allocated fragmented project aid? Explanations may include
increasing competition among donors as more countries and agencies have entered the aid “mar-
ket”; the related tendency for traditional donors to allocate aid to larger numbers of countries
(Frot and Santiso 2009); the proliferation of specialized bureaucratic units within donor country
governments, each with incentives to allocate and monitor projects (Cooley and Ron 2002; Kilby
4Author’s calculations.
5This may explain why Clist, Isopi and Morissey (2012) find that the factors that predict the allocation of (any)
budget aid by multilateral donors do not also predict the share of budget aid allocated.
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2011); and a shift towards aid in social sectors, which may be prone to fragmentation (Frot and
Santiso 2010). It is likely that all of these factors contribute to relatively high levels of project
fragmentation.
If donors were adhering to their own commitments to promote aid ownership, we would ex-
pect a decrease – not increase – in project fragmentation over time. Yet, recent studies argue that,
even when allocating project aid, donors may still exercise selectivity in favor of aid effective-
ness. Dietrich (2013), for instance, argues that donors have pursued greater aid effectiveness by
exercising selectivity over project implementing agents. When donors perceive recipient country
governments as capable and well-governed, Dietrich argues, donors are more likely to send aid
through recipients’ public sectors. By contrast, donors tend to “bypass” corrupt or weak govern-
ments by allocating project aid through NGOs or private contractors. Similarly, Knack (2013)
suggest that donors are unlikely to utilize recipient countries’ financial systems to administer aid
if donors perceive recipients’ systems as low capacity.
While the links between good governance, allocation of budget aid, and allocation of aid
through public sectors offer suggestive evidence that donors are ceding more control over aid
to countries with better governance, these studies overlook other motivations for donors to vary
recipients’ control over aid expenditures. A vast literature on aid conditionality finds that donor
governments’ strategic interests often distort aid targeting. In the following section, we argue that
donors also face incentives to vary their aid delivery tactics in order to achieve diverse aid objec-
tives, including but not limited to development.
Additionally, it is important to recognize that while donors’ willingness to engage recipient
country governments in project implementation and aid administration is important, it does not
reliably capture donors’ willingness to cede ownership over aid to recipient governments. In Tan-
zania, for example, donors have channeled high volumes of aid through the Tanzanian government
but divided that aid across numerous donor-specified projects, each with costly monitoring and
reporting requirements. In 2006, for instance, at least 73% of bilateral aid to Tanzania was chan-
neled through government systems but was fragmented across 663 separate donor-specified aid
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projects with a median size of less than $120,000. Tanzania is thus considered a classic case of
low ownership because of the fragmented way in which donors engage country systems (Birdsall
2004).
British aid to South Africa in 2008 provides a contrasting example. Although the UK did not
allocate budget support, many of its projects were channeled through the public sector in relatively
large transfers.6 The most prominent project supported a Rapid Response Health Fund to empower
the South African Minister of Health to be able to rapidly address problems that may arise in the
implementation of HIV/AIDS programming. This type of aid, by explicitly empowering local ac-
tors, reflects significantly more government influence over expenditure than the profuse project aid
allocated to Tanzania. Yet, considering budget support alone, British aid to South Africa appears
identical to aid to states where local actors are bypassed entirely (both receiving zero budget sup-
port). By contrast, considering whether donors engage or bypass recipients’ public sectors flattens
the distinction between high and low ownership aid – a central theme in aid policy debates.
In what follows, we offer a more comprehensive account of donors’ motivations to vary aid
ownership. To test our argument, we examine the extent to which donors spread aid across many,
small projects, a continuous indicator of the extent to which donors relinquish control over aid
expenditures to aid-receiving countries.
3.3 Incentives for donors to allocate aid ownership
3.3.1 Aid ownership for development
DAC donors have taken a strong, public stand on the relationship between aid ownership and aid
effectiveness. Ensuring ownership over aid for aid-receiving countries “increases aid effectiveness
by strengthening the partner country’s sustainable capacity to develop, implement and account for
6Clear data on implementing agency is missing for 87% of the total aid for this donor-recipient dyad, so it is
difficult to specify exactly how much aid was channeled through the public sector.
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its policies to its citizens and parliament” (OECD 2005: 4). Yet, donors simultaneously acknowl-
edge that many developing countries lack the institutional capacity to ensure that aid reaches its
intended beneficiaries. For instance, in states with low-functioning and corrupt bureaucracies like
Chad and Uganda studies have found that 99 percent of central government expenditures failed to
reach school and health clinics (Gauthier and Wane 2009; Reinikka and Svensson 2004). Accord-
ingly, to prevent aid capture, it may be necessary for donors to retain control over aid in countries
with weak institutional environments.7
Additionally, in their most robust statement of developmental commitments—the Paris Decla-
ration (OECD 2005)—DAC donors acknowledge that for aid reforms to work, aid-receiving coun-
tries must have broad-based national development strategies in place. Undemocratic governments
and governments that invest more heavily in patronage and the military than health and education
are likely to spend budget support on similar priorities. Donors motivated by aid effectiveness may
therefore allocate fragmented project aid in order to prevent aid capture by governments whose
demonstrated commitment to liberal development policy is low.
DAC donors’ own “best practices” therefore imply that when donors are motivated primarily
by aid effectiveness, they should allocate high ownership aid on average. Donors may deviate from
this high ownership mean by restricting opportunities for aid ownership only when governments
suffer from extremely low capacity or lack a demonstrated commitment to liberal development
priorities (hereafter, commitment to development).
To evaluate government capacity and quality, we follow Langbein and Knack (2010) in using
the mean of the six dimensions of the World Governance Indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mazruti
2010). To capture countries’ commitment to development, we consider three measures. First, we
assess democratic institutions using the Freedom House Index. To ease interpretation, we reverse
the scale of the Freedom House Index so that lower values indicate less democratic institutions.
Second, we include a dummy variable that indicates whether a country has endorsed a Poverty
7This behavior can be self-defeating over the long run, as allocating highly fragmented aid can further weaken
institutions, Yet, individual donors face incentives to avoid allocating high ownership aid in the near term when other
donors will reap related gains without paying the costs of higher risk of aid capture in (Knack 2013).
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Strategy Reduction Paper (PRSP). Introduced in 1999 by the World Bank and IMF, PRSPs out-
line “a country’s macroeconomic, structural, and social policies and programs to promote growth
and reduce poverty, as well as associated external financing needs.” Typically, governments work
with donors to develop their PRSPs, which also make them eligible for debt relief and conces-
sional financing under the World Bank and IMF’s Heavily-Indebted Poor Countries Initiative. We
therefore view the publication of a PRSP as indicating a government’s committed to develop-
ment spending that is in line with the priorities of major liberal donors. Third, given the OECD’s
repeated emphasis on education as a cornerstone for successful recipient-led development, we
consider government spending on education (per capita) as a share of GDP.
3.3.2 Aid ownership for influence
In contrast to the view that donors are primarily motivated by concerns about promoting develop-
ment, numerous studies of aid targeting emphasize that donors use foreign aid as a policy tool to
pursue foreign policy or military objectives (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009). Granting
– or withholding – control over aid expenditures is key to achieving foreign policy or military
objectives through foreign aid. Specifically, when strategic interests are at stake, donors face in-
centives to allocate ownership only when country governments demonstrate commitment to shared
strategic interests. In these cases, donors stand to benefit by allocating high ownership aid so that
local actors can effectively direct aid dollars towards shared security objectives. Between 2000
and 2004, for instance, the world’s largest bilateral donor, the U.S., allocated 90% of its bilateral
development aid to Israel – a critical military ally – in lump sum transfers of budget aid.8
By contrast, in the absence of shared interests, donors would reasonably expect aid-receiving
countries to divert aid from donors’ objectives if given high ownership aid. Accordingly, the U.S.,
has allocated fragmented project aid to non-state actors in countries where governments oppose
8After 2004, aid allocated to Israel (and other countries with relatively high GDPs) could no longer be counted as
“Official Development Assistance.”
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U.S. strategic interests, such as Russia and Bolivia, and in countries where the U.S. had major
foreign policy interests in political transitions, i.e., Egypt after Mubarak’s fall. The governments
of these countries expelled USAID after accusing the U.S. government of undermining their ability
to self-govern. In these cases, low ownership aid was used strategically to achieve foreign policy
and security objectives.
We therefore expect that donors motivated primarily by foreign policy and security objec-
tives will allocate relatively low-ownership aid on average, and will deviate from this mean when
they seek to induce or reward governments for embracing donors’ strategic priorities. To evaluate
this argument, we consider the influence of United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voting
alignment and donors’ official arms transfers on the allocation of aid ownership during the imple-
mentation of the “new aid paradigm” (2000-2010). Voting in the UNGA gives donors a unique
opportunity to observe governments’ relative policy positions in the same setting (e.g., Dreher,
Nunnenkamp and Thiele 2008; Dreher and Sturm 2012; Kuziemko and Werker 2006). According
to the U.S. Department of State (1985), for example, UNGA voting enabled them to “make judg-
ments about whose values and views are harmonious with our own, whose policies are consistently
opposed to ours, and whose practices fall in between” (as quoted in Dreher and Jensen 2013). We
expect that donors will allocate higher levels of aid ownership to UNGA voting allies. To measure
UNGA voting alignment, we favor a simple proportion of shared votes between each donor and
recipient pair (Voeten, Strezhnev and Bailey 2013).
Additionally, when donors’ security interests are at stake and they view recipient country gov-
ernments as reliable partners, we expect donors to allocate higher ownership aid. When donors
seek to bolster the military and political strength of an aid-receiving government, they may actu-
ally support the diversion of aid dollars away from development objectives towards other political
or military tasks, such as supplying local militias with resources or buying off internal opposition.
In these cases, donors prefer to allocate money in relatively large transfers with fewer specified de-
velopment objectives and reporting requirements in order to maximize the discretion of recipient
governments over expenditure. To measure donors’ interest in the military cooperation of recipient
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countries, we construct a binary indicator equal to one if a donor transferred arms to a recipient’s
government in a given year (SIPRI 2012).
In using UNGA voting alignment and bilateral arms transfers as indicators of donor-recipient
alignment on foreign policy and security goals, we note the difference between strategic alignment
as opposed to salience of recipient countries. Though several studies use United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) membership as an indicator of donor “security interests”, UNSC membership
alone does not signal policy alignment. For example, Russia and China are permanent members
of the UNSC whose foreign policy and security interests deviate substantially from OECD donors.
While the increased authority of UNSC members may induce donors to target them with aid, we
expect donors grant ownership only when they perceive interest alignment.
3.4 Measuring aid concentration
In line with the view that donors’ tendency to spread aid across many separate projects reduces
aid ownership for aid-receiving countries9, we measure aid ownership by the extent to which aid










where Pi is the amount of aid allocated for project i, and A is the total aid allocated by a donor
to a recipient in a given time period. Project-level data on bilateral aid commitments comes from
AidData 2.0 (Tierney et al. 2011). We include all 22 DAC donor countries in our sample of donors
and all countries that received Official Development Assistance from these donors, 2000-2010.10
9Theoretically, fungibility could mean that there is no difference between lump-sum and project aid other than
transaction costs. If aid funded projects that recipient governments would otherwise have implemented, this would
free up government resources. Yet, this is only true when donor and recipient governments share preferences; we
argue, that donors are more likely to allocate project aid when their preferences diverge from recipients.
10DAC donors listed in the Appendix.
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Aid concentration values range between 0 and 100. A value of 100 indicates a perfectly con-
centrated aid commitment, or, aid allocated in a single lump-sum payment. To ensure that the aid
concentration scores are meaningful, we take four precautions. First, we exclude all projects less
than $10,000, as they may reflect donor expenses related to aid management, which some donors
are more likely to report as aid projects than others (Togo and Wada 2007). Second, countries
receiving a small total amount of aid may receive aid concentration scores with little substantive
meaning. We therefore exclude all dyads receiving less than $1 million in bilateral aid in a given
year.11
Third, in calculating aid concentration, we ensure that the types of aid flows included in the
analysis truly represent positive bilateral aid flows between donors and recipients that actually take
place in the recipient country. To do this, we exclude Official Development Assistance classi-
fied as debt relief, donor administrative costs, and aid to refugees living in donor countries. The
distribution of aid concentration is reported in the Appendix.
Finally, we address the concern that aid concentration and aid amount correlate. Figure 1
plots aid concentration values against the logged value of total annual bilateral aid allocated to aid
recipients. The correlation between aid concentration and aid amount is close to zero (r = 0.20).
This mitigates the potential concern that the relationship between the explanatory variables and
Aid Concentration is mediated through aid amount.
11In the Appendix, we show that the results are not sensitive to these thresholds.
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Figure 3.1: Aid Concentration vs. Aid Amount
Figure 1 plots aid concentration scores against the logged value of total annual bilateral aid allocated to aid
recipients for all recipients in our sample.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Overall rates of aid concentration
We begin by examining overall rates of aid concentration. On average, do donors allocate high
ownership, concentrated aid or low ownership, fragmented aid? Rates of aid concentration are
remarkably low: In 2010, the median aid concentration value was only 19.4. To put this in context,
Swedish aid to Uganda in 2010 receives an aid concentration score of 19.6, which represents
around $58 million in positive aid flows spread across 39 separate projects of an average size of
around $1.5 million. It is staggering to consider that this represents aid flows from a single donor:
In 2010 alone, Uganda received 1,148 separate aid projects from bilateral donors. This hardly
represents the type of high ownership aid advocated by the Paris Declaration. Figure 2 presents the
distribution of aid concentration over time. If anything, the figure shows a slight downward trend
in aid concentration over time. Thus, it is not the case that donors are on average allocating more
aid concentration in response to their own commitments to aid ownership.
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Figure 3.2: Aid Concentration Over Time
Figure 2 shows the median aid concentration value for all DAC donors by year between 1995 and 2010. The dotted
lines represent the 25th and 75th percentile aid concentration values.
Yet, overall low rates of aid ownership among aid-receiving countries do not necessarily indi-
cate that donors are failing to adhere to their own principles about aid effectiveness. High own-
ership may only enhance aid effectiveness when aid-receiving countries have strong governance
and high commitment to pro-development spending. Low average levels of ownership may simply
reflect the failure of most aid-receiving countries to meet these conditions. Below, we assess this
possibility empirically.
3.5.2 Analysis
The unit of analysis is the donor-recipient dyad year over the period between 2000 and 2010. We
include only donor-recipient-years with positive bilateral aid flows. Therefore, we should interpret
the analysis as the factors that influence aid ownership conditional upon receiving aid. We log the
dependent variable so that it is normally distributed.12 This transformation also ensures that the
dependent variable is not bounded, allowing for straightforward estimation through OLS.
12The distribution of the logged dependent variable is reported in the Appendix.
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We present two types of models. First, we show fixed effects models. Fixed effects models
have the advantage of controlling for potential confounds that do not vary over time. We also
report models that instead include year and dyad fixed effects. These models have the advantage
of holding constant all unique features of the relationship between donors and recipients (e.g.
trading relationship, colonial relationship, cultural exchanges, historical features of the foreign aid
relationship).
While fixed effects models are typically the gold standard of time series cross-sectional anal-
ysis, their distinct disadvantage is that they only enable us to estimate the effects of changes in
covariates within aid-receiving countries, in other words, the “within” country effects. These ef-
fects are interesting for the political and security variables considered here, which do vary over
time. However, capacity and commitment to development tend to be slow moving, and fixed ef-
fects do not allow us to estimate the effects of differences between countries in these slow-moving
covariates.
In the Appendix, we summarize the variables included in the analysis, including the proportion
of the variance that occurs between donor-recipient dyads. Around half of the variance in aid
concentration occurs between donor-recipient dyads. Thus, fixed effects models that only consider
variation within dyads miss approximately half of the variation in aid allocation behavior. Further,
many of our key explanatory variables are slow-moving, varying primarily between- rather than
within-dyads.
This suggests that random effects models are appropriate. However, typical random effects
models suffer from potential correlation between covariates and residuals. Bell and Jones (2015)
argue that this problem most often arises because, in reality, each covariate is composed of two
separate parts: a “within” and a “between” effect. In other words, typical random effects models
assume that a one-unit change in a covariate within a single country has the same effect as a one-
unit difference in a covariate between countries. If these two processes differ, then any unaccounted
for variance is pushed into the error term, causing omitted variable bias. The authors argue that by
separately including the “within” and “between” effects within the random effects models, most
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omitted variable bias and endogeneity problems with time series cross-sectional data are resolved.
Most importantly, this specification enables us to estimate the effects of slow-moving covariates
through the “between” effects.
We therefore additionally estimate the following within-between random effects model for
donor i, recipient j, and time period t, we estimate the model:
ln(Aid Concentration)i jt = a +b1(Xi jt 1   X̄i j)+b2X̄i j +b3(Z jt 1   Z̄ j)
+b4Z̄ j +nt +ht +(ei jt +ui j)
where Aid Concentrationi jt is the concentration of donor i’s bilateral aid to recipient j in year
t; X̄i j are the means of each covariate xi j, as such the time-invariant component of these variables
(“between” effects); Xi jt 1  X̄i j is the difference between the lagged covariate and the mean value
for dyad i j (“within” effects); Z̄ jare the means of each covariate z j, as such the time-invariant
component of these variables (“between” effects); Z jt 1   Z̄ j is the difference between the lagged
covariate and the mean value for recipient country j (“within” effects); and nt and hi are year and
donor fixed effects respectively.
Table 1 presents the results from both fixed effects and random effects specifications. The
dependent variable in all models is log-transformed. One can therefore interpret a regression co-
efficient as a 100 ⇤ (eb   1) percent change in aid concentration for each one-unit increase in the
explanatory variable. The first column reports OLS results estimating the logged concentration
of aid delivered by donors to recipients, utilizing donor, recipient, and year fixed effects (Model
1). The second column utilizes dyad and year fixed effects (Model 2). Column 3 reports a stan-
dard random effects model, with random effects by aid-receiving country and donor and year fixed
effects (Model 3).
Table 2 presents the results from the within-between random effects specification. Column 4
reports a within-between random effects specification, with random effects by aid-receiving coun-
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try and donor and year fixed effects (Model 4). One issue that arises in the interpretation of the
results for arms transfers is that not all donors in the sample report allocating arms transfers dur-
ing the period. This can make interpretation of this variable difficult, as zeroes could occur either
because the donor never makes arms transfers or because a donor selected not to transfer arms to
a particular country. Thus, in Model 5 we include only the donors that report at least one arms
transfer in the sample during the period.13 Model 6 excludes GDP per capita as a control in order
to observe the effects of recipient state capacity more easily.
All models also include controls. We control for civil conflict, as donors face obstacles to
allocating high ownership aid to countries immersed in conflict. We also control for colonial ties
between donors and recipients. Donors plausibly have greater information about former colonies,
which could shape their willingness to grant aid ownership. Additionally, we control for total
amount of aid allocated bilaterally by all DAC donors to aid-receiving countries and the number
of donors operating within a country. Although donors may wish to coordinate and harmonize aid
behavior, in practice each individual aid agency faces bureaucratic incentives to implement its own
projects in order to maintain funding and relevance (Cooley and Ron 2002).
We also control for trade intensity between donors and recipients, the logged sum of imports
and exports (Barbieri et al. 2008). Donors with greater economic interests in recipient countries
may be more likely to allocate high ownership aid to promote long-term economic development.
Logged population and logged GDP per capita also serve as controls. We also control for UN
Security Council membership, in case donors allocate greater aid ownership in order to obtain
support on the Security Council. Finally, to measure the importance of the recipient to the donor
we control for each recipient’s rank in each donor’s aid portfolio in a given year, with higher rank
indicating that the recipient received more aid.14
13Listed in the Appendix.
14We favor this measure over the direct inclusion of the amount of bilateral aid. We view aid allocation as a three-
step process in which donors decide whether to give aid, how much aid to give, and, finally, the mode of aid allocation
(as in Clist, Isopi, and Morissey 2012). If, instead, one viewed the decisions of how much aid and the mode of aid as
simultaneous decisions, then including the amount of aid would induce bias. We thus err on the side of not inducing
bias in the estimates and exclude aid amount from the models. The Appendix demonstrate that including aid amount
does not alter findings.
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Table 3.1: Explaining Aid Ownership, Development vs. Influence, 2000-2010
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
FE FE RE
L.WGI 0.085 (0.053) 0.076 (0.063) 0.070 (0.042)+
L.PRSP -0.000 (0.030) -0.031 (0.032) 0.013 (0.027)
L.Freedom House -0.006 (0.012) 0.002 (0.012) -0.011 (0.010)
L.Educ. Spending (% GDP) -0.018 (0.005) -0.019 (0.005)** -0.011 (0.003)**
L.UNGA 0.515 (0.160)** 0.443 (0.132)** 0.440 (0.140)**
Arms Transfer 0.090 (0.052)+ 0.111 (0.046)* 0.100 (0.052)*
UNSC 0.020 (0.037) 0.021 (0.039) 0.017 (0.037)
Former Colony -0.406 (0.071)** -0.410 (0.070)**
Civil Conflict 0.008 (0.038) -0.015 (0.039) 0.007 (0.034)
Total DAC Aid (log) 0.088 (0.020)** 0.030 (0.020) 0.063 (0.017)**
Recipient rank in donor portfolio -0.004 (0.001)** 0.001 (0.001) -0.004 (0.001)**
L.Population (log) 0.243 (0.316) 0.133 (0.360) -0.042 (0.023)**
L.GDP per capita (log) 0.196 (0.114)+ 0.217 (0.121)+ 0.111 (0.031)**
L.Number of donors 0.001 (0.005) -0.004 (0.006) -0.012 (0.005)**
L.Trade Intensity -0.059 (0.013)** 0.011 (0.015) -0.056 (0.012)**
Donor Fixed Effects Y N Y
Recipient Fixed Effects Y N N
Dyad Fixed Effects N Y N
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Observations 10,240 10,240 10,240
Notes: ** p-value < 0.01, * p-value <0.05, + p-value < 0.10. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by
aid-receiving country. For all models, logged aid concentration score is the dependent variable.
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Table 3.2: Explaining Aid Ownership, Development vs. Influence, Within-Between Random Ef-
fects Models, 2000-2010
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Full Sample w/ Arms w/out GDP
Between
Effects
WGI -0.002 (0.070) 0.054 (0.066) 0.132 (0.051)*
PRSP 0.234 (0.096)* 0.172 (0.094)+ 0.124 (0.085)
Freedom House -0.042 (0.018)* -0.039 (0.018)* -0.047 (0.018)*
Educ. Spending (% GDP) -0.007 (0.013) 0.001 (0.014) -0.010 (0.011)
UNGA 0.720 (0.299)* 0.711 (0.309)* 0.755 (0.294)*
Arms Transfer 0.134 (0.094) 0.235 (0.097)* 0.150 (0.094)
Within
Effects
L.WGI-mean 0.100 (0.063) 0.131 (0.068)+ 0.121 (0.067)+
L.PRSP-mean -0.025 (0.033) -0.021 (0.038) -0.024 (0.033)
L.Freedom House-mean 0.004 (0.012) -0.001 (0.013) 0.004 (0.012)
Educ. Spending (% GDP)-mean -0.014 (0.006)* -0.015 (0.006)* -0.011 (0.005)*
L.UNGA-mean 0.449 (0.133)** 0.622 (0.147)** 0.458 (0.132)**
Arms Transfer-mean 0.109 (0.046)* 0.109 (0.046)* 0.109 (0.046)*
Donor Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Recipient Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Observations 10,240 8,372 10,240
Notes: ** p-value < 0.01, * p-value <0.05, + p-value < 0.10. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by
aid-receiving country. For all models, logged aid concentration score is the dependent variable. All models include
donor and year fixed effects and random effects by recipient country. Model 5 includes only those donors that record
at least 1 arms transfer, 2000-2010. Within and between effects are included, but not reported, for all control variables
listed in Table 1 unless otherwise noted.
3.5.3 Aid ownership for development?
Overall, we find limited evidence that aid ownership is shaped by a country’s capacity and com-
mitment to development. Capacity, as measured by the WGI governance index, is consistently as-
sociated with greater levels of aid ownership, but is not always significant. Because the WGI index
is highly correlated with (logged) GDP per capita in the sample (r = 0.60), it is often insignificant
when both are included in the same model. In general, per capita GDP is highly correlated with
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measures of administrative capacity and is plausibly both a cause and an effect of strong institu-
tions. Given the empirical and conceptual relationships between poverty and state capacity, it is
difficult to distinguish between the effects of each on donor behavior.15
Conditional on the exclusion of GDP per capita in Model 6, we observe that both differences
in governance quality between countries as well as changes in governance quality within the same
country over time are associated with greater aid ownership. A one-unit difference (equivalent to 2
standard deviations) between countries in governance quality is associated with a 14% increase in
aid concentration. This finding indicates that donors tend to allocate more lump sum aid transfers
when they perceive lower risk of aid capture or waste by extremely low-capacity governments.
This is consistent with prior studies that link better governance to donors’ willingness to allocate
aid directly to recipient country governments as opposed to NGOs (e.g. Dietrich 2013) and echoes
donors’ own commitments.
In theory, the fact that donors on average allocate higher ownership aid to countries with more
capable governments could indicate that donors are willing to allocate high ownership aid when
they can be assured that aid money will not be diverted from development objectives. However,
surprisingly, we find little evidence that recipient countries’ commitment to development predicts
aid concentration. In fact, liberal democratic governance correlates with less aid ownership: A
one-unit difference on the Freedom House index between countries is associated with 4% less aid
ownership (Model 4).16
Why would donors give less ownership to more democratic countries, which are presumably
more committed to national development? One would expect democratic India to be better able
to commit to spend lump sum aid transfers faithfully on development initiatives than autocratic
Tunisia, for example, yet Tunisia receives significantly greater aid ownership than India during
the period. Additionally, this finding is surprising because DAC donors have explicitly associ-
ated democratic governance with opportunities for broad-based, long run development.17 For the
15Studies that argue that recipient country governance influences donors’ aid allocation behavior frequently omit
GDP per capita (e.g. Dietrich 2013).
16For robustness, we show the results using Polity score in the Appendix.
17See, for instance, item 3 in the OECD’s 2008 Accra Agenda for Action.
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government of the world’s largest bilateral aid donor, the United States, aid-funded democracy
promotion has consistently been identified as leading justification for public spending on foreign
aid.18
One explanation for this finding might be that democracies provide donors with larger numbers
of potential aid recipients. Democratic regimes are characterized by stronger civil societies and
more decentralized governments than their non-democratic peers. This increases opportunities for
donors to channel aid to NGOs or subnational units of government within more democratic aid-
receiving countries. To enlist the expertise of these actors, donors may divide aid across a larger
number of projects in more democratic states. Secondly, donors may be especially likely to use aid
to pursue foreign policy and security objectives in non-democratic countries. Accordingly, they
may allocate high ownership aid in pursuit of these objectives.
While this puzzling finding merits further research, it is clear that if the allocation of aid own-
ership was determined by the ability of aid-receiving governments’ to commit to spend aid on
broad-based national development, donors would allocate more, not less, aid ownership to more
democratic countries. Other measures concerning countries commitment to liberal development
policy also fail to predict higher levels of aid ownership. Although countries that sign PRSPs at
some point during the time period tend to receive more concentrated aid than those without them
(the “between” effect of PRSP in Models 4 and 5), donors do not increase aid concentration in
response to the signing of a PRSP within a given country (the “within” effect of PRSP). A coun-
try’s general willingness to sign the PRSP is essentially a sign of the country’s broader cooperative
orientation towards the donor. There is little evidence that the signing of PRSPs, however, actually
constitute the first step towards greater aid ownership, as donors’ have often implied (e.g., OECD
2005). Similarly, recipient country expenditure on education is not associated with greater aid
ownership and increases in educational spending are in fact associated with a slight decrease in
ownership over aid (Models 1-6).19
18See, for instance, U.S. National Security Strategy Doctrines released between 1994 and 2010 at:
http://nssarchive.us/.
19This is consistent with results in, Clist, Isopi, and Morissey’s (2012) study of multilateral budget aid.
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Why do donors sometimes withhold aid ownership from countries that exhibit higher levels
of commitment to development? Democratic countries with high commitment to development
spending do not always favor the development policies that donors’ do within a given country.
Bolivia, for example, is a democratic state with relatively high public spending on education (with
educational spending levels around 75 percent above the average aid-receiving country in 2011).
Although this would presumably indicate the government’s willingness to spend on development
objectives, notoriously poor relations between USAID and the Bolivian government grew so con-
tentious that the Bolivian government expelled USAID from the country in 2013. Specifically,
USAID supported anti-narcotics efforts and programs to help farmers replace coca plants with
other crops in Bolivia; goals that were consistent with US anti-narcotics campaigns across Latin
America, but at odds with the policy preferences of Bolivian President Morales, leader of the
country’s coca growers’ union. In this case, both donor and recipient governments may care about
development, but because recipient country governments’ preferences conflict with important U.S.
national security objectives, USAID denied the Bolivian government opportunities to influence aid
expenditure by allocating fragmented project aid.
In sum, we find that DAC donors have generally allocated low ownership aid. This suggests
that donors have generally failed to adhere to their own principles about what makes aid effective
for development. Moreover, if donors were using project aid as a means of bypassing corrupt
governments that might divert aid towards non-developmental objectives, then variations in aid
ownership would be driven primarily by recipient countries’ likelihood of spending aid money
on development objectives. Although we do find evidence that donors vary ownership based on
government capacity, we find little evidence that they condition aid ownership primarily based on
expectations about whether aid dollars will be used for development. Instead, evidence indicates
that donors condition aid ownership on foreign policy alignment and security interests, to which
we now turn.
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3.5.4 Interests and aid ownership
To review, we hypothesized that donors are torn by long-run interests in promoting development
within aid-receiving countries and more immediate foreign policy and security objectives that re-
quire cooperation from recipient country governments, but have little to do with development. We
hypothesized that recipient country capability and demonstrated commitment to liberal develop-
ment policy would therefore influence donors’ behavior, but that this same behavior would be at
least equally affected by donors’ foreign policy and security interests. This argument is consis-
tent with an older tradition in the aid allocation literature, but contradicts more recent studies that
have excluded consideration of the role of UNGA voting alliance or military cooperation in their
empirical analyses.
In accordance with our expectation, we find that UNGA voting alignment emerges as a con-
sistent, statistically significant and substantively large predictor of aid concentration. Coefficients
on this variable are positive and significant across all models: Greater UNGA voting alignment
predicts greater aid ownership both between and within countries. This finding is unchanged even
when we hold historical features of relationships between donors and recipients constant by using
dyad fixed effects (Model 2).20 A one standard-deviation difference between countries in the share
of similar votes in the UNGA (0.20) predicts a 15% increase in aid concentration (Model 4), and
a standard-deviation increase in the share of shared votes within a donor-recipient dyad predicts a
9% increase in aid concentration (Model 4). Comparing aid ownership allocated by a DAC donor
country to a state that is either completely aligned or unaligned with the donor’s UNGA voting pat-
terns, we find that the aligned country receives 105% greater aid concentration than the unaligned
one. These findings are robust to the substitution of a voting alignment index rather than a simple
share of joint votes.21
The strong association between lagged UNGA voting alignment and aid ownership in the fixed
effects models enables us to refine our understanding of the role that UNGA voting plays in aid
20Year fixed effects are included in all models to account for annual changes in the UNGA agenda.
21Reported in the Appendix.
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allocation. Several studies have found that donors “purchase” greater alignment from developing
countries by increasing the amounts of aid allocated to different countries (Dreher et al. 2008;
Dreher and Strum 2012; Kuziemko and Werker 2006). Additionally, we find that donors respond
to voting alignment by rewarding countries with greater ownership over foreign aid budgets both
within- and across-recipients.
In a similar vein, donors also allocate more ownership to recipient country governments to
whom they simultaneously transfer arms. Official arms transfers predict an 11% increase in aid
concentration (Model 5). This striking finding remains strong even when we control for all histor-
ical and time-invariant features of the relationships between donors and recipients through dyadic
fixed effects (Model 2).
What does this look like in practice? Consider the case of Italian aid to Yemen between 2005
and 2010. During this period, Italy allocated bilateral aid with an average aid concentration value
of 28.9 across all of its aid recipients. Similarly, the average aid concentration value for Italian
aid to Yemen in years without arms transfers was 26.2.22 In 2007 and 2008, however, the Italian
government undertook a foreign policy initiative intended to stem illegal immigration to Italy,
which required cooperation from the Yemeni government. During these two years, Italy issued 70
arms transfers to the Yemeni Ministry of the Interior and Coast Guard and targeted the government
with large, lump sum transfers to promote “the control and the management of maritime traffic
across the Bab al Mandab straits” (OECD project description). As expected, Italy nearly tripled
its average aid concentration to Yemen during these years (aid concentration=74.6). Armed with
greater discretion over development aid budgeting, Yemen also armed its coast guard and worked
to achieve strategic objectives of importance to both country governments.
Overall, these findings confirm that donors’ foreign policy and security interests are the primary
drivers of variation in aid ownership both across and within recipient countries. OECD donor coun-
try governments also take recipient country government capacity into account, but, despite their
commitments surrounding the initiation of PRSPs, High Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness, and
22This includes 2005, 2006, 2009, and 2010.
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in the Paris Declaration, DAC donors do not vary aid ownership on the basis of recipient country
governments’ commitment to liberal development policy. Moreover, although the processes by
which DAC donors’ allocate aid vary across countries (e.g., Lancaster 2006) and across subna-
tional agencies (e.g., Arel-Bundock, Atkinson, and Potter, 2015), our results hold across all DAC
donors between 2000 and 2010.23 Our main findings are not driven by any single OECD donor.
3.5.5 Shifts over time?
Although we find no evidence that the allocation of aid ownership was influenced by recipient
countries’ commitments to development during the period 2000-2010, it remains possible that
donors have become increasingly sensitive to factors such as democratic governance within aid-
receiving countries over time. To assess whether donors have become relatively more concerned
with development over time, we examine aid concentration behavior using three-year averaged
models.
These models offer several advantages over the annual models shown above. First, they entail
no risk of serial correlation. They also ensure that results are not driven by year-to-year volatility in
donor behavior. Additionally, considering aid concentration averaged across several years accounts
for the possibility that donors may attempt to vary ownership by dividing aid commitments over
time, in addition to fragmenting aid transfers in a given year.
Figures 3a-g plot the coefficients and 90% confidence intervals from 11 separate models. Each
model is the three-year averaged model of the year plotted on the x-axis and the two years prior
(e.g. the coefficient plotted for 2005 is the three-year averaged model of the years 2005, 2004,
and 2003). Each model allows for random effects and clustered standard errors by aid-receiving
country. All models include all independent variables and controls except for logged GDP per
capita.
23In the Appendix, we graph each coefficient while dropping one donor at a time. Although there is some variability
when different donors are dropped from the analysis, none of the results are driven by single donor outliers.
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Results illustrated in Figures 3a-g reinforce (rather than complicate) findings produced by the
annual models. There is no evidence that donors increasingly condition aid composition on coun-
tries’ adoption of PRSPs, degree of democracy, or education spending. State capacity plays a
consistent but limited role in the allocation of aid ownership. Its coefficient is positive but not
significant in most years. By contrast, UNGA voting alignment is not only positive and significant
across all years, but the size of its effect appears to increase over time. The effect of arms transfers
is consistently positive, if not always significant. This suggests that donors’ international commit-
ments to improve aid effectiveness are not reflected in their actual decisions over aid composition.
Instead, donors’ foreign policy and security interests and, to a lesser extent, recipient state capac-
ity drive donors willingness to allocate aid ownership during the decade in which donors made
non-binding commitments to implement the new aid paradigm.
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Figure 3.3: Explaining Aid Ownership Over Time, 3-Year Average Models
Notes: Each figure plots the coefficients and 90% confidence intervals from 11 separate models. Each model is
the 3-year averaged model including the year plotted on the x-axis and the 2 years prior. Each model allows for
random effects and clustered standard errors by aid-receiving country. All models include all independent variables
and controls except for GDP per capita. Models reported in the arms transfers figure include only those donors that
record at least 1 arm transfer between 2000 and 2010.
3.5.6 Robustness: Variation within sectors
Donors’ interest alignment with recipient country governments is a strong predictor of donors’
tendency to allocate aid ownership over the entire bilateral aid flow to the recipient. However,
our conclusions may be unjustified if some donors specialize in certain sectors within which aid
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concentration scores commonly tend to be higher (e.g., healthcare) in certain countries.24 As
a robustness check, we therefore assess whether our findings hold for aid concentration within
sectors. We examine two main sectors identified by Frot and Santiso (2010): social sector aid
(including health, education, population, water supply, government, conflict prevention, gender,
environment, and support to NGOs), and productive sector aid (including agriculture, forestry,
fishing, industry, mining, construction, trade, and tourism).25
Table 3 reports results of these analyses, which are remarkably consistent even when we ac-
count for aid sector. Democratic institutions and higher educational spending do not increase the
likelihood of receiving concentrated aid in either social or productive sectors. Consistent with ear-
lier findings, countries that sign PRSPs between 2000-2010 receive more ownership on average,
but signing a PRSP does not increase ownership. Moreover, higher average UNGA voting align-
ment over the period is associated with greater aid ownership within social sectors, and increases in
UNGA voting alignment are associated with greater aid ownership within both social and produc-
tive sectors. Arms transfers also predict greater aid ownership within social and productive sectors.
These results strongly support the conclusion that donors’ foreign policy and security interests are
the primary drivers of aid ownership.
24Frot and Santiso (2010) argue that a major driver of project proliferation over time has been donors’ increasing
allocation of aid to social sectors, which have an elective affinity for smaller project sizes than other sectors. It is
worth noting that we include donor fixed effects in all models, controlling for donors’ potential differential tendency
to specialize in fragmented sectors.
25We include only those aid projects above $10,000 and donor-recipient pairs for which the total bilateral aid transfer
within the sector exceeded $100,000.
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Table 3.3: Explaining Aid Ownership Within Sectors, Development vs. Influence, Within-Between
Random Effects Models, 2000-2010
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Social Sectors Productive Sectors
w/out GDP w/ Arms w/out GDP w/ Arms
Between
Effects
WGI 0.03 (0.05) -0.02 (0.07) -0.10 (0.04)** -0.12 (0.05)**
PRSP 0.16 (0.09)+ 0.19 (0.10)+ 0.21** (0.06) 0.16 (0.07)*
Freedom House -0.06 (0.02)** -0.05 (0.02)** -0.02 (0.01)+ -0.03 (0.01)+
Educ. Spending (% GDP) -0.02 (0.04) -0.01 (0.02) -0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
UNGA 0.71 (0.28)* 0.67 (0.29)* 0.17 (0.22) 0.23 (0.22)
Arms Transfer 0.12 (0.08) 0.18 (0.09)* 0.15 (0.08)* 0.19 (0.07)*
Within
Effects
L.WGI-mean 0.11 (0.07)+ 0.13 (0.07)* -0.03 (0.08) -0.05 (0.08)
L.PRSP-mean -0.01 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.04) 0.01 (0.04)
L.Freedom House-mean 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
Educ. Spending (% GDP)-mean -0.01 (0.00)** -0.01 (0.00)* -0.02 (0.00)** -0.01 (0.01)
L.UNGA-mean 0.27 (0.14)+ 0.44 (0.17)** 0.73 (0.17)** 0.92 (0.19)**
Arms Transfer-mean 0.05 (0.05) 0.05 (0.05) -0.09 (0.04)* -0.09 (0.04)*
Donor Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Recipient Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y
Observations 9,793 8,003 6,320 5,223
Notes: ** p-value < 0.01, * p-value <0.05, + p-value < 0.10. Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered by
aid-receiving country. For all models, logged aid concentration score within sectors is the dependent variable. Donor-
recipient dyads with no positive aid flows or aid flows within sector of less than $100,000 are excluded. All models
include donor and year fixed effects and random effects by aid-receiving country. Model 8 and 10 include only those
donors that record at least 1 arms transfer between 2000 and 2010. Within and between effects are included, but not
reported, for all control variables.
3.5.7 Robustness: General Budget Support
Although aid concentration offers a more continuous measure of aid ownership, we assess the
robustness of our findings by examining donors’ tendency to allocate General Budget Support
(GBS), which we report in our Appendix. Given the censoring in the data, we use a double-
hurdle model. The first stage is a logit model with a dependent variable equal to one if a donor
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allocates GBS to a given recipient and zero if the donor allocates aid other than GBS. The second
stage estimates the amount of GBS as a (logged) share of the donor’s bilateral aid to the recipient,
conditional on receiving GBS.
Results reveal a similar picture about the allocation of aid ownership. While donors are more
likely to allocate GBS to countries that have signed PRSPs, they are no more likely to allocate a
greater share of bilateral aid as GBS. More democratic recipients and recipients with higher levels
of education spending are not more likely to receive GBS or higher shares of GBS, conditional
upon its allocation. Surprisingly, countries with greater capacity are generally less likely to receive
GBS, though improvements in capacity are associated with greater likelihood of receiving GBS.
Collectively, these results suggest a limited role for commitment to development as a criterion
for allocating GBS. Instead, conditional on receiving GBS, UNGA voting alignment and arms
transfers from donors predict significantly greater shares of GBS: One standard deviation differ-
ence in UNGA voting alignment (0.20) is associated with 51% more budget aid, and countries
receiving arms transfers from particular donors receive 272% more GBS.
3.6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have argued that donors typically allocate aid ownership in pursuit of diverse
strategic objectives, including but not limited to development. We find strong support for this ar-
gument. Donors’ foreign policy and security interests are consistently stronger predictors of the
allocation of aid ownership than recipients’ commitment to liberal development policy. Recipient
country capacity also influences the allocation of aid ownership, but the relationship between gov-
ernance and aid ownership is not always robust. Despite donors’ public commitments, we find no
evidence that the influence of donors’ strategic incentives has decreased over time. These results
are robust to substitution of alternative dependent variables and a number of modeling specifica-
tions.
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Additionally, this paper has illuminated the various policy levers that donors use to vary aid
ownership. To date, studies have typically focused either on the allocation of budget aid or the use
of recipient country systems. We advance the literature by identifying aid concentration as a more
reliable measure of aid ownership.
Finally, results reported in this paper are relevant for debate over aid reform. In seeking to
explain project proliferation, policymakers have emphasized technocratic obstacles to the alloca-
tion of greater aid ownership, such as redundancy of efforts across donors operating within an
aid-receiving country. Accordingly, reformers have invested heavily in promoting intra-donor co-
ordination and an improved “division of labor” among donors. Yet, our results call this emphasis
into question: Although we find that higher numbers of donors in a country predict less concen-
trated aid, the substantive influence of multiple donors is small. It would take the removal of 4
OECD donors to equal the substantive effect of a change in governance quality, and far more to ri-
val the change induced by UNGA voting alignment. Emphasis on donor coordination may obscure
more substantively significant, political determinants of aid ownership.
Ultimately, our findings support Barder’s (2009) critique of the “planning” approach to reform.
Whereas many reformers believe that changes in bureaucratic rule-making or intra-agency coop-
eration will reduce aid fragmentation, we argue that a larger shift in the balance of power over
aid expenditure is required before bilateral donors are likely to maximize the potential impact –
and minimize the potential harm – of development aid. Understanding the strategic dimension of
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3.8.1 Appendix Tables and Figures









United Kingdom $46.2 38.1
















New Zealand $1.1 27.0
Notes: Bilateral development aid totals and aid concentration values exclude debt forgiveness and donor expenses
for refugees living in donor countries. We exclude Czech Republic, Iceland, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and
South Korea as these countries all became DAC members in 2010 or later.
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Notes: Arms transfers as recorded in SIPRI database. Summary statistics include only those arms transfers in the
sample.
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Figure 3.4: Distribution of Aid Concentration, 2000-2010
Notes: Kernel density plot of (logged) aid concentration index.
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Table 3.6: Summary of Variables, Including Variance Between Donor-Recipient Dyads
Summary statistics Variance between dyads





3.08 -0.53 4.61 0.70 0.51
WGI -0.47 -1.67 1.51 0.32 0.95
PRSP 0.34 0 1 0.23 0.56
Freedom House 4.84 1 7 2.69 0.83
Edu. Spending (%
GDP)
4.34 0.58 31.3 6.33 0.75
UNGA Voting
Alignment
0.73 0 1 0.04 0.90
Arms Transfer 0.06 0 1 0.06 0.50
Number of Donors 17.32 1 23 16.4 0.79
Observations 10,240
Notes: Table 6 reports summary statistics for all variables included in the sample. The variance statistic reports total
variance for each variable, and the Variance Partition Coefficient (VPC) reports the proportion of the total variance
that occurs between dyads.
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Table 3.7: Differing Project Threshold Cutoffs, 2000-2010
Model 1 Model 2
No project threshold $50,000 project threshold
Between
Effects
WGI 0.13 (0.05)* 0.14 (0.05)**
PRSP 0.13 (0.09) 0.10 (0.08)
Freedom House -0.05 (0.02)** -0.04 (0.02)*
Educ. Spending (% GDP) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
UNGA 0.75 (0.29)** 0.73 (0.31)*
Arms Transfer 0.15 (0.09) 0.13 (0.097)*
Within
Effects
L.WGI-mean 0.12 (0.07)+ 0.12 (0.07)+
L.PRSP-mean -0.02 (0.03) -0.03 (0.03)
L.Freedom House-mean 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
Educ. Spending (% GDP)-mean -0.01 (0.01)* -0.01 (0.01)+
L.UNGA-mean 0.46 (0.13)** 0.43 (0.13)**
Arms Transfer-mean 0.11 (0.05)* 0.11 (0.05)*
Donor Fixed Effects Y Y
Recipient Fixed Effects Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y
Observations 10,240 10,239
Notes: ** p-value < 0.01, * p-value <0.05, + p-value < 0.10. Standard errors in parentheses. For all models,
logged aid concentration score is the dependent variable. Model 1 calculates aid concentrated score without using
any project size cutoffs. Model 2 calculates aid concentration score including only those projects of $50,000 or above.
Donor-recipient dyads that include no positive aid flows or aid flows of less than $1M are excluded in all models. All
models include donor and year fixed effects and random effects by aid-receiving country. Within and between effects
are included, but not reported, for all control variables as well, including: trade intensity (log), UNSC membership,
former colony, civil conflict, total DAC aid (log), aid-receiving country’s rank in donor’s aid portfolio, and population
(log). Standard errors for all models are clustered by aid-receiving country.
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Figure 3.5: Differing Measures for UNGA Voting Alignment and Democracy, 2000-2010




WGI 0.01 (0.07) 0.08 (0.07)
PRSP 0.19 (0.10)* 0.17 (0.09)
Freedom House -0.03 (0.02)+
Polity -0.01 (0.00)**
Educ. Spending (% GDP) -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01)
UNGA Voting Index 0.31 (0.15)*
UNGA Voting Alignment 0.79 (0.28)**
Arms Transfer 0.15 (0.09) 0.16 (0.09)+
Within
Effects
L.WGI-mean 0.11 (0.07)** 0.12 (0.08)
L.PRSP-mean -0.03 (0.03) -0.03 (0.03)
L.Freedom House-mean 0.01 (0.01)
L.Polity-mean -0.00 (0.01)
Educ. Spending (% GDP)-mean -0.01 (0.01)* -0.01 (0.01)*
L.UNGA Voting Index-mean 0.24 (0.07)**
L.UNGA Voting Alignment 0.50 (0.14)**
Arms Transfer-mean 0.12 (0.05)* 0.12 (0.05)**
Donor Fixed Effects Y Y
Recipient Fixed Effects Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y
Observations 9,989 9,989
Notes: ** p-value < 0.01, * p-value <0.05, + p-value < 0.10. Standard errors in parentheses. For all models, logged
aid concentration score is the dependent variable. Donor-recipient dyads that include no positive aid flows or aid
flows of less than $1M are excluded in all models. All models include donor and year fixed effects and random effects
by aid-receiving country. Within and between effects are included, but not reported, for all control variables as well,
including: trade intensity (log), UNSC membership, former colony, civil conflict, total DAC aid (log), aid-receiving
country’s rank in donor’s aid portfolio, and population (log). Standard errors for all models are clustered by aid-
receiving country.
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Table 3.8: Including Total Aid as Control, Fixed Effects and Random Effects Models, 2000-2010
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
FE FE RE
L.WGI 0.086 (0.054) 0.076 (0.063) 0.070 (0.042)+
L.PRSP -0.000 (0.030) -0.031 (0.032) 0.013 (0.027)
L.Freedom House -0.006 (0.012) 0.002 (0.012) -0.011 (0.010)
L.Educ. Spending (% GDP) -0.018 (0.005)** -0.019 (0.005)** -0.011 (0.003)**
L.UNGA 0.512 (0.160)** 0.443 (0.132)** 0.440 (0.140)**
Arms Transfer 0.091 (0.052)+ 0.111 (0.046)* 0.100 (0.052)*
UNSC 0.020 (0.037) 0.021 (0.039) 0.017 (0.037)
Former Colony -0.403 (0.072)** -0.410 (0.070)**
Civil Conflict 0.007 (0.039) -0.015 (0.039) 0.007 (0.034)
Total DAC Aid (log) 0.089 (0.020)** 0.030 (0.020) 0.063 (0.017)**
Recipient rank in donor portfolio -0.004 (0.001)** 0.001 (0.001) -0.004 (0.001)**
L.Population (log) 0.241 (0.315) 0.133 (0.360) -0.042 (0.023)**
L.GDP per capita (log) 0.194 (0.113)+ 0.217 (0.121)+ 0.111 (0.031)**
L.Number of donors 0.001 (0.005) -0.004 (0.006) -0.012 (0.005)**
L.Trade Intensity -0.058 (0.013)** 0.011 (0.015) -0.056 (0.012)**
Bilateral aid (log) -0.010 (0.019) 0.152 (0.024) -0.011 (0.019)
Donor Fixed Effects Y N Y
Recipient Fixed Effects Y N N
Dyad Fixed Effects N Y N
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Observations 10,240 10,240 10,240
Notes: ** p-value < 0.01, * p-value <0.05, + p-value < 0.10. Standard errors in parentheses. For all models, logged
aid concentration score is the dependent variable. Donor-recipient dyads that include no positive aid flows or aid
flows of less than $1 million are excluded in all models. Model 5 includes donor, recipient, and year fixed effects.
Model 6 includes dyad and year fixed effects. Model 7 includes random effects by dyad and donor and year fixed
effects. Standard errors for all models are clustered by aid-receiving country.
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Table 3.9: Including Total Aid as Control, Within-Between Random Effects Models, 2000-2010
Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Full Sample w/ Arms w/out GDP
Between
Effects
WGI 0.002 (0.068) 0.047 (0.065) 0.002 (0.068)
PRSP 0.2342 (0.094)* 0.185 (0.093)* 0.233 (0.094)*
Freedom House -0.039 (0.017)* -0.039 (0.018)* -0.039 (0.017)*
Educ. Spending (% GDP) -0.008 (0.012) 0.001 (0.014) -0.008 (0.012)
UNGA 0.573 (0.343)+ 0.620 (0.348)+ 0.573 (0.343)+
Arms Transfer 0.125 (0.091) 0.228 (0.095)* 0.125 (0.091)
Within
Effects
L.WGI-mean 0.086 (0.065) 0.123 (0.069)+ 0.086 (0.065)
L.PRSP-mean -0.026 (0.033) -0.0214 (0.037) -0.026 (0.033)
L.Freedom House-mean 0.002 (0.012) -0.002 (0.013) 0.002 (0.012)
Educ. Spending (% GDP)-mean -0.015 (0.006)* -0.016 (0.006)* -0.015 (0.006)*
L.UNGA-mean 0.478 (0.138)** 0.637 (0.152)** 0.478 (0.138)**
Arms Transfer-mean 0.104 (0.044)* 0.106 (0.045)* 0.104 (0.044)*
Donor Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Recipient Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Observations 10,240 8,372 10,240
Notes: ** p-value < 0.01, * p-value <0.05, + p-value < 0.10. Standard errors in parentheses. For all models, logged
aid concentration score is the dependent variable. Donor-recipient dyads that include no positive aid flows or aid
flows of less than $1 million are excluded in all models. Model 8 includes donor and year fixed effects and random
effects by aid-receiving country. Model 9 includes only those donors that record at least 1 arms transfer between
2000 and 2010 (listed in Supplementary Materials). Within and between effects are included, but not reported, for
all control variables as well, including: trade intensity (log), UNSC membership, former colony, civil conflict, total
DAC aid (log), aid-receiving country’s rank in donor’s aid portfolio, population (log), GDP per capita (log), and
bilateral aid (log). Model 10 excludes GDP per capita as a control. Standard errors for all models are clustered by
aid-receiving country.
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Figure 3.6: Coefficients and Standard Errors for Between- and Within-Effects of WGI, Dropping
One Donor at a Time
Figure 3.7: Coefficients and Standard Errors for Between- and Within-Effects of PRSP, Dropping
One Donor at a Time
Figure 3.8: Coefficients and Standard Errors for Between- and Within-Effects of Freedom House
Index, Dropping One Donor at a Time
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Figure 3.9: Coefficients and Standard Errors for Between- and Within-Effects of Educational
Spending, Dropping One Donor at a Time
Figure 3.10: Coefficients and Standard Errors for Between- and Within-Effects of UNGA Voting
Alignment, Dropping One Donor at a Time
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Figure 3.11: Coefficients and Standard Errors for Between- and Within-Effects of Arms Transfers,
Dropping One Donor at a Time
Notes: Each figure plots the coefficients and standard errors from 22 separate within-between random effects models.
Dashed lines indicate statistical significance at the 90% level. Each model drops all observations from a single donor.
For all models, logged aid concentration score is the dependent variable. Donor-recipient dyads that include no
positive aid flows or aid flows of less than $1 million are excluded in all models. All models include donor and year
fixed effects and random effects by aid-receiving country. Within and between effects are included, but not reported,
for all control variables as well, including: trade intensity (log), UNSC membership, former colony, civil conflict, total
DAC aid (log), aid-receiving country’s rank in donor’s aid portfolio, and population (log). GDP per capita (log) is
excluded. Standard errors for all models are clustered by aid-receiving country.
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3.8.2 Supplementary Measurement Discussion: Government as Implementing
Agency as a Measure of Aid Ownership?
Donors’ tendency to use recipient country government systems for managing aid is an important
component of the overall agenda for aid reform, articulated most clearly in the Paris Declara-
tion. Delivering aid using donors’ (rather than recipients’) reporting, procurement, and monitoring
procedures can undermine long-run institutional development and creates further separation be-
tween project implementers and intended aid beneficiaries, reducing accountability in aid-giving
and foreclosing opportunities for local knowledge to guide development policies. However, when
donors are concerned about the short-run success of a specific project, there are key short-run ben-
efits to delivering aid through their own systems. They can better ensure that aid dollars are not
diverted from specific project objectives when they retain control. Noting this tension, the World
Bank’s Assessing Aid report argues that: “At times, donors have hindered the creation of effective
public sectors because they saw end runs around local institutions as the easiest way to achieve
project success” (World Bank, 1998: 84).
In the Paris Declaration, donors commit to delivering aid in ways that are more consistent
with long-run institutional development, including channeling aid through recipient governments’
public sectors. As we note in the paper, however, this commitment came with the recognition that
channeling aid through public sectors with poor governance and records of corruption would result
in aid diversions and that donors could reasonably maintain control of aid in these instances. In
line with this logic, Knack (2013) and Dietrich (2013) find that donors are more likely to engage
recipient systems when the quality of governance is high.
However, examining donors’ tendency to channel aid through recipient systems in isolation can
yield misleading conclusions about overall levels of ‘aid ownership.’ Many of the aid-receiving
countries most active in the struggle for aid reforms to promote greater ownership already receive
large sums of aid through their own systems (e.g. Tanzania). In these cases, donors do channel aid
through recipient systems, but fragment aid to such an extent that they still maintain control over
individual projects and end up over-burdening recipient governments. This means of delivering
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aid can be equally detrimental to long-run institutional development. Thus, as we note in the main
paper, we favor considering aid concentration—alternatively, the extent to which aid is fragmented
across projects—as an indicator that more closely align with the notion of aid ownership (one
that does not undermine recipients’ long-run institutional development) central to the aid reform
agenda since 2000.
However, given the use of this indicator in the literature, it’s worthwhile to examine whether
recipient countries’ commitment to liberal development, in addition to quality of governance, ex-
plains donors’ tendency to channel aid through public sectors. Alternatively, donors’ foreign pol-
icy and security interests could shape their tendency to use recipient systems, as we find using our
preferred measures. Before showing these results, it is worth noting some serious constraints on
donors’ reporting of implementing agency. In 2004, the OECD began to collect voluntary informa-
tion from donors regarding “aid channel.” Donors report whether aid for a particular aid project is
directed through one of six different types of implementing agents: to donor government agencies,
to recipient government agencies, to non-governmental organizations, to public-private partner-
ships, to multilateral institutions, and to other institutions (including, for example, universities and
research centers). However, reporting on aid channel is voluntary, and there is significant missing
data. 21% of bilateral aid projects by DAC donors, accounting for 28% of bilateral aid flows,
between 2005 and 2010 contain missing data on aid channel.
Even data that is not technically missing is frequently misleading. For example, the United
States during much of the period only designates whether a project was implemented by a pub-
lic sector agency or not but does not distinguish between agencies within donor and recipient
countries. So, a project implemented by USAID and a project implemented by the recipient coun-
try government could receive the same implementing agency code (“public sector”). These two
scenarios obviously represent extreme differences in the level of ownership for recipient country
governments.
To mitigate missing data problems, we examined aid project descriptions for information on
implementing agent that may not have been reported in the implementing agent field. We reviewed
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147,261 separate projects and were able to determine whether or not the project utilized recipient
country systems for 68,545 of the projects. However, this review also caused us to reclassify
over 75,000 aid projects as missing data in cases where donors reported using public agencies as
implementing agents but failed to distinguish between donor- and recipient-country agencies. This
results in missing data on aid channel for 36% of all aid projects, representing 44% of bilateral aid
flows for the 2005-2010 period.26 Thus, in addition to the fact that use of recipients’ public sector
does not guarantee aid ownership, there are empirical limitations with using the data. Nonetheless,
we find the exercise valuable so that we can more fully engage the existing literature.
Due to the missing data and the more limited time frame of the data, we employ a simple
modeling strategy. Units of observation are donor-recipient dyad over the entire period between
2005 and 2010. For the dependent variable, we calculate aid traveling through recipient systems
over the entire time period. Independent variables are averaged over the period. We favor the
averaged model over annual models in this case because the time period is relatively short (i.e.
there are not many changes in the values of the independent variables) and because of the problems
caused by the missing data. Missing data would cause certain donor-recipient dyads to fall in
and out of the analysis during different years, potentially resulting in sample selection problems.
Instead, we simply include the donor-recipient dyads for which at least 75% of the data on aid
channel is reported over the entire time period. Dyads with significant data are therefore excluded
entirely, rather than jumping in and out of the analysis due to selective reporting in certain years.
Of course, this still results in a selective sample of countries on which donors choose to report
aid channel, but at least the rule for inclusion in the sample is consistent and does not result in a
volatile sample.
Given the censoring in the data, we use a double-hurdle model. The first stage is a logit model
with a dependent variable equal to one if a donor allocates any aid through the public sector to a
given recipient during the period and zero if the donor allocates aid but bypasses recipients’ public
26We only count as missing those projects where we could not positively identify whether or not the recipient
country government was the implementing agency. If we could determine that the recipient country government was
not the implementing agency (e.g. because the donor stated that it used an NGO), we counted this as aid bypassing
the government even if we could not positively identify which non-governmental agency implemented the project.
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sectors. The second stage estimates the amount of aid channeled through recipient systems as a
(logged) share of the donor’s bilateral aid to the recipient, conditional on receiving any aid through
the public sector.
Results are broadly consistent with findings in the main paper. In particular, greater UNGA
voting alignment between donors and recipients is associated with higher shares of aid traveling
through recipient governments.
Table 3.10: Explaining Aid Through Public Sectors in Aid-Receiving Countries, Averaged Models,
2005-2010
Model 1 Model 2
Get Gov’t Share Gov’t
WGI 0.367 (0.197)+ 1.018 (0.281)**
PRSP 0.508 (0.194)** 1.146 (0.365)**
Freedom House -0.012 (0.052) 0.006 (0.075)
Educ. Spending (% GDP) 0.076 (0.047) 0.069 (0.083)
UNGA 0.238 (0.571) 4.160 (1.232)**
Arms Transfer -0.691 (0.473) 0.046 (0.558)
UNSC 0.234 (0.202) -0.667 (0.280)*
Former Colony 0.492 (0.943) -0.100 (0.376)
Civil Conflict 0.070 (0.203) -0.183 (0.281)
Total DAC Aid (log) 0.143 (0.137) 0.372 (0.120)+
Recipient rank in donor portfolio 0.033 (0.004)** 0.007 (0.004)
Population (log) -0.299 (0.098)** 0.225 (0.151)
Trade Intensity (log) 0.139 (0.036)** 0.009 (0.069)
Observations 993 314
Notes: ** p-value < 0.01, * p-value <0.05, + p-value < 0.10. Standard errors in parentheses.
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